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This study is a philosophical conceptualisation of educational equality in retation to
provision for disabled students and students with Special Educational Needs. Its
theoretical core is the outline of a principled framework for a just distribution of
educational opportunities to these students.
Situated within liberal egalitarianism, this conceptualisation relates principles of
justice as fairness (as developed by John Rawls) and the capability approach (as
developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum) to the areas of disability studies
and special and inclusive education.
Current perspectives on disability, and in particular the social model of disability,
and positions on Special Educational Needs, as well as related policies, present
theoretical and operational limits not only in relation to the achievement of inclusion,
but also in addressing the equal entitlement of children to education. These limits
derive primarily from the absence of clear principles, and relate specifically to the
understandings of disability and special educational needs informing these
perspectives.
This conceptualisation of educational equality operationalises the capability
approach with reference both to issues of definitions and of provision. The capability
approach is a normative framework where equality is evaluated within the space of
the actual freedoms - or capabilities - people have to pursue their ends and to
convert resources into functionings they value. In connecting capability to the
demands of justice, this approach contributes important insights to the theorisation
of a principled framework for resource distribution. The framework theorised entails
principles of justice as fairness informed by a capability metric, which is sensitive to
the interests of disabled students and students with learning difficulties, and
underpinned by definitions of disability and Special Educational Needs reconsidered
in terms of functionings and capabilities.
Whilst re-establishing the centrality of educational equality, this study re-
conceptualises disability and Special Educational Needs within a framework of
justice.
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Educational equality is a fundamental value of social justice. It is surprising,
therefore, that whilst the analysis of social justice is central to theory and research in
education, the conceptualisation of educational equality is rather neglected. The
meaning of equality in education is therefore unclear, and there is a lack of
consensus on its implications at policy level. However, as an important aspect of
social justice, equality has a crucial normative role to play at two interconnected
levels in education: the theoretical level, concerned with conceptualisations of
values and aims, and the level of provision, related to the enactment of these ideals
into policies and practice. Two examples can help in illustrating the relevance of
educational equality for the theory and practice of education.
First, consider the understanding of educational equality as equal entitlement to
education, which informs many state systems of schooling. While the idea that all
are equally entitled to education is an appealing general aim, the precise content of
this aim is not only difficult to determine, but also a source of controversy in itself.
On the one hand, an equal entitlement to education can be understood as implying
the role of the state in enacting it through the equal provision of schooling, for
example through a national curriculum. On the other hand, another way of
understanding the equal entitlement to learning may relate to giving everybody an
equal chance of developing and fulfilling individual interests. Each of these
proposals entails evidently a different understanding of an equal entitlement in the
provision of education. Furthermore, an equal entitlement to education is a different
concept from an entitlement to an equal education. Whilst the former concept
relates to the idea of an equal right to education, the latter refers instead to the
equal provision of educational resources. These contrasting understandings show,
and in turn reflect some of the complexities of the concept of equality in education.
Second, consider the relevance of equality at the level of provision, and hence in
terms of the design and implementation of systems of school funding, with their
different implications and results. Underpinning many systems of funding are
policies aimed at fairness and claiming to apply equity measures. Here again,
however, the understanding of fairness in terms of resource distribution, or even the
7meaning of equity, need specification. For instance, one of the most recent funding
policies in England and Wales is the 1998 Consultation Paper Fair Funding (DfEE,
1998). As its name implies, fairness appears to be at its core. Yet studies attest to
the wide range of different funding procedures in the finance of special and inclusive
education arising from its regulation, and thus reveal the pervasive unequal results it
has lead to across the country (Evans et al., 2001, Seaton, 1999). Therefore, if
policies aimed at fairness in the provision of resources do have disparate results in
terms of equality, then clarifying the meaning of educational equality to inform
policies that are more just becomes an important educational matter.
These two examples clearly point out the importance of equality in the theory and
practice of education. Further, they highlight that the meaning of educational
equality relates fundamentally to questions of distributive justice. Asserting, on the
one hand, the right to an equal education, and, on the other, the importance of
fairness in school funding, implies an understanding of educational equality in terms
of equal distribution. Finally, and importantly, these examples highlight also the
importance of clarifying the precise meaning of educational equality, both
theoretically and normatively, as a fundamental aspect of the design of policies
aimed at social justice in education.
My thesis is concerned with the debate on equality in education and explores some
aspects of the concept of educational equality in its distributive meaning, i.e. in its
conceptualisation as fair distribution of educational opportunities and resources.
More specifically, it analyses the meaning of educational equality in relation to one
of its most difficult problems 1 : the conceptualisation of equality in the distribution of
educational opportunities and resources to children with different levels of abilities,
and in particular to disabled children and children with special educational needs.
There are two main difficulties related to conceptualising educational equality for
these children. On the one hand, difficulties arise at the level of ideal theory and
reside in defining precisely what is a just distribution of resources when considering
learners' differences and differential abilities. This is a normative problem, which
considers educational equality for disabled learners in ideally just conditions. On the
other hand, difficulties arise in relating normative considerations to the complex area
of special and inclusive education, thus in connecting ideal theory to non-ideal
1 In School Choice and Social Justice, Harry Bnghouse highlights this problem as one of the most
difficult aspects of a theory of educational equality. As we shall see, Brighouse's conceptualisation of
educational equality provides the basis and the inspiration for my thesis. See Bnghouse, 2000: 131-
134. See also Bnghouse, 2001: 25.
8conditions. Here complexities are related to the theoretical frameworks underpinning
the debate in special and inclusive education and are mainly referred to the aims,
provision and funding of education for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Furthermore, the same definitions of special and inclusive
education stand in need of clarification, as they are connected to historical, political,
social and educational contexts, which are themselves sources of debate and
contrasting positions. Finally, the conceptualisation of disabilities and learning
difficulties is in itself a complex and contested issue. The second difficutty,
therefore, refers to theoretical problems in their operationalisation in educational
contexts.
Clarifying educational equality in relation to the case of special and inclusive
education requires a principled perspective. Central to my project, therefore, is the
development of a principled framework for a just distribution of educational
resources to disabled children and children with special educational needs. This
thesis works towards specifying elements of a critical theory that, primarily, morally
adjudicates what disabled learners are entitled to, in terms of educational
opportunities and resources, and the moral reasons that justify that entitlement. In
doing so, the principled framework I develop provides not only the theoretical
foundations for a fair distribution of resources, but also more policy-oriented
guidance to that aim, in that it sets out a theoretical groundwork upon which to
evaluate the fairness of current models of distribution and the design of policies that
are more just.
In what follows I shall outline the theoretical and normative framework underpinning
the design of my research, whilst contextualising some of the difficulties of the task
at hand. As we shall see, the concepts of functionings and capability are
fundamental to a new conceptualisation of disability and special educational needs
and to their evaluation within a framework of justice.
1.1 Problems of Distributive Justice: Resource Distribution,
Educational Equality and Special and Inclusive Education
Problems of resource distribution are central to the design of educational policies
and to their enactment for the achievement of educational aims. However, the
9fairness of resource distribution and the understanding of educational equality relate
to normative and principled positions, which are the primary subject of analysis of
liberal egalitarian perspectives in contemporary political philosophy. Although
differing on the exact understanding of the kind of equality that institutional
arrangements should seek to achieve, egalitarian perspectives present and
articulate the meaning(s) of fairness and the content(s) of resources within theories
of justice. Likewise, a conceptualisation of educational equality should provide an
understanding of the meaning of a just distribution and the content of resources,
and justify the concepts adopted in relation to a more general theory of social
justice. In this task, the analysis of the concept of educational equality draws on the
concepts and on the clarifying methods of enquiry of political philosophy.
In his monograph School Choice and Social Justice (2000), Harry Brighouse
presents an important and influential perspective on educational equality, which
draws on a specific liberal egalitarian theory of justice. Brighouse conceptualises
educational equality in ternis of a just distribution of resources and specifies it
through principles of social justice in education. This position constitutes the
theoretical and normative standpoint for my research questions. Although my
perspective departs substantially from Brighouse's (more on this later on), the
important questions raised and left unexplored by his theory provide the groundwork
for the framework I develop in this thesis. In what follows I shall briefly outline
Brighouse's position and at the same time progressively unfold the genesis of my
research problem.
Brighouse maintains that supporting equality in education implies two general
concerns: first, children should not have significant advantages in education due to
family circumstances, such as wealth and social position. Secondly, children should
not have significant advantages in terms of better education because of their natural
talents or abilities (2000:112). These two concerns refer to a common egalitarian
position on the compensation for inequalities in social and natural assets, which is
applied here to the context of education. This position immediately rules out the
possibility of interpreting a just resource distribution in education as the distribution
of equal educational resources. If the latter understanding were applied, it would
lead to unfairness to all the children with abilities not met by that specific resource
distribution. Providing all children with equal literacy resources, to mention a
common case, would intuitively be unfair to dyslexic children, as well as providing
the same resources to every child could prove evidently unfair for example in the
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case of children with hearing impairment or visual impairment, since, quite probably,
they would require respectively signing interpretation or Braille resources.
Consequently, Brighouse argues that educational equality, in taking into account
those two concerns, should be based on two principles. First, that no one should be
advantaged or disadvantaged because of the personal, social and economical
circumstances they were born in (2000: 112). Second, resources should be
allocated and used effectively, and therefore allowing that more resources should
be devoted to children with disabilities (2000:138-1 39). Note here that, while playing
a fundamental role in egalitarian theories in general, the question of resource
distribution is fundamental to educational equality as well. This is reflected in
Brighouse's position, when he argues,
A full and principled account of educational equality would say something about how much more
must be devoted to children with disabilities than to ordinanly-abled children. (...) The account must
also be able to guide the distribution of resources among more or less able children within the
ordinanly-abled group. If the same resources should be devoted, the account needs to explain why,
and why such differences do not merit the same responses as the differences between the
ordinanly-abled and disabled. If, on the other hand, differential resources should be devoted, this
needs to be explained (2000: 138).
According to Brighouse, therefore, educational equality entails a differential
distribution of resources to children with different abilities on grounds of fairness.
But his analysis goes further in that it sets the requirement of specifying exactly
what the differential distribution should amount to and of justifying the reasons
behind the differential amount of resources. Moreover, his analysis gives a full
account of how to understand resources in this context. In providing his principles of
educational equality, Brighouse draws on a conception of justice in terms of
fairness, and understands resources in the wider context of educational
opportunities. This implies considering educational equality as interrelated to the
two functions of education for the individual: namely, providing competitive
advantages in economies, which distribute benefits and burdens unequally, and
providing fulfilling life experiences (Brighouse, 2000:122-123). Educational equality,
ultimately, is inscribed in a theory that considers equality in terms of equality of
opportunities and fair distribution of resources as fundamental elements of justice2.
2 These concepts and assumptions will be fully addressed throughout my thesis, and in particular in
chapters 5 and 7.
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This position constitutes not only a relevant and precise understanding of
educational equality, but also the normative and theoretical position from which my
thesis originates. My thesis is developed from an in-depth analysis of the principle of
differential distribution of resources as an element of educational equality, in the
strong sense of equality of opportunity, and expands to considerations of justice for
disabled children and children with special educational needs. More specifically,
starting from Brighouse's principles of educational equality, my thesis extends
beyond his perspective in three main areas. First, while analysing the sociological
and educational debate on the definition of disability and special educational needs,
I work towards a philosophical framework within which to conceptualise impairment,
disability and special needs in the context of education, a point not explored by
Brighouse. Secondly, I reconsider the understanding of educational equality in the
'equality of what' debate3 and extend its meaning to include concepts of
functionings and capabilities (more on this later on). These, I maintain, are concepts
more effective to a full consideration of justice for disabled children and children with
special educational needs, and ultimately, lead to a possible extension of the
concept of justice informing Brighouse's theory. Finally, I provide a framework for
the operationalisation of educational equality, which is specifically aimed at
answering the question of how to conceptualise educational equality between
children with different levels of ability, and how to think of exactly what and how
much should be distributed, a question posed but not answered by Brighouse
(2002: 25).
Ultimately, my research question consists in three main arguments. Firstly, I argue
that a full and principled account of educational equality should necessarily be
based on clear understandings and on possibly coherent definitions of the elements
involved. This implies reconsidering current contrasting definitions of learning
differences and differential abilities, and evaluating what constitutes disability and
special educational needs in the context of education. Secondly, I argue that how
we define disabilities and special educational needs is fundamentally important, in
that the assumptions involved will influence the ways in which we understand the
question of special or differential provision in education. More concretely, the set of
definitions applied will influence, if not completely determine, the model of
distribution of resources implemented to meet the defined different requirements. To
illustrate this point in a very simple way, we can say that it will make a difference to
3 Sen, 1992:13-30. This aspect will be addressed in chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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the model of resource distribution if differential abilities were defined in terms of
special needs or in terms of difference, understood as individual differences, and
more so if differential abilities were classified according to medical categories, or
indeed including social factors such as poverty or social deprivation. Evidently, in
the case of definitions provided in medical terms, the differential distribution of
resources would consider only specific medical diagnoses, whereas in the last case
the distribution of resources would be extended to non-medical situations and would
imply social considerations, thus reaching a different and probably wider number of
children. Thirdly, I argue that a further and fundamental facet of educational equality
for disabled learners requires considerations of the provision of education for these
students. If we endorse equality as distributive ideal and consider education in view
of the future opportunities it yields for the individual, such as future access to
careers and fulfilling life experiences, then specifying exactly what is owed to
disabled learners in terms of educational opportunities and resources is a central
matter of justice.
In conclusion, the argument I develop in this study proceeds from the concept of
educational equality as fundamental for a just society and analyses its
understanding as distributive ideal in the case of children with different levels of
ability. In particular, I argue that, for educational equality to be conceptualised in the
case of disabled children and children with special educational needs, a principled
framework is fundamental. This normative framework consists in two interrelated
levels, a theoretical level, concerned with definitions and conceptualisations of
disability and special educational needs, and a level of provision, which specifies
the distributional aspect of equality in education. I further suggest that the
framework within which to redefine fair distribution of resources and disability and
special needs in education draws on perspectives developed in political philosophy,
thus implying the adoption of philosophical methods in education. Having set the
framework of the problem, which constitutes the central question of my study, I shall
now address the issue of defining abilities and disabilities in the context of education
1.2 Problems of Definitions: Impairment, Disability or Special
Educational Needs?
Definitions of abilities and disabilities are fundamental to a principled framework for
educational equality in the case of children with differential abilities, since how we
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identify children requiring differential resources and the concepts used to describe
their learning characteristics have wide implications on the principles of distribution.
However, prior to the analysis of the concepts currently adopted, and to illustrating
why they do not seem to respond coherently to the demands of justice in education
for disabled learners, I shall briefly address three general considerations. The first
draws on sociological views on the use of categories in education, thus
acknowledging the problem suggested by some sociologists of a 'labelling use' of
concepts, which is detrimental to the individual child, her development as
autonomous and free person and her sense of self-esteem. The second
consideration refers to the 'sediment' meaning that certain definitions imply, as
different categories adopted in education have come to assume meanings linked to
oppressive practices and discrimination. The final comment refers to the necessity
of adopting politically correct language in order, not only to acknowledge the claims
of due respect, but also to allow for new meanings to take over from those
perceived as oppressive and offensive. Let us address these issues in more detail.
Many authors4 have drawn attention to the limits of using any category in general in
education, but specifically categories of special educational needs, disability and
disadvantage. Definitions such as 'special educational needs', 'learning difficulties'
or 'learning disability', while mainly introduced to describe situations, can and
indeed are also used to 'label' and produce 'negative stereotypes' (Wilson, 2000:
817). Moreover, in education, probably more than in other contexts, the use of
categories to describe situations varies considerably over time, and reflects
specifically a particular theory or view behind it. In this sense, for instance, the
whole terminology applied to describe what is currently referred to as 'learning
difficulty' has changed to a great extent in the last century, from the use of terms like
'idiot', 'mental retardation' or 'educational sub-normality', to current definitions such
as 'multiple' or 'specific learning difficulties'. Some authors point out how the
'labelling' use of these categories implies a 'bad-mouthing process', whereby the
categories of learning disability in use in the past become the insults of the present
(Corbett, 1996 and also Tomlinson, 1982). Trying to overcome this Issue by simply
not using categories at all, however, does not seem to be an acceptable solution.
The absence of categories altogether presents difficulties that, although of a
4 The literature on the labelling use of categories in education is extremely wide and mainly developed
by sociologists of education. See, for instance, Barton, 1993, 2000; Corbett, 1996; Riddell, 1996;
Tomlinson, 1982. For a more philosophical position, see Wilson, (2000). This aspect of the debate is
discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4, where I also provide more precise references.
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different nature, do yield the unwanted consequence of not allowing for the
differential requirements for children with learning difficulties to be identified,
described and provided for. How could we provide additional educational resources
to children, without having any means of identifying who should benefit from it?
True, we could still identify the 'recipient' of our additional resources by means of
descriptions without any synthesis in terms of definitions, but this also presents
some considerable shortcomings, at least in practical terms. This problem
constitutes one of the theoretical and moral dilemmas characterising the debate in
special and inclusive education, which I shall present and discuss in my thesis.
Nevertheless, acknowledging these views in my study leads to the adoption of
definitions and distinctions, which are those proposed by disabled peoples'
movements and scholars. Since disabled people have expressed through their
political movements their request of using terms such as 'disabled people' or
'impaired people' as well as 'disabled child' as preferred expressions, then their use
is adopted here, in the hope, of course, that labelling process could be avoided.
This, furthermore, implies also listening to the voices and the claims of the persons
involved in the definitional 'riddle', thus including their positions and understanding
as well. However, the theoretical necessity of referring to current policy and practice
in special and inclusive education, as well as to government's documents, requires
also the introduction of the concept of 'special educational needs', widely adopted in
the relevant literature. Consequently, throughout my research I shall refer to
'disabled children' and 'children with special educational needs' as well as to
'disabled learners', with full awareness of the limits and the contingent and
problematic meanings they subsume.
However, there is a second facet to the conceptualisation of impairment, disability
and special educational needs. Let us now return, therefore, to the theoretical
dimension of defining these terms in education. Current models of definitions mainly
reflect two situations. The first relates to definitions and statement processes in
government policies and documents, as well as in the school practice, which
broadly refer to medical and psychological classifications of disability and special
educational needs. The second situation relates to the definitions proposed by
disabled people's movements and drawing on their model of disability, which mainly
promotes the use of concepts of impairment and disability and strongly opposes any
concept of special needs. Each of these models subsumes and refers, in turn, to a
theory and understanding of the situation described and defined.
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Educational policies, for instance, are broadly based on medical categories and
classifications of disabilities in terms of individual deficit, like 'autistic spectrum
disorder' or 'mental handicap' or 'speech disability', with the addition of
consideration for elements of social disadvantage or individual 'gift' in some
countries (OECD, 1995, 2000). As I shall outline further on in this chapter and in
more detail in chapter 2, however, this system of classification is one of the
elements that gives rise to profound inequalities in the educational provision for
disabled children, not only among countries but also within the same country. On
the other hand, the conceptualisations proposed by the social model of disability,
the model linked with the political and theoretical work of disabled scholars, in
challenging the pathologising approach of medical definitions, and in suggesting the
use of categories of normality as ideological and oppressive, support a view that
locates the difficulty on society and institutions. Yet this model, in its rejection of any
use of categories as source of oppression and in delineating disability as pertaining
to society, presents unspecified and to a certain extent flawed conceptions, which, I
argue in chapter 3, are not conducive to the very aim of inclusion and equal
entitlement advocated by disabled people's movements. Consequently, I contend
that none of the models of disability or indeed special educational needs available is
apt to the promotion of equality, either socially or educationally, and that a re-
consideration of the whole understanding of disability and of learning difficulties
constitutes a necessary part of a theory of educational equality.
A final point refers to the meaning of special and inclusive education. Here again,
these expressions reveal both the historical and the present situation of education
for children with special needs. On the one hand, the term 'special education' was
adopted when special segregated institutions for disabled children were introduced
at the beginning of last century (Tomlinson, 1982, Clough, 1998, Armstrong 1999).
As special schools are still providing for children in some educational systems, the
use of this term mainly acknowledges this situation, as well as the substantive and
important debate on the specific, somehow 'special' requirements of educating
disabled children and children with special educational needs. The use of 'inclusive
education', on the other hand, is more complex and, although its meaning will be
addressed later in this study in chapters 2 and 4, it is worth pointing out here that it
refers primarily to a wide concept supporting the full inclusion in mainstream
education of disabled children and children with special educational needs
(UNESCO, 1994, OECD, 1999, 2000, Lindsay, 2003, Armstrong F. & Armstrong &
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Barton 2000). Here again, as some educational systems are indeed progressing
towards full inclusion and other are introducing mainstream provision for disabled
learners, the use of inclusive education implies reference to this situation.
1.3 The Theoretical Framework: Liberal Egalitarianism and Differential
Abilities
Inscribed within the principles of liberal egalitarianism, my thesis engages with the
debate on equality and, in particular, with the 'equality of what?' question. It argues
that a specific perspective within this debate, the capability approach, developed by
Amartya Sen and further articulated by Martha Nussbaum, provides the theoretical
context not only for re-examining and re-conceptualising impairment, disability and
special needs, but also for reconsidering the broader demands of equality and,
therefore, educational equality for disabled learners. My thesis presents therefore
an operationalisation of the capability approach in education, and shows how this
approach provides the theoretical and normative groundwork for the principled
framework for a just distribution of educational opportunities, fundamental to
educational equality for disabled learners. This section introduces aspects of the
liberal egalitarian debate on equality and social justice, whilst outlining the problems
posed by differential abilities and disabilities to liberal theories and concepts. It
further highlights why the capability approach provides a valuable and innovative
answers to these questions. First, on the importance of the egalitarian concern for
equality.
There are many reasons for supporting egalitarianism. According to Dworkin,
equality is a valuable political ideal and its virtues reside on two main points: it is
intrinsically good and instrumentally necessary as a precondition of political
legitimacy. 'Equality matters' - says Dworkin - 'because no government is
legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over
whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance. Equal concern is the
sovereign virtue of political community.' (Dworkin, 2000:1.)
Equal concern for each and every individual is the liberal principle invoked by
egalitarians as the one that should inform the design of social and institutional
arrangements. Liberalism, moreover, is 'primarily concerned with the freedom and
autonomy of individuals' (Swift, 2001: 137) and its core principle is the idea that
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individuals should be free to choose for themselves what conception of the good life
to endorse and what kind of life to live. The freedom and autonomy of each
individual, however, is not understood in terms of egoistic pursuit of personal
interest above and beyond the interest of all the others. As specified by Dworkin,
equal concern for each individual means exactly that each individual matters
equally. Therefore, self-interest, according to liberals, can only be pursued within
the moral boundaries that others have to be treated justly and that the state can
enforce regulations and limits to enact this commitment to equal concern (Swift,
2001: 138). Liberal egalitarian theories, however, are often criticised for being based
on an abstract notion of the individual and, more specifically, of rational individuality.
At least at a superficial level, therefore, they seem to score badly when confronted
with the problems posed by those individuals who do not fall into their abstract
model.
In Dworkin's liberal egalitarian theory of justice, for instance, the ideal of equality as
equal concern hinges on two principles: the principle of equal importance and the
principle of special responsibility. The first principle states that it matters - and it
matters objectively - whether a human life succeeds or fails. Whereas the second
principle establishes that everyone has a concern for each and every life to be
successful, but each individual has a special responsibility for that success, and that
is the person whose life it is. The two principles of equal importance and special
responsibility, and, specifically, the latter, condemn deep paternalism while setting
themselves against the claim that communities know better than the individual on
the matter of what is the valuable life. The problem with the concept of equality as
equal concern arises in connection with the principle of special responsibility: how
can a severely mentally disabled person be held accountable to the special
responsibility claimed by the second principle? Moreover, how can we avoid falling
back into deep paternalism, when trying to provide for severely disabled people?
Furthermore, is the concept of rationality we are applying in our liberal model apt to
consider severely or mentally disabled people? Certainly no liberal theory would
allow us to neglect or overlook these problems, as we would infringe the very
principle of equal concern. Yet any possible answer to these problems seems to
make us question our liberal framework at its own foundations.
John Rawls's theory of justice is one of the leading examples of liberal egalitarian
theories of justice (Brighouse, 2001: 537). Rawls provides us with an index of
comparable social primary goods to measure our well-being: liberties, opportunities,
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powers and prerogatives of office, and income and wealth. According to Rawls,
people's relative positions have to be evaluated in the space of these social primary
goods. His theory of justice consists in two principles: the Liberty Principle, which
guarantees a set of basic liberties equally to all, and the Difference Principle, which
stipulates that opportunities must be equally distributed and that inequalities of
income and wealth are to benefit the least advantaged members in society (Rawls,
2001: 42-43). Within these two principles, Rawls defines fair equality of opportunity
by stating,
Suppose that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent
and ability and the same willingness to use them should have the same prospects of success
regardless of their social class of origin (Rawls, 2001: 44).
Rawls's theory has often been critiqued for not allowing in considerations for
disabled people. In particular, by comparing people's well-being on the basis of
primary goods, therefore ultimately on the shares of resources they hold, the
Rawlsian model fundamentally neglects the crucial heterogeneity of human beings
(Nussbaum, 2000: 68) and therefore excludes all those not meeting his model of
rational and fully cooperating members of society. Yet Rawls openly formulated his
theory aiming at covering the 'fundamental case', thus leaving any possible
extension to further developments. He maintains,
Our aim is to ascertain the conception of justice most appropriate for a democratic society in which
citizens conceive of themselves in a certain way. So let us add that all citizens are fully cooperating
members of society over the course of a complete life. This means that everyone has sufficient
intellectual powers to play a normal part in society, and no one suffers from unusual needs that are
especially difficult to fulfil, for example unusual and costly medical requirements (Rawls, 1980: 545-
546).
Rawls did not proceed to provide an extension of his theory and to reflect on the
position of disabled people in his conception of justice. His position, therefore, does
not seem to constitute the best framework within which to reconsider justice for
disabled people and people with special educational needs.
I maintain that the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen, although not
specifically formulated within a concern for justice for disabled people, can respond
to my demands of re-examining and re-defining disability and impairment, whilst at
the same time inscribing this theoretical dimension in a normative framework for
equality and, ultimately, justice. Let us see some elements of this approach.
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Sen originally thought of his capabilities approach as a feasible answer to the
fundamental question of 'equality of what?' (Son, 1992.) Although Sen's position
departs in many relevant ways from Rawls's, the capability approach, in critically
referring to Raiws's primary goods while re-setting the terms of the problems within
a concept of capabilities, shows its indebtedness to Ralws's theory of justice 5. Sen
argues that, given the fundamental centrality of human diversity, equality and social
arrangements should be evaluated in the space of capabilities, that is, in the space
of the real freedoms people have to achieve valued functionings. It maintains that
rather than the means to freedom, what is fundamental in assessing equality is the
extent of people's freedom to choose among valuable functionings. Functionings
are the beings and doings valued by individuals and constitutive of their own well-
being. Walking, reading, being well nourished, being educated, having self respect
or acting in one's political capacity are all examples of functionings. Capabilities are
the real opportunities and freedoms people have to achieve these valued
functionings. Capabilities are therefore potential functionings or, as Sen's says, they
are
various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is,
thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or
another ... to choose from possible lMngs (1992: 40).
Sen provides a useful example to understand the distinction between functionings
and capability by illustrating the situation of a starving person compared to that of
someone fasting (Sen, 1992: 111). Clearly the person starving is deprived of the
capability to choose whether to eat or fast, whereas the person who fasts retains
her freedom to choose, hence she has the relevant capability. For the capability
approach what is fundamental in the assessment of equality is 'what people are
actually able to be and to do' (Nussbaum, 2000:40), hence the sets of capabilities
available to them, rather than the sets of achieved functionings they can enjoy at
any given time. The focus of the capability approach is therefore on the real
eftective freedoms people have and on their choice among possible bundles of
functionings. This allows for the pursuit of people's individual well-being and the
making of their life-planning through individual choices (Robeyns, 2003).
I maintain that it is in the space of the capability approach as provided by Sen that a
re-conceptualisation of impairment and disability can find a valuable theoretical and
normative dimension. The capability approach, in placing human heterogeneity as
5 See Sen, 1992: 8-9 and chapters 5 and 9.
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central to considerations of justice and equality, and in evaluating people's
reciprocal positions in the space of the real freedoms they have to achieve valuable
aims, allows for a re-examination of impairment, disability and special educational
needs within a perspective of equality and justice.
The theoretical framework outlined here constitutes the philosophical underpinning
of my study, which I develop throughout the thesis, while connecting principles and
concepts of political philosophy to concepts and problems in education. Before
describing in more detail the structure of my work, however, it is worth addressing
briefly why we should care about the problem I am setting out to explore and,
hopefully, to clarify in this work.
1.4 Distributive Justice, Differential Abilities and Inclusion: Why Care?
There are reasons at three levels, all interrelated, for caring about the problem of a
just distribution of resources in the education of children with difterent abilities.
Primarily, there is an inescapable moral reason, which refers to the concerns I
described throughout these introductory notes, for justice and equality to be
conceptualised in ways that allow full consideration for the moral worth of all
individuals. Secondly, there is a theoretical reason, in that theories, and the
principles underpinning them, ought to be right or, at least, as approximating as
much as possible the level of rightness we are able to formulate. Not only this, but
also in developing a principled framework, concepts are analysed and clarified, and
thus improved in terms of theoretical cohesion. The final reason is connected to the
relation between theory and practice, in that clarity at theoretical and philosophical
level would help in informing decision-making on resource distribution at policy level
(Evans, 2001: 255). It is recognised that the relation between philosophical
argumentation and practical realisation is not straightforward, but presents various
tensions deriving primarily from some of the non-instrumental aspects of
philosophical investigations and the more practice oriented nature of policy making
(McLaughlin, 2000). However, the design of policy should considerably improve
when the theoretical principles underpinning it are clear and coherent; therefore
providing these principles is one of the roles of educational research. Two examples
can illustrate better why this study addresses important problems.
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Recent reforms in the education systems of several countries, including the UK, US,
Australia and New Zealand, have introduced more managerial responsibilities to
schools while decentralising budgetary decisions. This restructuring of schooling
systems has had different results, but what is important here are its effects on
resource distribution and the fairness of funding processes. Let us consider the
case of England and Wales6.
In England and Wales, budget delegation to schools has been implemented
together with a system, which maintains part of the funding to the LEAs (Local
Education Authorities). Different studies7 have pointed out how, in the case of
special and inclusive education, school reforms based on the 1981 Education Act
and the following 1988 Education Reform Act, produced not only unworkable
definitions of special needs in education, but also complex systems of funding
whose results entail very different practices. According to Evans et al., for instance,
the system of funding for special educational needs following the 1988 Act 'has set
up a dichotomy which leads to a wide range of practice across England and Wales'
(Evans et al., 2001: 2). As a consequence of these reforms, there are huge
variations in the number of pupils designated as having special educational needs
by different LEAs, and even more widespread differences in the allocation of
resources for special and inclusive education across the country (Evans et al, 2000:
13).
In the US the emphasis is more on issues of parental choice of schools and
eligibility to mainstream education for children with special needs in relation to
funding systems. According to some studies (Rothstein, 1999, Parrish et al, 1999)
the challenges of implementing school choice while at the same time fulfilling the
legal mandate for the education of disabled students, has resulted in extreme
variations in the provision for disabled children from state to state and within the
same state, thus giving way to inconsistent practices and to an upsurge in legal
procedures by parents of disabled children (Rothstein, 1999: 355-356).
These two examples indicate that current policies and systems of funding result In
wide differences in resource distribution within the same country and, as in the case
of the US, between states and within states, and suggest that differences are linked
to widespread inequitable conditions in the provision and funding of special and
6 These examples will be fully analysed in chapter 2.
7 Evans and Lunt, 1994; Lunt and Evans, 1994; Marsh, 1998; Vincent et al. 1994.
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inclusive education. Ultimately, therefore, beyond all the considerations outlined
earlier on, these findings are strongly supporting the reasons behind of my study.
1.5 Educational Equality and Philosophy of Education - Rationale of
the Study
This thesis is a work in philosophy of education. In connecting political philosophy to
education policies, it outlines a theoretical ground where the normative aspect of
political philosophy meets the normative, yet more practice oriented aspect of
education policy. Thus this thesis proposes a possible understanding of the nature
of philosophy of education through its deployment in addressing a particular
problem. It can therefore be read at the level of an exercise in a specific perspective
in philosophy of education.
In exploring the ideal of educational equality, my research draws valuable
connections between political philosophy and educational theories, thus showing
how the debate in philosophy can contribute to educational understanding and vice-
versa. Not only, but while educational theories are enhanced by the clarifying
process of philosophical analysis, philosophical reflection is conversely enriched by
the valuable input of the empirical and more practice based part of education itself.
Ultimately, in exploring what educational equality means, we not only clarify its
meaning(s), but also think of how to operationalise it, thus considering the various
elements, many of empirical nature, which can promote or obstruct its
accomplishment as an educational aim. This point highlights the connection
between theory and practice and underlines its relevance to philosophical studies in
education.
Further, the methodology I adopt in this study draws on the standard process in
analytical political philosophy and applies the Rawlsian notion of 'reflective
equilibrium' to educational theory and policy. Reflective equilibrium consists in
presenting the arguments for a theoretical position, testing them against our moral
intuitions, and subsequently adjudicating the conflicts between principles and
intuitions when they arise. For example, among our moral intuitions might be the
judgement that inequality in education due to family circumstances or to individual
abilities or disabilities are wrong. We then see how the various conceptions we
examine respond to that intuition, and we may support the capability approach as
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the perspective that best responds to that intuition. We then move towards an
argument, which shows consistency and accommodates our judgements, and those
of other citizens, in a shared consensus on political grounds.
Having outlined the nature of my research and its method, I now proceed to present
the rationale of the study.
In this chapter I have set out the theoretical and normative framework of my
research and its guiding questions. Chapter 2 addresses current policies in special
needs education and the dilemmas at the core of the debate in this area. While
relating disability issues to policy settings, it considers the international scene and
the national systems of schooling in the UK and US. It shows how the absence of a
principled framework in the educational theory and provision for disabled children
and children with special educational needs leads to a variety of policies and
practices, whose main similarity resides in pervasive and widespread inequitable
conditions.
Chapter 3 critically engages from a philosophical position with the social model of
disability, which is very influential in political as well as educational settings. It
shows the theoretical limits of the social model in providing proper grounding for its
own claims of equal entitlement and consideration for disabled people.
Chapter 4 critically presents educational perspectives applying the social model of
disability and shows that the limits inscribed in the social model are reproduced in
education. The upshot of my discussion is that, as in the case of the social model,
educational positions operate in the absence of a principled framework, thus
hindering the achievement of their own aims of equal entitlement in education for
disabled children. These chapters highlight the compelling need of a principled
framework informing both conceptualisations of disability and special educational
needs as well as the provision of education for disabled learners.
Chapter 5 introduces the capability approach as an important and innovative
perspective within which to re-examine and re-conceptualise impairment and
disability. It suggests that the specific understanding of human diversity proposed by
the approach, as well as the democratic decisional process promoted and the
normative dimension entailed, are all fundamental elements for informing the
principled framework I develop.
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Chapter 6 applies the capability perspective on disability to the context of education,
and presents a conceptualisation and evaluation of disability and special
educational needs in terms of functionings and capabilities. The chapter furthermore
discusses and counter-argues two critiques to the framework proposed and outlines
the theoretical reach of the approach, which has the potential to take the debate on
differences and disabilities in learning beyond the concept of needs and, in
particular, special educational needs.
Chapter 7 explores the normative dimension of the principled framework I develop,
and addresses the difficult question of what constitutes educational equality for
disabled children and children with special educational needs. Furthermore, it
outlines elements of a just distribution of resources to these children and suggests a
possible understanding of an educational entitlement.
Chapter 8 presents and counter-argues three possible objections to the
conceptualisation of educational equality as equal effective opportunities for
fundamental educational capabilities and reinstates the validity and feasibility of the
principled framework proposed in my work.
Finally, chapter 9 summarizes the main elements of the framework suggested in this
thesis and proposes themes and questions for further analysis and research.
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Chapter 2
Special and Inclusive Education: Incoherence in
Practice and Dilemmas in Theory
This chapter is an account of current policies in special and inclusive education and
the relevant debate in this area. Whilst mainly referring to the schooling systems of
the United Kingdom, with a specific focus on England and Wales 8, and the United
States, it also makes reference to more general developments in the international
scene. The chapter critically outlines the educational provision for disabled students
and students with special educational needs. It shows that such a provision
presents a variety of policies and practices, whose main similarity resides in
pervasive and widespread inequitable conditions. This situation, further aggravated
by the tensions and dilemmas at the core of special and inclusive education, relates
primarily and substantially to the absence of a principled framework in terms of
definitions and provision, which could guide the design of more just policies.
Introduction
The educational provision for disabled children and children with special educational
needs is a key area not just for those involved in it, students, parents and
professionals, but also for all those interested in the field of education more broadly
conceived, as well as for society as a whole (Riddell, 2002:1). Considering the
provision for these students, and the related debates on how to characterize their
educational interests, implies addressing two interrelated levels of analysis: the level
of policy and practice in special and inclusive education, and the level of the
theoretical frameworks and 'models' informing this field.
At the first level, the current provision for disabled students and students with
special educational needs is mainly characterised by systems of schooling which
involve the coexistence of special institutions, specialised additional provision in
mainstream settings and more inclusive schools. For Instance, in England and
8 The United Kingdom consists in four separate but interconnected countries: England, Wales,
Northern Ireland and Scotland. Whilst England and Wales share almost the same educational policy,
Northern Ireland and Scotland have distinct arrangements.
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Wales the educational system is organised in special schools operating alongside
the inclusion of disabled students and students with special educational needs into
mainstream education, 'wherever possible' (Lunt, 2002: 38). Similarly, in the United
States provision is organised in a continuum from full inclusive schools to special
ones, on the basis of the principle of the Least Restricted Environment (LRE) set out
in the 1997 Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Likewise, provision
within the European Union varies considerably according to the features outlined
above. In some countries, such as, among others, Iceland, Sweden, Italy or Spain,
policies are geared towards the inclusion of almost all students within mainstream
schooling. In other countries, for instance France, Denmark, Austria, Finland and
Slovenia, provision encompasses inclusion in mainstream schools alongside special
ones. Only a few countries, like Belgium, still present completely separate settings
organised in special and mainstream ones (Meijer, Soriano and Watkins, 2003).
The picture emerging from this brief overview reveals some current important
tendencies in the provision of special needs education. Firstly, it highlights that
'inclusive education is now firmly established as the main policy imperative with
respect to children who have special educational needs or disabilities' (Lindsay,
2003: 3). Secondly, it shows that the movement towards the inclusion of all students
in mainstream schools, whilst being widespread, is nevertheless at different stages
in different countries. Finally, and importantly, it points out how the provision for
these students encompasses different settings, from special to more inclusive ones.
This leads to a complex and heterogeneous situation, which sees a variety of
differently articulated policies and practices within the same country and among
different countries.
A fundamental element of the policies informing these different systems of provision
is the set of definitions and classifications of disabilities and special educational
needs they adopt. Here again, there are widespread variations. For instance, in
England and Wales, following the recommendations of the 1978 Warnock Report
(DES), definitions of disability have been abolished, and policies and official acts
refer to the notion of 'special educational needs'. More recently, however,
references to medical and psychological notions have been reintroduced as a
necessary specification of this broader concept (DFE, Code of Practice, 2001).
Conversely, policies in the United States adopt 11 categories of disabilities, mainly
relating to medical and psychological notions, such as, for example, 'visual
impairment' or 'mental retardation'. The situation is similarly differentiated in the
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European Union, with countries adopting various systems of classifications, from
medical and psychological definitions, to broader ones, including reference to health
and social factors, such as chronic illness or immigration (OECD, 2000).
If consistent variations characterise the level of provision, the theoretical level
presents tensions, and different and often contrasting positions on how to respond
to the educational demands of children with special educational needs. The debate
in special and inclusive education presents wide arrays of theoretical perspectives,
which are seen by scholars in the field as reflecting the problematic and complex
nature of the issues involved. Brahm Norwich, among others, has outlined the
inherent tensions and the dilemma at play when trying to characterise the
educational interests of disabled children and children with special educational
needs (Norwich, 2002). In his view, these tensions are expressed by
the issue of whether we talk about special or inclusive education. Do we assume that there is
something additional or different about special education compared to mainstream or general
education? Or do we assume that the mainstream education is to be extended and enhanced to
accommodate or include the diversity of learners? Is reference to anything additional or different a
form of discrimination? Or does talk about inclusive education just perpetuate the apartness of
special provision which critics have identified in reference to special educational needs? (2002: 482-
3)
Addressing these issues implies not only reference to current theoretical models in
the field, but also recognising and analysing the 'dilemma of difference'. According
to Norwich, dilemmas are inherent to the conceptualisation of differences in
education and are related to the possible negative connotation of concepts of
disability and special needs. In this sense, dilemmas arise between, on the one
hand, identifying differences connected to disability and special educational needs
in order to establish an appropriate educational provision, but with the possibility of
attributing negative connotations to differences. Or, on the other hand, emphasising
what is common among children, with the risk of not responding to the educational
interests of some of them (Norwich, 2002: 495).
In this chapter I outline the current situation in the educational provision for disabled
children and children with special educational needs, with respect to policies in
England and Wales and the United States, and, to a lesser extent, to developments
in the international scene. I furthermore relate issues of provision to theoretical
debates and frameworks in the field of special and inclusive education. My aim is to
show that the situation at the level of provision leads to inequitable widespread
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conditions. This can be related to the tensions and the dilemma at the core of
special and inclusive education and referred primarily and substantially to the
absence of a principled framework informing this field. More specifically, my main
claim is that the current incoherent and inequitable provision of education for
disabled children and children with special educational needs stems from the
absence of a framework, both in terms of definitions and provision, guiding and
informing educational policies and, in particular, the distribution of educational
resources and opportunities to these students in a just way.
Whilst this analysis does not constitute an attempt to make a specific comparative
study between the United Kingdom and the United States, or indeed among these
and other countries, I maintain that referring to policies and practices of these two
countries is useful, since it provides wider perspectives and broader insights on the
issues at stake. Moreover, recent studies have emphasised how, in education, 'the
two countries [the UK and the US] have influenced each other's reforms, and yet
their individual policies and practices vary enough to provide interesting contrasts',
whilst, at the same time, exerting a considerable influence on other countries, too
(McLaughlin and Rouse, 2000: 1).
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first explores the wide variations in
the provision of special and inclusive education, in light of recent developments and
with reference to legislation and policy issues. The second section analyses current
policies for the funding of special and inclusive education and outlines the profound
inequalities resulting from the implementation of these policies. Finally, the third part
outlines the main terms of dilemmas of difference, and addresses some conceptual
tensions inherent to current perspectives in the field.
2.1 Variations in Provision: Special, Integrated and Inclusive Education
In this section I outline the wide variations characterising the educational provision
for disabled children and children with special educational needs in most Western
countries. As these variations can be seen as a result of recent developments in
special and inclusive education, I first present these changes with specific reference
to legislation and policy documents. In particular, I trace the move from segregation,
through integration to inclusion in education, whilst drawing parallels with the
international and national situation at the level of resolutions and governmental
29
documents. Finally, I analyse the main current developments of policy towards
inclusion within England and Wales and in the US, and outline the correlated
variations in provision.
In most Western countries the last three decades have been characterised by
substantive developments in the provision of education for disabled children and
children with special educational needs, and by parallel theoretical debates about
the aims, practice and location of special education (e.g. Dyson and Millward, 1994,
Rouse and Florian, 1997, Ainscow, 1999). As Hegarty notices, 'in 30 years we have
moved from a segregation paradigm, through integration to inclusion' (2001: 243).
The historical legacy of separate special schools - a feature common to developed
and developing countries, which refers to an initial provision, often organised by
religious or philanthropic bodies, and subsequently expanded by national systems
of public education (Ainscow, 1999: 180-181) - has gradually been challenged by
different approaches. More specifically, perspectives based on human rights have
questioned the practice of segregated institutions and expressed moral concerns for
the placement of children in special schools. At the same time, arguments in the
field of special education have voiced concerns for the effectiveness of segregated
provision. This has led to a move that has involved the whole of the Western
countries and, although to a different extent, also developing countries. The move
has progressively shifted provision from segregated institutions towards more
'integrated' settings, thus towards educating disabled children and children with
special needs within mainstream schools. (PijI and Meijer, 1994: xi, Ainscow,
1999:181).
In their study of integration in six countries conducted at the beginning of the 1990's,
PijI and Meijer define integration as 'a collective noun for all attempts to avoid the
segregated and isolated education of students with special needs', and furthermore
specify integration as 'conceived in terms of the organisational structure and in
terms of the nature of integration' (1994: 4). According to their study, integration can
be characterised along three parameters. The first refers to the actual 'place' of
education, its 'location', which, for students with special needs, could be either in
special classes or units within mainstream schools, or in mainstream classes with
additional provision. The second parameter relates to elements of social
interactions, in terms of the possibility of social contacts between children. Finally,
the third refers to curricular elements, and is defined by the use of the same broad
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curricular frameworks for the education of all children (1994: 6). The results of PijI
and Meijer's study demonstrate that integrated provision has taken many different
forms and has led to substantially diverse outcomes in different countries.
Nevertheless, this study also importantly suggests that the vast majority of Western
countries, during their 'integrationist phase', has made substantive changes in their
educational systems in order to accommodate disabled children and children with
special educational needs within mainstream, neighbourhood schools.
In the last decade, however, the concept of inclusion has consistently replaced
integration, which, in turn, has been seen as limited and unsatisfactory (Ainscow,
1999: 182, Rouse and Florian, 1997: 326). Two main interrelated factors have
contributed to this change. First, professionals in the field of special education have
started to express concerns about the often too narrow interpretation of integration
as simple 'placement' of children with special educational needs in mainstream
schools, without any attention to the quality of the education provided. In many
cases integration has resulted in the actual transfer of special educational practices
and methods to the new setting, with a correspondent provision in terms of a
'watered-down variant of the regular curriculum' (Meijer, PijI and Hegarty, 1999: 2).
Hence, integration has often taken the form of a means to avoid segregation, but
with little improvement in terms of the actual content and practice of education.
Furthermore, professionals in the field of special education have advanced critiques
of the way in which children are designated as having disabilities or special
educational needs, and have brought to attention the social element inscribed in any
form of classification, as well as the relation between learning difficulties and the
design of schooling systems. This has led to questioning the 'simple' integration of
children into regular schools and classes, and called upon a change of educational
systems to accommodate the diversity of children (Ainscow, 1999: 182).
The second, important factor that has influenced the move from integration to
inclusion in education relates to the progressively stronger influence exercised by
disabled people's movements and by associations of parents of disabled children,
who have advanced their pressing requests for equal consideration and entitlement.
The social model of disability, in particular, as the theoretical model providing the
meaning of disability from disabled people's own perspective, emphasises ways in
which existing social structures and policies should be fundamentally changed to
ensure the removal of all forms of institutional and physical barriers for the full
participation of disabled people to political and social life (A critical account of the
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social model of disability is provided in chapter 3). Correlatively, inclusive education
is often proposed by the same movements as a means to remove barriers and
discrimination, and to ensure the full participation of all children to education. These
movements have resulted in the recognition of the individual rights of disabled
people as well as in the affirmation of the rights of disabled children and children
with special educational needs to be educated in 'regular' schools.
This new emphasis on rights and opportunities for equal participation is reflected in
important and influential documents at international and national level. At the
international level, for instance, the 1982 United Nations World Program of Action
Concerning Disabled Persons states the equalisations of opportunities as one of the
main goals to be achieved worldwide (U.N., 1982: 2). Likewise, at the national level,
different countries have devised laws and policies aimed at ensuring disabled
people equal rights and opportunities, as, for instance, in the UK the 1995 Disability
and Discrimination Act, and in the US the 1990 American with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The provision of education for disabled children as integral part of education
systems is stated at the international level in the Standard Rules on the Equalisation
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1993, which emphasises access to ordinary schools as a
fundamental process for the equalisation of opportunities.
The same emphasis on rights and equal opportunity has informed the move from
integration to inclusion in education, which is now central to the debate in special
needs education. This centrality is expressed by several documents and policies
both at the international and the national level. The main document based on
human rights perspectives and stating the aims of inclusive education at
international level has emerged from the 1994 Salamanca World Conference on
Special Needs Education and is expressed in the 'Salamanca Statement',
proclaimed by delegates representing 92 governments and 25 international
organisations (Lindsay, 2003: 3). The Statement highlights 'the necessity and
urgency of providing education for children, youths and adults with special
educational needs within the regular education system' (UNESCO, 1994: 9) and
claims, specifically, that
Every child has a fundamental right to education, and must be given the opportunity to achieve and
maintain an acceptable level of learning ... those with special educational needs must have access
to regular schools which should accommodate them within a child centred pedagogy capable of
meeting these needs (UNESCO, 1994:10)
32
While reaffirming the aim of educating disabled children and children with special
needs in regular schools, the Statement endorses a 'Framework for Action on
Special Needs Education', which is intended to provide guidance for governments
and organizations. The guiding principles informing the Framework specify several
fundamental aspects of inclusive education. Among them, three parameters are
specifically relevant both for policy implementations and for their centrality in the
debate on inclusion in education: identifying and defining special educational needs,
the location of education, and the importance of additional provision in terms of
resource allocation to ensure the process of inclusion.
With regard to the first aspect, identifying and defining disability and special
educational needs, the Framework affirms, primarily, that, 'schools should
accommodate all children regardless of their physical, intellectual, social, emotional,
linguistic or other conditions' (UNESCO, 1994: 59). It then defines 'special
educational needs' by stating:
In the context of this Framework, the term 'special educational needs' refers to all those children
and youth whose needs arise from disabilities and leaming difficulties. Many children experience
learning difficulties and thus have special educational needs at some time during their schooling.
Schools have to find ways of successfully educating all children, including those who have serious
disadvantages and disabilities (UNESCO, 1994: 59).
This definition identifies both disabilities and learning difficulties as aspects of
special needs. In doing so, the definition incorporates elements deriving from
considerations of physical disability and mainly referring to medical perspectives,
together with elements referring to the wider concept of learning difficulties. In the
context of the framework, moreover, special needs are defined both with reference
to the different demands posed by individual children to the school system in the
process of learning, and to general considerations of disadvantage and serious
disability. The Framework explicitly states:
This [definition of special needs] should include disabled and gifted children, street and working
children, children from remote or nomadic populations, children from linguistic, ethnic or cultural
minorities and children from other disadvantaged or marginalized areas or groups (UNESCO, 1994:
59).
Although aiming at including a wide variety of 'needs', the definition of special
educational needs provided is nevertheless unspecified in its considerations of the
different dimensions of needs, from those related to impairment and disability, to
learning difficulties and needs deriving from social causes, such as poverty and
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deprivation. The definition does not specify whether disabled children and children
experiencing learning difficulties, or children from underrepresented groups and
gifted children, actually present different special educational needs, thus
assimilating a wide range of different demands within a broad conceptualisation.
This unspecified aspect of the definition, while important in urging governmental
action upon a wide range of causes of exclusion from education, is rather less
effective in terms of its possible operationalisation in policy development.
The second element considered in the Statement is the location of education. In
proposing mainstream education as a fundamental right of disabled children and
children with special educational needs, the Statement advocates the confinement
of special settings and institutions to past practices. The statement outlines that
access to ordinary schools is an integral part of the process of equalisation of
opportunities:
Inclusion and participation are essential to human dignity and to the enjoyment and exercise of
human rights. Within the field of education, this is reflected in the development of strategies that
seek to bring about a genuine equalization of opportunity (UNESCO, 1994: 61).
According to proponents of the Statement, moreover, not only are inclusive
institutions
the most effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities,
building an inclusive society and achieving education for all, but they provide an effective education
to the majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost-effectiveness of the
entire education system (UNESCO, 1994: 10).
It is important to highlight here the social and economic dimensions implied by this
position. On the one hand, the statement emphasises the anti discriminatory and
participatory aims of inclusive institutions, while, on the other, introducing elements
of cost-effectiveness and efficiency 9 . This last point links recommendation on the
location of education to the accent on resource provision advocated by the
statement, which is the third important element relevant for policy implementation
and for the debate on inclusion in education.
Considerations in relation to resource requirements open the analysis to the
fundamental and complex element of resource allocation for inclusion in education.
The Salamanca Statement expresses the importance of this aspect by stating,
9 Lindsay has addressed the controversial aspect of the argument for efficiency and efficacy in relation
to inclusive education, and has specifically outlined how the Statement asserts the effectiveness of
inclusion in the absence of clear empirical evidence (Lindsay, 2003).
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The development of inclusive schools as the most effective means for achieving education for all
must be recognized as a key government policy and accorded a privileged place on the nations
development agenda. It is only in this way that adequate resources can be obtained. Changes in
policies and priorities cannot be effective unless adequate resource requirements are met. Political
commitment, at both national and community level, is needed both to obtain additional resources
and to redeploy existing ones (UNESCO, 1994: 78, Italics added).
Moreover, the Statement recommends:
The distribution of resources to schools should take realistic account of the differences in
expenditure required to provide appropriate education for all children, bearing in mind their needs
and circumstances (UNESCO, 1994: 78).
This appeal to additional funding for inclusive education represents a fundamental
claim and introduces considerations of resource distribution at the core of the
process of inclusion. However, the statement leaves unspecified both the concept of
resources and the differential amount that should be provided for the education of
children with special needs, hence resulting in a declaration of intentions that needs
further specification in order to be enacted at policy level.
Despite the often under-specified nature of the definitions and concepts introduced,
the Salamanca Statement represents an important international declaration both at
legislative and policy level, upon which governments and international agencies are
called to act in order to promote and establish inclusion in education. In this sense
the Salamanca Statement has encouraged the overall worldwide trend towards
providing different responses to the educational demands of disabled children and
children with special educational needs, from those traditionally associated to
segregated and special provision (Ainscow, 1999: 183). Notwithstanding these
important trends and correlated legislative and policy measures, however, different
countries are at different stages in this process towards inclusion, and in the vast
majority of cases education systems still reflect the ongoing transition from special,
segregated institutions, through integrated settings and toward inclusive schooling.
The situation of special and inclusive education in England and Wales and the US
reflects this state of affairs, and it is therefore worth exploring in some more detail
as way of example.
2.1.1 Special and Inclusive Education in England and Wales
According to Lindsay, Within the UK the development of policy towards inclusion is
well advanced, but not all-encompassing' (Lindsay, 2003: 4). Anticipations of the
move towards educating all children in normal schools are traceable back to the
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1928 Wood Committee, which emphasised the unity of special and ordinary
education, and also to the 1944 Education Act, which recognised that education for
children with special requirements should take place in ordinary schools (Lindsay,
2003: 4). However, it was the 1978 Warnock Report (DES, 1978), which marked
what has been seen as a watershed in the educational provision for disabled
children and children with special educational needs (Riddell, 2002: 6). The Report
importantly and substantially pointed out the commonality of educational aims for all
children, and the rights of children with special educational needs to be educated in
mainstream schools, providing their needs could be met, and stipulating additional
support to this purpose. The Report also introduced the concept of 'special
educational needs', whilst highlighting the interactive nature of learning difficulties,
seen as related to the context of the student and to different variables, not all
pertaining to the individual child. It recognised that 20 per cent of children
experience learning difficulties at some time during their education, and that for only
2 per cent of children these difficulties are so significant as to require their
assessment by a multi-disciplinary team, and their condition protected through a
formal statement. Hence the Warnock Report asserted the possibility of meeting
children's needs through additional resources and specialist services, without the
recourse to special school provision (Dyson and Millward, 2000: 1).
The recommendations of the Report were subsequently implemented by the 1981
Education Act 10, which mainly set the frameworks of the current provision in special
and inclusive education (Norwich, 2002: 485). The Act legally formalised the
concept of special educational needs and endorsed the principle of educating all
children in mainstream settings. It furthermore introduced the statutory multi-
disciplinary assessment, conducted by the competent Local Education Authority",
and stipulated that Local Authorities and schools should provide the appropriate
support necessary to meet the needs of children experiencing learning difficulties.
The Act also increased spending on special education and encouraged school level
initiatives in order to develop policies for meeting special educational needs.
Norwich (2002) outlines how, as a consequence of this Act, there are now three
main groups of children with special educational needs' 2. The first includes children
with the most severe learning difficulties ascertained by a statement and educated
10 This Act has been superseded since by the 1993 Education Act, the 1996 Education Act and the
2001 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (Marsh: 2003:14).
11 Local Education Authorities in England and Wales are governmental institutions at local level and
provide services to the schools under their responsibility.
12 These considerations draw substantially on Norwich 2002 and 1997.
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in special schools, estimated to be around 1.3 per cent of all students. The second
includes children with statements but educated in mainstream schools, currently
representing more than half the children with statements; and, finally, a third group
of children with no statement, but whose special educational needs are met through
additional specialised support within mainstream schools. The latter group
represents the 20 per cent mentioned in the Wamock Report (Norwich: 2002: 485).
A more decisive focus on inclusion in special education has emerged as a
consequence of the 1997 Green Paper (DFEE, 1997) and the 2001 Code of
Practice on the Identification and Assessment of Special Educational Needs (DFE,
2001). In particular, the Green Paper officially endorses the Salamanca Statement
and affirms the support of the government for the inclusion of pupils with special
educational needs in mainstream primary and secondary schools, thus implying
provision for a variety of needs within regular schools (DFEE, 1997: 44). The more
recent 2001 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act (SENDA) further
emphasises inclusive education by requiring children with special educational needs
to be educated in mainstream schools, unless this is against the wishes of the
parents or incompatible with the efficient education of other children (Lindsay, 2003:
4). Moreover, the Act extends provision in mainstream settings also at the level of
secondary and higher education, stipulating the requirement for institutions to make
all the 'reasonable adjustments' in order to anticipate and accommodate the broad
variety of educational needs.
Ultimately, educational policy in England and Wales shows an evident promotion of
inclusion and a commitment to extend it to all sectors of education. At the same
time, the educational provision is characterised by a variety of organisational
settings, which include special schools, integrated settings and 'more' inclusive
provision. Correlatively, the educational debate is characterised by a prominent
focus on the language of inclusion and by greater attempts by some of its
proponents to abandon the language of needs (Norwich, 2002: 484). As we shall
see, these differences in educational provision, together with difficulties in
operationalising the concept of special educational needs, and unclear conceptual
frameworks, lead to wide inequitable conditions in the education of disabled children
and children with special educational needs (more on this below). Before
addressing these issues, however, I shall analyse the situation in the US in more
detail.
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2.1.2 Special and Inclusive Education in the US
According to Lipsky and Gartner (1996: 46) the history of public education in the
United States is characterised by the progressive inclusion of underrepresented
groups of students into mainstream education. In particular, the educational
provision for disabled students has developed along the three stages of exclusion,
formal integration or inclusion on the basis of judicial or legislative requirements,
and a progress towards more precise definitions of the nature of inclusion.
Until the 1960's, severely disabled children were either home educated or placed in
private institutions, whilst children with less severe disabilities were educated in
special schools or in residential centres (Hall, 2002: 151). As a result of the
pressures from civil rights movements and from parents of disabled children in the
late Sixties and early Seventies, the public education of these students began to be
addressed by federal and states regulations and legal mandates, which have since
played a substantial role in special education in the United States (Florian and
PuIlin, 2000:19). This struggle resulted in the passage in 1975 of PL 94— 142: The
Education of All Handicapped Children Act, which stated that all disabled children
were entitled to a 'free appropriate public education' (FAPE). The main concern of
the Congress in passing this law was to affirm the educability of all disabled children
and the provision for their education in the regular neighbourhood school (Lipsky
and Gartner: 1996: 147). Whilst adopting eleven categories of disability mainly
based on medical definitions and still currently in use, the law identifies children on
the basis of a defined disability, and the associated educational needs resulting
from the adverse effect of the disability. It further establishes financial assistance to
the states for the pursuit of these goals, and also encompasses 'detailed procedural
protections for children and their families to ensure compliance with the law,
including the right to use the federal court system to obtain enforcement of these
legal rights, if necessary' (Florian and Pullin, 2000: 19). At around the same time of
the enactment of the federal law, each state passed similar sets of requirements,
thus establishing the educational provision for disabled children across the whole of
the country.
The 1975 Act has been amended several times and finally re-authorized in thel 997
Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which maintains the original
requirements of a 'free appropriate public education', to be provided in the 'least
restricted environment' (LRE). The Act outlines the precise meaning and content of
both 'free appropriate public education' and 'least restricted environment', linking
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compliance with their implementation to the provision of additional federal funding to
state and school districts. Hence, a 'free and appropriate public education' is
intended as
special education and related services that - A) have been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge; B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; C) include an appropriate pre-school, elementary, or secondary education in the State
involved; D) are provided in conformity with the individualised education program required under
IDEA (IDEA, quoted in Flonan and Pullin, 2000: 20).
The US Supreme Court has subsequently specified the concept of appropriate
education by indicating that 'special education and related services' have to be
provided in conformity with the IDEA procedure and have to ensure educational
benefits to disabled children.
Conversely, the other primary principles of IDEA, the right to be educated in the
'least restricted environment', sometimes referred to as mainstreaming, requires
that children with disabilities should be educated, to the maximum extent possible,
with children who are not disabled. The 1997 enactment extends this opportunity to
include the possibility for disabled students to be educated in private institutions,
when the program or the design of public ones does not respond to the criteria set
forth by the law or to the parents' choice.
Although the American education system has seen a progressive development
towards more inclusive institutions, inclusion does not represent a legal
requirement. According to Lipsky and Gartner the concepts of mainstreaming and
the principle of the 'least restrictive environment' de facto still stipulate the existence
of two systems of provision, special and regular ones, in which disabled students
subdivide their educational time. Hence, they maintain, despite developments
towards more inclusive practice, most disabled students continue to be educated in
separate settings, which could be separate classes within mainstream schools or
special units, and interact with their non-disabled peers mainly in socialising
activities (1996: 151). Furthermore and importantly, Lipsky and Gartner maintain
that 'there can be little doubt that the current system is not working' in spite of an
annual cost of approximately $30 billion (1996: 148). To support their claim, these
authors report the poor educational outcomes of disabled students, including high
drop out rates, low graduation rates and limited success in post-secondary
education (1996: 148). In addition to this, as I shall address in more detail in the
next section, the current funding of special education in the US encompasses
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varying rules, regulations and practices at state level, which result in wide variations
in both placement of children and expenditure within states and between states,
thus fundamentally proving the substantial inequitable situation in the educational
provision for these students.
This brief overview of developments in England and Wales and in the US highlights,
on the one hand, the transitory situation in the provision of special and inclusive
education, and the current uneven achievement of inclusion. On the other hand, it
presents evidence of the widespread variations in the educational provision for
disabled students and students with special educational needs. As Hegarty
suggests, although such uneven results may be related to the magnitude of the
changes under way in educational systems the world over, it may nevertheless be
prudent to allow for other possible explanations of these variations, not least that the
aims being pursued are not well-formulated, or are the wrong ones (Hegarty, 2001:
244). Taking Hegarty's insights further, I maintain that these variations, which result
in widespread inequitable conditions, may be related to the absence of principled
frameworks underpinning and informing policy and practice in special and inclusive
education. Next section addresses the variations in the funding of this education,
and the resulting inequalities through a general outline of the situations in England
and Wales and in the US.
2.2 Inequalities in Practice: The Funding of Special and Inclusive
Education
This section presents an overview of the current financial provision for disabled
children and children with special educational needs in England and Wales and in
the United States, as an example of a more widespread situation in the funding of
special and inclusive education. It outlines the pervasive inequalities resulting from
these systems of funding, which see great disparities in the resources allocated
among and within different Local Educational Authorities in England and Wales, and
among different school districts and states in the US. Similar trends are identified by
recent studies conducted by the OECD among its member countries (OECD, 2000,
Evans, 2001). In general, the picture emerging from research and data available
shows a general increase in the funding of special and inclusive education, together
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with wide and substantial differences in the amount of resources being allocated,
which, in turn, result in substantial inequalities of provision. I start my analysis by
outlining the situation in England and Wales, and then turn to the finance of special
education in the US.
In England and Wales the 1981 Education Act introduced the concept of special
educational needs, recognising that almost 20 per cent of students experience
learning difficulties during their education, with only 2 per cent having severe and
significant needs. The Act stipulated that all children with special needs should
receive additional support in order to meet their demands, but only children with
severe learning difficulties should be provided with a statement to protect their
condition. It designated Local Education Authorities to provide the appropriate
additional support, including financial assistance, to meet the needs identified (see
above).
A series of reforms in the financing of education during the 1980's delegated the
administration of school budgets to the individual schools, enabling them to manage
their own finances (Evans et al, 2000: 1). The major legislation embodying this
change is the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA), which introduced also a unified
National Curriculum and national testing and assessment. Furthermore, schools
were deemed to be competing for students under an open enrolment scheme, and
parental choice enhanced by the publication of school performance tables. The
1988 Act is unanimously considered one of the most important and far-reaching
pieces of legislation for England and Wales, and its effects on the school system in
general, and on the provision for disabled children and children with special needs
in particular, are to day subject of research and discussion. More specifically,
several authors have pointed out how the market-oriented elements formalised by
the Act in terms of school choice, competition and local management of schools
have yield negative consequences for disabled students and students with special
educational needs13
Particularly relevant to my analysis is the introduction of the local management of
schools (LMS), which required Local Education Authorities to delegate finance to
single schools and to determine a funding formula for the allocation of the school
13 See, among others, Barton, 1993; Evans and Lunt, 1994 and Rouse and Flonan, 1997; see also
Marsh, 2003 for a detailed study of the funding of inclusive education and for discussions on the
effects of the 1988 ERA.
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budget. Under Section 38 of the Act, the formula must apply 'a consistent set of
criteria for distributing resources'. In addition to the notional principle of allocating
resources according to the number of pupils enrolled at the school (Age-Weighted
Pupils Numbers), it may take into account any other relevant factors which could
affect the requirements of individual schools, for instance the number of pupils
having special educational needs (Marsh: 2003: 72).
Further governmental guidance about school finance is contained in the Fair
Funding document published in 1998 (OfEE, 1988) and implemented in 1999. Under
the system of 'Fair Funding',
Local Authorities in England and Wales are currently required ... to delegate at least 80 per cent of
their budget for funding schools to the schools, leaving 20 per cent to fund central administration
and services to support school, such as psychological services, advisors to support school
improvement, and funding for making provision for pupils with statements of special educational
needs (Evans et al., 2000: 1).
As Evans el al. note, in this way the funding of special needs education is
characterised by a two-tier system, with resources being provided by the Local
Education Authorities from central funds on the one hand, and resources given
directly to schools on the other (2001: 2). Furthermore, the same two-tier system
regulates the responsibility for children with special educational needs, since
children identified with a formal statement are under direct LEA responsibility,
although shared with the school, whereas children identified by the schools, but
without a formal statement, remain under the responsibility of the school. This
organisation is also related to the implementation of the Code of Practice on the
Identification and Assessment of Special Educational Needs, following the 1993
Education Act (see above) and the current revised 2001 Code of Practice (Df ES,
2001). The original Code established a five-stage model of assessment and
provision, with the first three stages under the responsibility of the school, but with a
direct involvement of the Local Education Authority at stage three, and the last two
stages under shared responsibility. The conduct of a statutory assessment and the
drawing up of the formal statement of special educational needs lay with the Local
Authority. The revised current Code of Practice has a graduated model of
assessment and provision organised in only four stages. However, this change does
not substantially alter the two-tier system of provision. Under the revised Code of
Practice schools are primarily responsible for the provision at the first two stages,
namely School Action and School Action Plus. Once a request for statutory
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assessment is made, at stage three, the Local Authority becomes responsible both
for the conduct of the assessment and for the drawing up of the statement of special
educational needs.
Several studies have addressed how the implementation of the local management
of schools and subsequently the Fair Funding system have resulted in substantial
differences from one Local Education Authorities to another in the provision for
students with special educational needs (Vincent et al, 1994, Evans and Lunt, 1994,
Evans et al. 2001, Marsh, 2003). Three main difficulties are mentioned as causing
these widespread differences. First, difficulties arise in operationalising the concept
of special educational needs for the identification of children. Lunt and Evans (1994)
note how 'the 1981 Education Act produced an unclear set of descriptors in its
definition of the term 'special educational needs' . . .which was effectively impossible
for LEAs to operationalise' (1994: 9). The set of descriptors implied both a relation
to a concept of normality, which was differently conceptualised by different schools,
and a relation to the school's learning environment, which is another aspect
particularly subject to different conceptualisations. This has resulted in the
possibility for a child, legally, to have special educational needs in one school but
not in another (Florian and Pullin, 2000:18).
Secondly, determining the funding formula for the allocation of the budget to schools
has proven difficult for Local Education Authorities. In particular, due to the absence
of clearly stated and shared criteria for the identification of children, the task of
devising an acceptable formula, which could account for students with no statement
of special educational needs has caused numerous problems. Local Education
Authorities used at first indicators such as the percentage of children entitled to free
school meals (FSM). Recent studies demonstrate that, over a ten-year period, from
1992 to 2002, the number of Local Education Authorities adopting the 'free school
meal' criteria raised from 81 to 96 per cent (Marsh: 2003). More recently, Local
Education Authorities, in order to determine the percentage of school delegated
budget with respect to children with special educational needs but no statement,
appear to be using a combination of indicators, such as the 'free school meals', and
audit systems like tests results and professional consultation (Marsh, 2003: 73).
Furthermore, as a consequence of the Fair Funding procedure, increased amounts
of funding have been delegated to schools: 'the Audit Commission estimated that
the amount of funds transferred to school as a result of that increased by over £600
million' (Marsh: 2003: 73). As a result of these mechanisms, 'the expenditure in
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Local Education Authorities on additional and special educational needs ranges
from £8 per pupil to £270 per pupil' (Marsh: 2003: 74).
Finally, the two-tier system of funding has worked as incentive to formally assess
children, in order to secure additional funding, and has resulted in a consistent
increase in the number of children with formal statement and in the total cost for
special needs education. As Marsh notes,
The total SEN spend has increased by 50 per cent, from £2.5 billion in 1996 to £3.8 billion in
2001/02, of which £1 billion is now delegated by English LEAs for AEN [additional educational
needs, such as difficulties related to social deprivation] and SEN (Marsh, 2003: 81).
A recent study undertaken by the National Foundation for Educational Research
(Evans et al: 2001) on the impact of the system of Fair Funding on 56 English Local
Education Authorities confirms the widespread differences in funding noted by
previous researches. In particular, according to the findings of the study, most Local
Education Authorities 'allocated between 3 per cent and 7 per cent of the Local
School Budget to special education' and, furthermore, 'all categorised spending
differently and allocated different proportions of special education spending to each
of the eight subheadings in the budget statement' (Evans et al. 2001: ii). The
authors of the study conclude that the overall picture emerging is one of 'diversity
and difference within and among Local Authorities, with no clear trends ... which
account for the range of policies and practices regarding special educational needs
funding' (Evans et al. 2001: 67). Finally, the research also confirms that the national
variation in the funding of special education noted in previous researches 'has been
maintained and is as great as it was at the inception of local management' (Evans et
al. 2001: 68).
In conclusion, the pervasive differences noted in the funding of special needs
education in England and Wales lead inevitably to consistent inequalities in
provision, and appear to reaffirm substantially the importance of questioning the
practice as well as the policy underpinning the system, and to reconsider the
theoretical frameworks informing it.
If the funding of special needs education in England and Wales presents such
pervasive differences and, ultimately, inequalities, the situation in the United States
shows no better picture. With the passage of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act - P. L. 94-142 in 1975 and its re-authorisation in the Individual with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1997, provision for disabled children has
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become integral part of the American public education system (see above). Parrish
(2000: 432) notes that there has been a recent increased interest for the funding of
special education, due largely to its high level of total estimated annual expenditure,
in the range of $32 billion, but also due to questions being raised about the rapid
growth in costs for special education and its possible negative effects on the
resources of the entire public education system (2000: 433).
The funding of special education in the United States is organised through a
complex set of provision at federal, state and local level of government, with the
federal government accounting for about 8 per cent of the total expenditure, and the
remaining equally provided by the state and the local level of school districts
(Parrish, 2000: 180). The federal funding has been mainly based on the count of
children with disabilities receiving special educational services in each state, with no
distinctions made with respect to the variations of type of disabilities or their level of
severity. More recently, however, as a consequence of the 1997 IDEA
amendments, the federal funding is gradually moving towards a census-based
system, centred on total enrolment rather than on the number of children with
disabilities. Under census-based funding, the federal government provides funds for
the total number of students registered in each state, regardless of the number of
disabled students, the severity of the disability or their different placement. Under
this system, therefore, two states with the same number of students would receive
the same amount of funding, regardless of their respective numbers of disabled
students. Census-based funding, introduced essentially to limit the increase in the
identification of disabled students in order to secure more funds, is also adopted in
various forms by six of the fifty states for their level of funding (Parrish, 2000: 432).
In addition to the progressive introduction of the census-based funding, the 1997
IDEA contains another important element for the provision of special education. This
consists in the possible adjustment upward of the amount allocated to each state,
on the basis of the percentage of students in poverty in each state (Special
Education Poverty Adjustment Funding) (Parrish, 2000: 442).
However, the major responsibility for the funding of special education lies at state
level. Although 'All 50 states have special provision in their funding formulas that
acknowledge the excess cost of special education' (Parrish, 2000: 433), there are
substantial differences in the ways in which they account for their expenditures.
These vary from reimbursing a fixed percentage of the actual expenditure for
special education, a system adopted by 11 states, to pupil-weighted systems in 19
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states. Moreover, 10 states use systems that fund directly the number of special
education teachers and other 10 use a system of fixed dollar grants to each student.
These different systems of funding relate to consistent differences across the states
and within each state. Moreover, these differences are subject also to the 1997
IDEA amendment in favour of school choice extended to parents of disabled
children. Under this amendment, 'when parents place their child in a school
chartered by the state or the local educational agency, the public agency remains
obligated to provide special educational services and funding to students with
disabilities in the same manner that the local agency provides support to its other
public school programs' (Rothstein, 1999: 336). Although local educational
agencies, on the basis of financial considerations, try to respond to the educational
demands of disabled students within their own public program, the elements of
'placement' and school choice add complexity to the funding formula of each state.
Despite the fact that the exact amount of current expenditure for special education
is unknown, since states were last requested to report these expenditures for the
1987/88 school year, the current estimated cost of special education in the United
States, as mentioned above, is in the range of $32 billion per year. The Centre for
Special Education Finance (CSEF) at Stanford University has addressed this lack of
nationally representative data on the funding of special education through a survey
of states' expenditures between 1994 and 199614. The data collected show
considerable variations across states in the average special education expenditure
per student, ranging from $2.758 in Indiana to $8.501 in Connecticut - with a ratio of
more than 3 to 1 (Parrish and Wolman, 1999: 215). Moreover, as Parrish and
Wolman note,
These data also show much variability across states in the local, state, and federal shares of
spending. For example, the federal share of expenditures ranged from a low of 4% in Connecticut
and Nevada to a high of 17% in Indiana. State support ranged from 23% in Virginia to 94% in
Louisiana to 69% in Maryland (1999: 215).
Furthermore, the percentage of students identified as disabled has grown every
year since the passage of the 1975 special education law. 'On a state-by-state
count, however, this percentage varies considerably across the nation, with 10.7 per
cent being identified in Massachusetts as compared to 5 per cent in Hawaii'
14 In response to the CSEF survey, only half of the states were able to provide data with a 'high
degree of confidence'. However, in the absence of other sources, the data collected in the survey have
been used in several studies (Wolman and Parrish, 1996: 215) and are considered here as valid and
reliable, although partial.
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(Bowers and Parrish, 2000: 180) with these variations being related to the varying
practices and regulations in place in different states.
In conclusion, the funding of special education in the United States presents
pervasive differences, which parallel the inequalities at provisional level noted in
England and Wales. Moreover, recent studies conducted by the OECD across its
state members show similar patterns in the provision for special needs education,
thus confirming the problematic situation noticed for England and Wales and the US
(OECD 2000, Evans, P. 2000). The picture emerging from the analysis of the
provisional level in terms of enactment of equal entitlement to education for disabled
children and children with special educational needs is therefore a rather
discouraging one. The different and often contrasting 'models' informing the level of
theories in special and inclusive education, however, further complicate this picture.
The next section outlines elements of the 'dilemma' central to this field.
2.3 The Dilemma of Difterence
In this section I critically address the main elements of the 'dilemma of difference' at
the core of theories and frameworks in special and inclusive education. My aim is to
show the limits of these frameworks, which restrict their feasibility in informing policy
and practice in this field. More specifically, I maintain that the current divide between
individual and social elements inherent to models in the field represents a limited
and artificial opposition, which needs to be overcome by different and more complex
theoretical and normative frameworks.
Central to special and inclusive education, the dilemma of difference consists in the
seemingly unavoidable choice between, on the one hand identifying children's
differences in order to provide for them differently, with the risk of labelling and
dividing; or, on the other hand, accentuating the 'sameness' and offering a common
provision, with the risk of not making available what is relevant to, and needed by,
individual children (Dyson: 2001, Lunt: 2002, Norwich: 1993, 1996, and above). This
dilemma subsumes two fundamental and interrelated questions: What counts as
disability or special needs in education? What educational provision can best meet
the equal entitlements of disabled children and children with special needs? These
questions relate, in turn, to two interconnected aspects: a theoretical dimension,
concerned with issues of conceptualisation and definition, and a political one, which
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refers to questions of provision in order to meet the equal entitlements of children to
education. In what follow I shall address specifically the theoretical level of the
dilemma, whilst trying to outline the problematic elements inscribed in the positions
proposed, and, consequently, their limits in informing the political level.
Conceptualising differences among children, and in particular differences related to
disability and special needs, is a contentious educational problem. What counts as
disability and special needs, and how this relates to learning difficulties, is not only
much debated in education, but also the subject of contrasting and often opposed
views. Educational approaches to definitions and causes of disability and special
needs, however contrasting, can all be substantially subsumed in the different
understandings of the relation between children's diversity and the school system.
The theoretical core of the contention lies not only in the definition of children's
diversity with respect to school, but also, and more specifically, in the factors
causing the difficulties experienced by some children either throughout or at any
time during their school career. The debate is characterised, on the one hand, by
perspectives that causally relate children's difficulties to their individual
characteristics, often seen as individual limitations and deficits. These perspectives
suggest the adoption of medical categories of disability and concepts of learning
difficulties. On the other hand, other positions, mainly in sociology of education,
locate the causes of children's learning difficulties within schooling institutions
characterised by their inability to meet the diversity of children's learning. While
opposing the adoption of any form of category or classification of children's
differences, seen as inherently discriminatory, these positions promote instead 'the
recognition and appreciation of all aspects of diversity in education' (Barton, 2003:
15).
The theoretical frameworks informing special and inclusive education, therefore,
present a substantial duality between individual and social elements. I maintain that
this duality, whilst being an artificial causal opposition, leads to limited and
unsatisfactory conceptualisations of disability and special educational needs. More
specifically, perspectives emphasising individual limitations end up overshadowing
the role played by the design of schooling institutions in determining learning
difficulties. Conversely, perspectives that identify schooling factors as causes of
learning difficulties tend to overlook elements related to individual characteristics.
Let me proceed to substantiate these claims.
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Perspectives that explain children's learning difficulties as causally linked to their
personal features adopt concepts of disability as related to an individual impairment
and limitation. They rely on the use of classificatory systems mainly based on
medical or psychological categories, for example 'sensory impairments' or
'intellectual difficulties'. Categories are seen as part of the 'attempts to understand
learners' individual characteristics' (Mackay, 2002:160) and to provide the specialist
support assumed as fundamental to their education. Proponents of these views
criticize perspectives based on the social model of disability - the model supported
by disabled people's organisations - for failing to analyse the complexity of disability
and for simplifying it under the 'neat umbrella of disability' as socially constructed
(Mackay, 2002:160). For instance, Mackay expresses concern about the fact
that many cohorts of experienced teachers ... have been taught that impaired hearing is not a
barrier to learning, because real barriers have to be construed socially (Mackay, 2002: 160).
Whilst agreeing with some terms of this critique of the social model of disability, I
maintain that perspectives centred on the individual's impairments present limits in
their understanding of children's difficulties. Impaired hearing, to return to the
example mentioned, can certainly become in itself a barrier to learning, hence a
disability, when teaching is not provided to accommodate children with hearing
impairment. If teaching were conducted in diverse ways specifically sensitive to the
learning modalities of deaf children, then hearing impairment would remain an
impairment, but would probably not become a disability, hence not resulting in a
barrier to learning. This distinction is subtle, but worth making. Ultimately, what this
example shows is how category-based positions end up emphasising the 'individual'
aspect of the relation between children's difficulties and school, thus seriously
overlooking the relevance of the schooling factor in determining learning difficulties
and, therefore, failing to express the complexity of disability as difference in
education.
Similar considerations apply to the concept of special educational needs adopted in
the UK following the Wamock Report (DES, 1978) and the 1981 Education Act. The
concept of special educational needs was introduced with the aim of emphasising
the relational aspect of learning difficulties, whilst bringing the theory and practice of
special education beyond the use of categories of disability. However, as Norwich
points out, the concept of special educational needs not only remains inscribed in a
'within-child model', but also substantially introduces a new category, that of special
needs. This category still presents special needs as essential to the individual child,
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and de facto separates children with special needs from the others (Norwich,
1993:45). Furthermore, the concept of special educational needs appears
theoretically unspecified and practically unworkable (see above). This leads, on the
one hand, to a conceptual proliferations of needs, for instance in ideas of
exceptional needs, defined as 'arising from characteristics shared by some, e.g.
visual impairment, high musical ability' (Norwich, 1996:34) or notions of 'individual
needs' (Ainscow, 1989) related to the full and irreducible diversity of individuals. On
the other hand, the unspecified nature of the concept leads to the reintroduction of
the medical and psychological categories it aimed to abolish, like categories such
'sensory impairment' or 'emotional and behavioural difficulties' now informing the
Code of Practice for the Identification and Assessment of Special Educational
Needs (DfES 2001). Ultimately, therefore, the notion of special needs remains
conceptually a 'within-child model' and fails to capture the complexity of disability.
Let us now consider those perspectives that identify the learning difficulties
experienced by some children as related to the limitations of the schooling systems
in meeting their diversity. These perspectives hold the view that it is indeed how
schools deal with the issue of difference that determines the correlation between
diversity and difficulties. In this sense, disabilities and special needs are considered
wholly socially constructed, thus not inherent nor essential to the child.
For some educationalists (for instance Booth and Dyson) difficulties and needs are
caused by the inflexibility of the school system and by its inability to meet the
diversity of children. It is therefore the limitation of schooling, which causes special
educational needs. Norwich notes that, although in this view difficulties are seen as
arising from the relation between the diversity of children and the school system,
critical attention is specifically directed only to the limitations of the school, rather
than to a comprehensive understanding of how this relation takes place. In this
sense, for instance, Dyson states,
Special needs are not the needs that arise in a child with disabilities with regard to a system that is
fixed. Rather they are needs that arise between the child and the educational system as a whole
when the system fails to adapt itself to the characteristics of the child (Dyson, cited in Norwich,
1993: 50).
As Norwich has rightly pointed out, there seems to be an inconsistence in arguing
for an interaction between child and school and then asserting only the limitations





Some sociologists of education influenced by the social model of disability maintain
that disability and special needs in education are socially constructed in the sense
of being the products of disabling barriers and of exclusionary and oppressive
educational processes (Armstrong, Barnes, Barton, Corbett, Oliver, Slee,
Tomlinson)' 5. They see disabilities and difficulties as caused by institutional
practices, which marginalize and discriminate through the use of labelling
procedures and disabling categories and methods. These positions critique the use
of categories of disability for their arbitrary, socially situated and discriminatory use.
The use of categories is seen as aimed at separating and, until recently,
segregating children on their presumed 'abnormality', and as labelling and devaluing
disabled children and children with special needs. Consequently, and in line with the
social model of disability, according to proponents of this perspective,
difference is not a euphemism for defect, for abnormality, for a problem to be worked out through
technical and assimilationist education policies. Diversity is a social fact. (Armstrong & Barton,
2000:34).
Differences and diversity, therefore, instead of constituting a 'dilemma', have to be
promoted and celebrated.
This position, while highlighting possible limits of medical and social practices of
categorisation, nevertheless gives rise to important theoretical problems. First,
stating that difficulties and disability in education are socially constructed presents
obvious elements of over-socialisation and significantly overlooks the individual
factors related to impairments. To resume the example mentioned above, a hearing
impairment has to be recognised and acknowledged if provision has to be made in
order to avoid educational barriers. Hence, simply stating that hearing impairment is
a difference to be celebrated does not seem to be a sufficient means to the end of
educating the child and even less so when the aim is the enactment of equal
entitlements. This becomes more evident in the case of severely disabled children
or children with multiple disabilities. Second, the abandonment of any use of
categories and classifications of disability and special needs in favour of a generic
celebration of differences is in itself a problematic and, to a certain extent,
counterproductive position. How can policies be designed to celebrate differences,
and specifically differences related to impairment and disability, in the absence of
any specification of the concept of difference? Ultimately, therefore, educational
15 These perspectives will be analysed in chapter 4, following my philosophical critique of the social
model of disability in chapter 3.
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perspectives that advocate the abandonment of categories of disability and special
needs and assert that they are solely socially constructed seriously overlook the
relevance of individual factors and the importance of the relation between the latter
and the design of schooling systems in determining learning difficulties. To
anticipate one of my later themes, they also neglect a notion of functioning, which
alone makes sense of a disability, whether socially or personally constituted.
The same polarisation of perspectives is evident in the theorisation of the second
question subsumed in the dilemma, the problem of what system of schooling better
responds to the educational interests of disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Here again, positions vary between, on the one side, those
advocating for the 'special' element inherent to the education of disabled students
and students with special educational needs, and, on the other, those advocating for
a full inclusion in mainstream schools, hence for flexible schooling systems
accommodating the full diversity of children. Furthermore, despite its centrality in
policies and practices at national and international level, as well as in the
educational debate, the notion of inclusive education is differently conceptualised
and understood by various educational perspectives, and there is no agreement
either on its meaning, or on its precise content (Mitchell, 2004: 1, Rouse and
Florian, 1997: 323, Hegarty, 2001: 243). For instance, on the one hand, some
perspectives describe inclusive education as the possibility for disabled students
and students with special educational needs to attend the local school with
appropriate supplementary aids and services (Lipsky and Gartner, 1999). On the
other hand, other perspectives conceptualise inclusive education in terms of
accommodating and responding to the diversity of children, without any clear
reference either to additional or to specific learning support (Ainscow, 1991, Barton
1993, Thomas and Loxley, 2001).
Ultimately, current perspectives on disability and special educational needs, remain
polarised between individual and social elements, thus presenting artificially fixed
and limited positions, which, whilst reflecting main theoretical frameworks in socio-
medicine and disability studies (more on this in the next chapters), do not account
for the complexity of disability, special educational needs or learning difficulties.
These limits point in the direction of different frameworks, which could reconsider




This chapter has analysed the wide and pervasive differences characterising the
educational provision for disabled children and children with special educational
needs in England and Wales and in the United States. It has shown how these
differences result in substantial inequalities in the resources and opportunities for
these children. Furthermore, the chapter has presented and addressed elements of
dilemmas at the core of the theoretical debate on disability and special educational
needs, whilst trying to outline the limits inscribed in perspectives in the field. The
picture emerging from this analysis of the educational provision, policy and
theorisation in special and inclusive education confirms the need for rigorous
normative frameworks informing the field. However, before presenting such a
framework, I will analyse the main conceptualisations of disability and, more
specifically, I will critically address the social model of disability, theorised by
disabled scholars and supported by disabled people's movements, and widely
influential in educational debates, too. The next chapter addresses the social model
of disability from a philosophical perspective.
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Chapter 3
The Social Model of Disability:
A Philosophical Critique
Emerging from the political activism of disabled people's movements and mainly
theorised by the scholar Michael Oliver, the social model of disability is central to
current debates in Disability Studies and related perspectives on inclusive
education.
This chapter develops a philosophical critique of the social model of disability and
outlines some of its theoretical problems. More specifically, it presents two main
critiques of the social model: the first questions the appropriateness of the
materialist framework underpinning it, whilst the second analyses some limits of the
definition of disability provided by the model, and its controversial rejection of
normative categories. The chapter argues that in conceptualising disability as
unilaterally socially caused, the social model presents a partial and, to a certain
extent, flawed understanding of the relation between impairment, disability and
society. Hence it sets a framework that needs clarifications and extensions, and
presents limits to the achievement of its own aim of inclusion and equal
consideration.
The chapter concludes by suggesting that, despite its theoretical limits, the social
model acts as a powerful and important reminder to face issues of inclusion as
fundamental moral issues.
Introduction
Despite the presence of people with accredited impairments at all times and in all
societies, a systematized political and theoretical reflection on impairment and
disability by disabled people and scholars has emerged only in the last three
decades. This contribution has mainly originated from within the disabled people's
movements and in opposition to the prevailing analyses based on medical or
mainstream sociological frameworks. The social model of disability, theorised
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principally by the disabled scholar Michael Oliver, is a fundamental contribution not
only to the discussion about the complexity of disability, but also to our
understandings of disability as informed by disabled people's reflection on their own
experience.
The social model of disability is interlocked with the political actions of disabled
people's movements, both in the UK and, to a lesser extent, in the US, and has
initiated and contributed to the establishment of the field of disability studies. Prior to
the theorisation of the social model of disability, approaches to disability were
mainly conducted within medicine or medical sociology. According to disabled
scholars, this is reflected both in medical models of disability and in the general
marginalisation that the social approaches to disability have endured within
mainstream sociology. Nevertheless, the social model of disability draws
consistently from sociological insights, although presenting a view that, in situating
disability within social structures, diverges consistently from orthodox positions.
Moreover, since its emergence is connected to the political activity of the disabled
people's movements, the social model of disability shares its challenges to
mainstream disciplinary and institutional political positions with new social
movements that have characterised social actions during the 1980's and 1990's.
In outlining the social model of disability, Oliver maintains that it is not a fully worked
out sociological theory and should not be considered as such. Moreover, he states
that the social model cannot totally explain the various dimensions of disability and
cannot do the work of a social theory (Oliver, 1996: 41). However, the social model
provides both definition and analysis of disability and sets them in a materialist
framework, which identifies the relation between individuals and social and
economic structures with reference to the modes of economic production, while
opposing the social to an individual model. The social model is a response to the
individual model and to its definition of disabilities, seen as deeply flawed. According
to the social model the individual model, mainly theorised within the sociology of
medicine, wrongly conceptualises disability within a medical framework, thus seeing
disability as the unfortunate consequences of a presumed deficit proper to the
disabled person. As opposed to that, the social model aims at showing disability as
the product of specific social and economic structures. It also aims at addressing
issues of oppression and discrimination of disabled people, caused by institutional
forms of exclusion and by cultural attitudes embedded in social practices.
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My critical account of the social model of disability is based on political philosophy.
As such, my critique is conducted at a theoretical and political level, and identifies
and addresses the conceptual problems of the social model of disability, rather than
the experiential ones, connected to the lived, personal dimension of disability. In so
doing, however, it aims at providing an alternative awareness on conceptual issues,
which could inform the reflection on the personal experience of disability. My critique
is conducted at two levels, one internal and one external to the social model itself.
At the internal level, I address one intrinsic problem of the model, which consists in
its reference to the materialist framework. At the external level I present elements of
a liberal perspective that helps overcoming some limits of the social model, thus
suggesting the need of an alternative framework for the understanding of disability.
In doing so, my purpose is to clarify some theoretical issues related to the definition
and the meaning of disability as proposed by the social model and to suggest how
these limits impinge on the very aims of disabled people's movements.
Finally, as this critique is conducted from outside of the disabled people's
movements and the direct experience of disability, it can be considered as
fundamentally external to the social model. Therefore, according to disabled
theorists, this position implies a number of problems, which are mainly related to
issues of emancipatory research for disabled people and, secondly, to the
necessarily external point of view it advances on disability and impairment. While
these possible problems cannot be either addressed or overcome here, I
acknowledge their relevance and their importance for disabled people in this
debate.
3.1 The Individual Model of Disability and Its Critique
Disabled people and scholars, and among them primarily Oliver, have firmly
rejected the theoretical framework underpinning medical and mainstream
sociological theories on disability. In their critique of accredited theories, disabled
scholars have delineated a specific and necessarily partial account of the complex
positions they subsumed under what they defined the individual model of disability.
Consequently, the present rendering of the individual model is drawn mainly from
the characterisation of its opponents and, particularly, from Oliver's account of it.
The social model of disability is equally complex and characterised by different
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perspectives and positions. However, Oliver's understanding is recognised as one
of the most important conceptualisations of the social model of disability, and plays
therefore a fundamental role in this debate.
One of the definitional approaches to disability is the International Classification of
Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH) published by the World Health
Organisation (WHO) in 1980 (recently revised in 1997 and 2001; see Bickenbach,
1999, Bury, 2000, and Thomas, 2002). This classification represents a more
systematic definition than the ones in use in biomedicine in that it outlines a
distinction between impairment, disability and handicap. Impairment is there seen
as related to the
'abnormality in the structure of the functioning of the body', whether through disease or trauma;
disability refers to the restriction in ability to perform tasks, especially those associated with
everyday life and self care activities; and handicap refers to the social disadvantage that could be
associated with either impairment and/or disability (Bury in Barnes and Mercer, 1996: 19).
According to the medical sociologist Bury, this classification, together with other
forms of socio-medical models, tries to provide the grounds for identifying and
drawing attention to the various needs of disabled people while promoting a wider
appreciation of the relational character of disability when interacting with a
sometime hostile social environment. It also attempts at providing a better welfare
for disabled people and, in so doing, it inevitably exposes the health/illness
dimension of impairment and disability (Bury, 1996: 22).
Disabled people reject this view as they identify it with the theorisation of their
oppression. Oliver's criticism, in particular, hinges on two points:
Firstly, it (the indMdual model) locates the 'problem' of disability within the individual and secondly it
sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the functional limitations or psychological losses
which are assumed to arise from disability. These two points are underpinned by what might be
called 'the personal tragedy theory of disability' which suggests that disability is some temble
chance event which occurs at random to unfortunate indMduals (Oliver, 1996: 32).
According to Oliver, in locating the 'problem' of disability within the individual, the
model identifies disability as a fixed state inherent to the single person and causally
linked to a restriction of activity. In other words, the model describes the individual
impairment as the cause of the functional limitations experienced by disabled
people and presumes that those limitations create psychological problems, feelings
of loss of identity, negative self-images and the consequent need to adapt to the
state of disabled person in stages.
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Oliver maintains that the individualisation of disability includes its 'medicalisation' as
one of its elements (hence individual and medical are terms often used
interchangeably to refer to the model). In his view, the individual model is based on
the medical use of normative categories and informed by a related strong emphasis
on issues of cure and rehabilitation. The medical definitions, in identifying
impairment with a deficit or a non-normal individual condition and disability with its
causal limitation, compare disability to abstract and ideal standards of normality and
of able-bodieness. This view, therefore, creates and justifies the necessity of
medical interventions in terms of cure and rehabilitation, which are imposed with the
aim of redressing the impairment and reverting the individual condition of disability
back to the normal functional state or, anyway, to the nearest possible
approximation. In critically illustrating this point Oliver quotes the disabled scholar
Finkelstein and his experience as a person with a spinal injury 'forced' to undergo
intense rehabilitation:
The aim to return the individual to normality is the central foundation stone upon which the whole
rehabilitation machine is constructed. . . .The rehabilitation aim becomes to assist the individual to be
as 'normal as possible'. The result, for me, was endless soul-destroying hours ... trying to
approximate to able-bodied standards by 'walking' with callipers and crutches (Oliver, 1996: 105).
Individualisation and medicalisation are underpinned by the personal tragedy theory
of disability and, in turn, they are constitutive elements of the theory itself. Oliver
argues that in defining the state of functional limitation as pathology, the individual
model has helped in configuring a culturally negative image of disability. This is
expressed in terms of disability as personal tragedy and as a deficit dimension in
need of medical intervention. A clear example of this is, among others, the
recurrence in medical classifications of terms such as handicap, with its derogatory
image associated to the 'cap-in-hand" 6 (Thomas, 2002: 42). This process has also
promoted a passive state of dependency of disabled people to non-disabled
professionals seen as experts in the normalisation process advocated by medicine.
Moreover, the imposition of the authoritarian and external voice of expert medical
professionals on the condition of disability has undermined the voice and self-
perception of disabled people.
16 The Oxford English Dictionary does not acknowledge the above meaning as associated to the word
'handicap' and provides instead the following definitions: 'disadvantage imposed on a competitor to
make the chances of success more nearly equal for all' and 'anything likely to lessen one's chances of
success'.
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Through a materialist analysis, concerned with the relation between the individual
and the modes of economic production, Oliver places the onset of the individual
model of disability within the economic and institutional structure of capitalist
societies. According to his view the emergence of a medical individual model of
disability in advanced western societies is connected to the rise of capitalism, with
its creation of ideologies and hegemonies. There are three main issues that Oliver
relates to the individualisation of disability under capitalism. First, is the normative
use of ideological categories of normality/abnormality. Second is the role of medical
professionals. And, third, is the hegemony of disability, i.e. the exclusion and
oppression of disabled people from society operated through social and economic
structure imposed by dominant groups in society.
According to Oliver, under capitalism disability became understood as individual
pathology, hence abnormality, and disabled people became controlled through
exclusion and through the medicalising of disability. In other words, the whole
ideology of normality originated within the rise of capitalism, with its needs for a
workforce defined by people's capacity to be usefully trained and productively
employed. It is in this process, Oliver argues, that the construction of 'able-bodied'
and 'able-minded' individuals is significant 'with their physical capabilities of
operating the new machines and their willingness to submit to the new work
disciplines imposed by the factory (Oliver, 1990: 45-46)'. Consequently, those
individuals who could not be included in the category of ability identified in terms of
productivity became identified as dis-abled people.
This process is, in turn, connected with the rise of the medical profession, its
dominance and its power of controlling through defining and prescribing (Oliver,
1990: 54). Oliver gives a detailed account of the rise of the medical profession
within the capitalist setting, but it is its role that is worth exploring here. Oliver
maintains,
As society's experts they (doctors,) have a great deal of power and this gives them control over
fundamental aspects of people's lives and they have not been noticeably reticent about using this
power to make decisions about disabled people's lives; where they should live, whether they should
work or not, what kind of school they should go to, what kinds of benefits and services they should
receive and in the case of unborn disabled children, whether they should live or not (Oliver, 1996:
36).
And it is within this framework, as seen, that Oliver and the social model theorists
criticise what they name as the 'industry of rehabilitation', with its aim of restoring
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people into 'normality' and into 'productive and socially useful human beings'. The
medicalisation of disability has justified also the creation of a wide range of 'pseudo-
professionals', like therapists, physiotherapists, occupational and psychological
therapists, who thrive on the business of disability but whose activities are judged
almost, if not totally, unnecessary by disabled people.
Oliver concedes:
There have, of course been substantial gains from this medicalisation of disabilities, which has
increased survival rates and prolonged life expectancies for many disabled people as well as
eradicating some disabling conditions. But the issue of the late twentieth century is not one of life-
expectancy but expectation of life and it is here that the negative and partial view prompted by
medicalisation is most open to criticism (1990: 48).
It is indeed this criticism that the social model has embodied in its framework.
Finally, the individualisation and medicalisation of disability are the constitutive
elements of disability as hegemony, hence as a socially constructed category,
produced by dominant groups in capitalist societies and perpetuated by
discriminating and oppressive social structures.
According to disabled scholars, ultimately, the individual model is the theoretical
expression of the oppression and discrimination of disabled people operated
through economic, social and cultural structure, which take little or no account of the
lived dimension of disability and of the voice of disabled people themselves. As
opposed to that, the social model of disability sets itself the tasks of theorising and
expressing disability from the disabled people's perspective, while at the same time
providing a conceptual framework for the political action of disabled people's
movements.
3.2 The Social Model of Disability
Oliver initially conceptualised the social model of disability with reference to the
Fundamental Principles Of Disability, a document produced by the Union of the
Physically Impaired Against Segregation in 1976 (UPIAS 1976). The aims and the
theoretical perspectives of the social model are already inscribed in its origin within
the disabled people's movements and in its development as their model.
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Oliver maintains that the genesis and articulation of the model are a rejection of the
fundamental concepts underpinning the individual model (Oliver, 1996: 32) and that
the model itself is still valuable and useful, despite several critical approaches to it,
both within the disabled people's movements and from external positions. The
social model aims primarily at deconstructing and countering the individual or
medical model of disability with a model situated in the direct experience and
understanding of disability by disabled people themselves. It also aims at
addressing issues of marginalisation, oppression and discrimination while trying to
denounce and remove the disabling barriers produced by hegemonic social and
cultural institutions (Oliver, 1990: 11).
As mentioned earlier Oliver claims that the social model of disability does not
constitute a fully worked out 'social theory' and should not be considered as such.
Nevertheless, the model provides a definition of disability inscribed in the same
sociological perspective informed by Marxism and historical materialism that guides
his critique of the individual model. Furthermore, Oliver is aware of the limits proper
to any model and recognises that the social model itself cannot explain all the
aspects of disability as he maintains:
Models are merely ways to help us to better understand the world, or those bits of it under scrutiny.
If we expect models to explain, rather than aid understanding, they are bound to be found wanting
(Oliver, 1996: 40).
In Oliver's account the social model 'does not deny the problem of disability but
locates it squarely within society' (Oliver, 1996: 32) and its definition of impairment
and disability is an articulation of this perspective. The definition of disability
provided by the social model refers back to the distinction originally drawn by UPIAS
as one of the Fundamental Principles of Disability. Basically, disability is seen as
something imposed to disabled people on top of their impairment by oppressive and
discriminating social and institutional structure.
Thus impairment is defined as:
lacking part or all of a limb, or having a delective limb, organ or mechanism of the body; and
disability is the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation
which takes no or little account of people with impairments and thus excludes them from
participation in the mainstream of social activities (Oliver, 1996: 22).
Disability, therefore, "is all that imposes restrictions on disabled people" and as
such, "disablement is nothing to do with the body" (Oliver, 1996: 35) but is instead
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caused by the oppression of social and economic structure on disabled individuals.
Disabled people are, consequently, an oppressed group in society.
Two main issues of this definition are fundamental in the debate between individual
and social model. The first is an issue of causality. Oliver, and with him
Shakespeare (Shakespeare, cited in Oliver, 1996: 39) and other disabled scholars,
underlines the importance of breaking the causal link between impairment and
disability in trying to overcome oppression. In other words, if the individual model
sees disability as a restriction of activity caused by impairment, the social model
aims at breaking up this link by maintaining that disability is caused by institutional
and social discrimination. It is therefore not ultimately ascribable to an individual
condition. The second issue, intertwined with the previous one, is connected to the
'divide' between illness and disability. Oliver suggests that asserting the complete
separateness of illness and impairment or, on the contrary, their contiguity, might
have more to do with terminology than with conceptual differences. Furthermore, he
concedes that there might be some similarities between the two conditions and that
some disabled people may have illness at some points in their lives. However, he
also argues that
disability as a long-term social state is not treatable medically and is not certainly curable. Hence
many disabled people experience much medical intervention as, at best, inappropriate, and, at
worst, oppressive (Oliver, 1996: 36).
As seen above, the definition of impairment and disability provided by the social
model is set within a Marxist analysis of the economic and social forces of
capitalism, which are considered as producing precisely the oppression experienced
by disabled people. Consequently, it is worth here recalling the three main
elements, central to the social model rejection of individualistic views on disability,
as their analysis sets the foundations of the social model core: the use of normative
categories, the role of medicine and the medical profession and the hegemony of
disablement.
The core of the social model message, ultimately, hinges on three fundamental
claims, which are at the same time three political standpoints. First, the social model
demands the acceptance of disabled people as they are, not as society thinks they
should be, and claims that it is society that has to change, not individuals (Oliver,
1996: 37). As opposed to a regulatory use of abstract ideas of normality, the social
model promotes the reflection on the concept of difference and the celebration of
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differences (Morris, 1991, Wendell, 1996, Thomas, 1999). Secondly, as Oliver has
poignantly expressed,
this change will come about as part of a process of political empowerment of disabled people as a
group and not through social policies and programmes delivered by establishment politicians and
policy makers nor through indMdualised treatments and interventions provided by the medical and
para-medical professions (Oliver, 1996: 37).
The social model argues for the full inclusion of disabled people in society and for
their complete acceptance as 'citizens with all that entails in terms of rights and
responsibilities' (Oliver, 1996:152). In that, consequently, it aims at addressing the
issues of pressing concerns to many disabled people: independent living, poverty,
education, employment, communication, transportation, accessing built
environments and civil rights (Thomas, in Barnes, Oliver, Barton, 2002: 44). Finally,
while claiming to contrast the hegemony of disability through the empowerment of
disabled people and their movements, it reinstates its own validity as the model of
the disabled people (Oliver, 1996: 42).
In the following sections I will critically analyse the social model of disability with
respect to its materialist framework and its theoretical underpinnings. In addressing
some limits of the social model of disability, I suggest that the model is itself
problematic for the achievement of its aim of an inclusive society.
3.3 A Philosophical Critique of the Social Model of Disability: A Critique
of the Materialist Framework
The social model examines the relationship between disability and society and, in
determining why disabled people became excluded from economic and social
structure, places the answer in the emergence of industrial capitalism and its
specific organisation of economic activities (Thomas, 2002: 46). Some of the
leading social model theorists have addressed the position of disabled people within
the capitalist society through differently oriented materialist paradigms. Finkelstein
(1980) and Stone (1985), for instance, have based their analysis of disability on,
respectively, historical materialism and a Weberian notion of rationalisation.
In delineating the social model of disability, as seen, Oliver adopts a materialist
framework. His aim is to explain, rather than describe, what happened to disabled
people with the rise of capitalism and his analysis is conducted through a materialist
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view, which implies that 'the production of the category disability is no different from
the production of motor cars or hamburgers' (Oliver, 1996: 127). Underpinning this
view is 'a framework, which suggests that it (disability) is culturally produced and
socially structured. Central to this framework is the mode of production' (Oliver,
1990: 22). It is in the articulation between the primacy of modes of production and
cultural products that Oliver sees the position of disabled people in society. Thus, as
seen, the emergence of the category of disability is associated to the creation of the
unproductive and the dependents. According to Oliver, moreover, two more crucial
factors of this process are the size of the economic surplus produced by any given
society and the means of redistributing it amongst the population as a whole (Oliver,
1990: 24). To illustrate this point Oliver notes that restricted mobility, for instance, is
likely to have different implications in an agricultural setting than in a nomadic one
(1990:22). Similarly, a society producing a large surplus will adopt different
redistributive systems than a society with a scarcity of surplus. This, in turn, will
have different consequences on how disability is considered.
Gleeson has more recently gathered evidence on the historical and economical
roots of disability and has expanded the materialist perspective as to argue,
'disability is bound up with social relationships at specific historical junctures' and it
is therefore located spatially, temporally and economically (Thomas, 2002: 47).
Two main criticisms at two levels emerge from applying a materialist analysis to the
position of disabled people in society. First, within the disability movement, disabled
theorists have addressed the need to update the materialist framework 'to take
theoretical account of contemporary developments in capitalist economic systems'
(Thomas, 2002: 47). Furthermore, post-modernist and feminist approaches within
Disability Studies have noticed the significance of culture and cultural processes in
the creation of disability and have criticised social 'modellists' for having relegated
this as a marginal aspect of disability (Shakespeare, 1997, Corker, 1999, Thomas,
2002). Second, two main considerations arise from an external perspective, one
that entails considerations of justice. At this external level, the first question is the
appropriateness of using a materialist paradigm in addressing disability issues and,
secondly and consequently, the problem of what concept of distributive justice
would best serve the interests of disabled people and their claim for an inclusive
society.
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The debate within Disability Studies is varied and encompasses different
perspectives. Thomas, herself a disabled theorist endorsing a specific view of the
social model, has expressed the need 'to examine whether economic arrangements
characteristic of a global capitalism, or hyper capitalism ... is changing, perhaps
transforming, the social position of people with impairments, for better or worse'
(Thomas, 2002: 47). She goes on by expressing the necessity to questioning
whether new technologies are means to inclusion or, on the contrary, to further
exclusion of disabled people from the labour market. Certainly Thomas's claim is a
well founded one; if we limit the field of enquiry to developed countries, the
dominant cooperative framework is increasingly characterised by sophisticated
information processing technology. It is evident that in such a setting, visually
impaired people or people with impairments in fine motor skills of the hands, would
be excluded from accessing most computing technologies, if the latter were
designed only in a standardised form aimed at non-impaired people (Buchanan,
Brock, Daniels and Wikler, 2002: 298, 298). Furthermore, much needs to be
addressed in terms of the position of disabled people with respects to new forms of
labour implying the use of such technology. Thomas's request for a reconsideration
of the materialist paradigm opens up the possibility of questioning the assumption
underpinning the social model. If the means of production are rapidly changing and,
correlatively, so are the abilities required to being productive, then the question
raises as to what the implications for disabled people are. Moreover, as Thomas
herself has noticed, some forms of impairments would stand in a different
relationship towards the means of production than others, thus causing changes in
the presumed creation of the category of disability by economic arrangements.
A second internal criticism to the disability movement regards challenging the
'materialist prioritisation of the economic roots of disability and the contemporary
operation of structural barriers in the wider social environment' (Thomas, 2002: 48).
Increasingly, feminist and postmodernist theorists within Disability Studies have
pointed out different dimensions to disability, which, they claim, have been
downplayed by the materialist framework. Central to their critique is the role of
culture and cultural processes in shaping society and, ultimately, disabled people's
position in it. The concept of difference comes to be included in the disabled
people's agenda, with reference not only to general cultural settings, but also to the
specific culture of difference connected to gender, ethnicity, sexuality and type of
impairment. Evidently, it is argued, deaf people experience a very different form of
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exclusion from the one created by economic structure. Theirs is mainly related to
language, communication and cultural systems, rather than to traditional barriers
identified by the social model (accessing built environments, for instance). (Thomas,
2002: 48).
More radical is the critique advanced by postmodernists to the materialist bases of
the social model. In postmodernist accounts,
current approaches to theonsing disability as a fomi of social oppression and their relationship to
disabled people's experience are hampered by a modernist conceptual framework, which is
increasingly at odds with the contemporary social world and with developments in theory-making as
a whole (Corker, 1999, p.627).
According to this view, no social phenomena, including impairment and disability,
exists independently from the 'discoursive practice' that has created it. Therefore,
rather than focusing on material relations of power, the social model of disability
should draw attention to the cultural processes that shape impairment and disability
and build a model to counter 'the disability-engendering role played by cultural
ideas, always negative, about people with impairment' (Thomas, 2002: 49). As
Corker has noticed,
In order to bring disability theory closer ... to the politics of new social movements, ... the
conceptual underpinnings of theory must be broadened beyond their current focus on structure
(Corker, 1999: 627).
Much of this is still an on going debate within Disability Studies; nevertheless, the
call for a framework different from the materialist one in analysing disability is
increasingly emerging not only as vital part of this internal debate, but also, as
external criticisms show, as necessary step for disability theory to achieve a more
cohesive and coherent framework.
After addressing criticisms to the social model arising from within disability studies, I
will now analyse the materialist framework underpinning the social model of
disability from a theoretical perspective external to disability studies and social
theory on disability. The external level argument is twofold. On the one hand, it
addresses considerations of the type of cooperative framework that would achieve
greater inclusion while, on the other hand, looking at what concept of justice, if any,
would support it. In addressing these points it is worth recalling the requirement, at
theoretical level, 'to compare actuality to actuality, and in our particular historical
circumstances' (Rawls, 2001:178) and the implications that each cooperative
framework has on concepts of citizen, society and their relationship.
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Let us begin from the actuality of the framework. There, whilst it is clear that by
making the mode of production central to his framework, Oliver and the social
'modellists' can show the discrimination of capitalist societies, it is more doubtful
why the social structure suggested by the social model, would best represent and
defend the position of disabled people in society. As the model is indeed based on
modes of production and on concepts of productivity, it seems to rest on a scheme
of redistribution of resources based on what has been named justice as reciprocity
(Buchanan, 1990: 228). Thus, the model considers proper subjects of justice those
with the capacity to engage productively in social cooperation, i.e. the 'deserving
ones'. However, as impairment might entail the possibility or impossibility to
participate in social cooperation, and at different levels and degrees, the same
framework presents problems to the achievement of inclusion. Furthermore, it is
quite clear that disabled people and their movement rightly aim at their full
recognition as citizens, 'as citizenship determines the conditions for full membership
and inclusion in a society' (Rioux, 2002: 217). In so doing disability theorists have
criticised the assumption that citizenship rests on the capacity of an individual to be
productive. Consequently, for the above reasons, it is not evident why and how the
materialist framework would best represent the demands of citizenships and full
membership in society. A final comment relates to the actualisation of the society
advocated by the materialist paradigm informing the social model. Oliver concedes
that the realisation of the communist society is rather unlikely and recognises a
struggle between some conceptual and theoretical basis of the model and the
development of effective political strategies for change. Furthermore, he maintains
that different schemes of redistribution and related policies will only be possible in
the chance of capitalism itself being transcended, a chance that he recognises as
not likely to materialise in the foreseeable future (Oliver, 1990: 97).
In trying to unlock these issues, let us bring the analysis back to the theorisation of
types of societies. Then, two considerations emerge. If
a full communist society seems to be one beyond justice in the sense that the circumstances that
give rise to the problem of distributive justice are surpassed and citizens need not be, and are not,
concerned with it in everyday life (Rawls, 2001: 177),
then the case for aiming at a full communist society as the more inclusive one might
have a major appeal. In that case, presumably disabled people would not face the
exclusion inscribed in the capitalist setting and their equal share of resources could
be secured.
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However, if general considerations of citizenship are brought in, together with the
recognition of the fundamental importance of the fair values of political liberties and
of the reasonable pluralism of democratic regimes (all issues claimed by disabled
people's movements, both theoretically and in actuality), then a different theory
looks more likely to accommodate the demands of disabled people. Justice as
fairness, in the specific,
assumes that ... the principles and political virtues falling under justice will always play a role in
public political life. The evanescence of justice, even of distributive justice, is not possible, nor, I
think, is it desirable (Rawls, 2001: 177).
It is within justice as fairness, that a concept of subject-centred justice would find its
space. In that justice requires that 'basic rights to resources are grounded not in the
individual strategic capacities, but rather in other features of the individual herself-
her needs or non-strategic capacities' (Buchanan, 1990: 231). Furthermore, these
rights are based on the equal moral status of persons or, in other words, 'on the
preeminent moral values of persons' (Buchanan, 1990: 235). According to
Buchanan, To acknowledge the fundamental moral equality of persons is, first of
all, to accord a certain kind of being full moral status' (Buchanan, 1990: 234). This
view supports and implies the conviction that we owe something to each person,
even to the more incapacitated to reciprocate, in virtue of their moral equal worth.
Moreover, these considerations require a reconceptualisation of social cooperation,
in order to recognise that different cooperative arrangements, in demanding
different capacities to participate in the cooperation itself, imply different possibilities
to contribute, thus setting the level at which each individual will contribute. For these
reasons, social cooperation has to be evaluated in terms of justice and, as in the
concept of justice as fairness, fairness is not only fairness among contributors, then
justice as fairness allows a wider morality of inclusion.
In light of these considerations, ultimately, justice as fairness suggests a better
framework, as a more extensive one in terms of both equal liberties and just
distribution of resources, than the materialist framework underpinning the social
model and presents, therefore, a theory open to a greater and more complete level
of inclusion for disabled people in the social cooperative framework.
My criticism of the materialist framework of the social model of disability consists
ultimately in an internal critique to the model itself, as proposed by scholars in
disability studies, and in arguments provided from an external perspective, liberal
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egalitarianism. This perspective informs my critique of the theoretical assumptions
of the social model of disability, which I consider in the next section.
3.4 A Philosophical Critique of the Social Model of Disability: External
Critique
There are two premises to my external critique of the social model of disability.
Firstly, liberal egalitarian concepts underpin both my critical approach and my
implicit delineation of a possible, alternative framework for the understanding of
disability. Secondly, the aim of inclusion, in a way a redefinition of the inclusive
society advocated by disabled scholars and disabled people's movements, is kept
firmly in sight as necessary and valuable element of a liberal egalitarian position.
My critique addresses three main issues. First, it considers the definition of
impairment and disability in light of concepts of causality, responsibility and moral
agency. Second, it analyses the place and use of normative categories within the
social model and in defining disability and impairment. Finally, it explicates the
concept of individual as citizen with relation to a cooperative framework, a society,
where justice is the main political virtue.
3.4.1 Defining Impairment and Disability: Causality, Responsibility and
Agency
The question of defining impairment and disability occupies a central and
foundational place in any analysis or theory of disability and in any account of
inclusion. Any given definition subsumes theoretical perspectives whilst, on the
other hand, implying differently oriented policies, too. The social model definitions
refer to a precise understanding of disability and, in turn, support political actions
and policies that are different from those suggested by the individual model. The
slogan 'change society not the individual', if taken as a basis for social policies, has
evidently very different implications than the idea that it is the individual who needs
to be modified with respect to certain norms. Thus, the centrality of providing a
theoretically coherent definition of impairment and disability becomes self- evident.
The task at hand is not an easy one, though, as the complexity of disability and
impairment and the different perspectives on their dimensions suggest.
Nevertheless, my critique will articulate two main issues related to the social model
definition: the issue of causation and that of responsibility and moral agency.
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It is worth here revisiting briefly the definition proposed by the social model
theorists. The social model asserts,
It is not the individual's impairment which causes disability (Impairment -* Disability), or which is the
disability (lmpairment=Disability), and it is not the difficulty of individual functioning with physical,
sensory or intellectual impairment which generates the problem of disability" (Thomas, 1999: 14).
Disability is the result of social arrangements that, by placing and acting as barriers,
work to restrict the activities of people with impairments. Disability, ultimately, is
socially caused (Social barriers—*Disability). (Thomas, 1999:14)
The claim by Oliver and other disabled theorists that disablement is a consequence
of social oppression and that, 'it has nothing to do with the body' (Oliver, 1996: 35)
stems exactly from the definition above. Furthermore, Oliver argues,
What is at stake here is the issue of causation, and whereas previous definitions were ultimately
reducible to the individual and attributable to biological pathology, the above definition locates the
causes of disability squarely within society and social organisations (Oliver, 1990: 11).
Whilst agreeing with Oliver that causation is fundamental here, I suggest that the
advocated break-up of the causal link between impairment and disability, and the
consequent causality established between society and disability is incorrect and
needs further consideration.
One immediate intuition, the idea that impairment and disability are related, proves
prima facie difficult to deny. As the medical sociologist Bury notices,
Without some underlying initial problem, social responses would, so to speak, have nothing to
respond to. If labelling theory is invoked, some form of 'primary derivation' is necessary, if societal
reactions are to have any meaning (Bury, in Barnes, Mercer, 1996: 30).
In other words, it would appear difficult to understand why society would oppress
and discriminate some individuals, if there were no relation at all with a, perhaps
wrongly, perceived initial state which they share. True, this needn't be a causal
relation, but does not exclude it, either.
A major criticism that disabled people and theorists have raised to the social model
is that is does not give any account of the element of impairment. French, among
others, has convincingly described how her visual impairment imposes social
restrictions, like not recognising people or not reading social and non-verbal
languages in social interactions, restrictions that are unaccounted for by the social
model (Oliver, 1996: 37; French, 1993). Moreover, feminist disabled scholars like
Wendell (1996), Morris (1991) and Thomas (1999) have reconsidered impairment
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while accepting, at different degrees, the basic assumptions of the model. Thomas,
for instance, maintains:
In the everyday lives of disabled people there is a melding of the accumulated consequences of
coming up against social bamers which restrict what one can do, of having to deal with emotional
and psychological consequences of other people's reactions to the way we look or behave, as well
as the wider cultural representations of being impaired, and (for many) of the difficulties of lMng with
pain, discomfort, fatigue, limited functioning and other impairment effects (1999: 81).
In her account of the social model, therefore, Thomas reinstates impairment
considered as impairment effects and claims that the personal experience of living
with disability and impairment and their interaction should be on the Disability Study
agenda (Thomas, 1999:125).
Why is impairment an important element? I suggest a hypothetical scenario related
to Oliver's claim on social oppression as causing disablement and his decisive
separation of impairment from disability. Thus, if we imagine a society where
barriers and discrimination against disabled people were totally overcome and
therefore non- existent, how would the experience of impaired people be
configured? Would such a society imply French's impairment be not related at all to
any restrictions in communication? I find it difficult to think of how French could
actually overcome her restriction of activity, i.e. recognising non- verbal cues, if not
by overcoming her impairment altogether. So, in my understanding, French would
not be oppressed, as we have imagined that oppression has indeed disappeared,
but her restriction of activity, her inability to read non-verbal messages would still be
there. We can extend the hypothesis to think that somehow, people would all be
able to interact at different levels, verbal and non-verbal, thus allowing for French to
communicate without experiencing any difference. Still, French would not be able to
relate to other people through non-verbal language, unless she could overcome her
impairment. Finally, even if oppression and discrimination were eliminated, where
would the pain, the discomfort and the fatigue, acknowledged by Thomas as
impairment effects, stand, according to social theorists? And how would they relate
to restrictions of activities?
Disabled scholars have certainly considered the importance of analysing impairment
as well as its effects, and, in light of that, they have even proposed the theorisation
of a 'sociology of impairment' to complement their 'sociology of disability' (Oliver,
1996: 42). The framework would then be configured as follows. Disablement would
be all that is referred to the systematic exclusion of impaired people from society,
71
and consequently, disability would be all restrictions of activity caused by disabling
arrangements. Impairments would have certain effects, among them restriction of
activities or pain and discomfort, but that would be a completely separate matter
from disability. Hence the necessity of defining the latter 'impairment effects' and of
providing a sociology of impairment.
In my opinion, rather than supplementing a theory through another one, a
reconsideration of some problematic elements within the first theory would be
preferable. However, let us proceed with the analysis of impairment as conducted
by the disabled scholar Abberley, as his position, like the social model, raises
further theoretical issues in the articulation between impairment, disability and
society.
Abberley has long claimed that social 'modellists' should not have left the analysis
of impairment to biological theories and should have configured, instead, a social
model of impairment (Thomas, 2002: 52). In his theory of the social origin of
impairment and oppression, Abberley claims that for the vast majority of the world's
disabled people, 'impairment is very clearly primarily the consequence of social and
political factors, not an unavoidable 'fact of nature" (Abberley, 1987:11). This claim
is certainly well founded in some of the cases Abberley quotes, which are related to
impairments as results of wars, or famine, or poverty, or hazardous occupations.
Where he seems to conclude with arguable generalisations, however, is when he
suggests that all impairments are socially caused. He provides, for instance, the
example of the degenerative process connected to ostheo-arthritis. In so far as this
example is concerned, the claim that impairment is socially constructed can be
partially accepted if modified into the statement that some impairments, for some
individuals, in some specific circumstances can have social components. The case
of the degenerative process of arthritis when linked to specific occupations can
certainly be considered as having a social element, but that does not extend to all
cases and not to all people. Some people do develop arthritis independently from
occupations or without having being exposed to the working conditions considered
the social causes of the impairment.
Abberley presents a further argument in his analysis of impairment that may result
from hereditary factors or from injury at birth (Abberley, 1987:12). His example
draws from the case of Phenilketonuria (P.K.U.), a disorder associated with the
hereditary inability to metabolise the amino-acid phenylanine, which, if undetected
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at birth, causes mental retardation. In Abberley's explanation, if prior to the
detection and cure of the disorder it was reasonable to characterise it as congenital,
it is now equally reasonable to characterise it as socially determined, as the effects
of it are now emerging only in those settings in which the adequate detecting tests
are not conducted. Consequently, Abberley concludes:
It would thus seem impossible to adequately draw a dMding line between genetic and
environmental, and thus ultimately social, factors. Rather, the designation of genetic factors as
primarily causative is itself a judgement determined by knowledge, interest and intention, in other
words, a political judgement (Abberley, 1987: 12).
It is, indeed, difficult to mark a clear divide between genetic and environmental
origins for some traits so we do have to address empirically the fundamental
question of how intrinsic features of an individual interact with features of the social
environment to produce impairment and, in some cases, disability (Bickenbach,
1999:1174). More arguable, though, is the statement that P.K.U. is therefore, a
socially caused impairment. In my understanding of the contention, if every child at
birth presented P.K.U. as a congenital character, and only some children were to be
treated, it would certainly be true that, for those who did not receive any tests or
treatment, and only for those, the origin of the impairment would rest on certain
biological traits, but aggravated by a clear social component. However, as not all
children present the congenital trait of Phenilketonuria, but only some and in a
hereditary and therefore predictable way, Abberley's conclusion of its social cause
is difficult to accept.
My disagreement with the definition of impairment and disability provided by the
social model does not certainly aim at reintroducing a linear causal link between
impairment and disability sic et simpliciter and in all cases. If we accept that society
discriminates against impaired people, then we can understand the claim of the
disablement structure of society, too. What I hold, ultimately, is that there certainly is
a relation between oppression and disability, when society plays a strong role in
excluding and marginalizing impaired people, thus causing disability. But in
maintaining that disability is exclusively socially caused, the social model theorists
are over-socialising their position, in other words they are attributing to society
elements that are not entirely and clearly social, thus, as seen, setting a model that
needs clarifications and extensions (Bury, 2000, Thomas, 2002: 44).
More specifically, the social model overlooks the impairment effects, in terms of
their restriction of activities or the possible inabilities to perform different functions.
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In so doing, it downplays the importance of the relational nature of impairment,
disability, and society. Moreover, in asserting the total separation between
impairment and disability, it opens up a potential 'proliferation' of terms other than
disabilities, to denote inability or being unable to do things. This, if politically correct,
appears less justified theoretically. Consider, for example, some forms of congenital
blindness that prevent people to perform certain actions, like driving a car. This form
of impairment, which relates to a clear inability and a disability if referred to driving
(after all, society is currently structured as to have sighted drivers only), is certainly
not a cause of inability or disability in many other possible activities, like enjoying
music or cooking or acting as a state minister. It is now clearer, therefore, why some
disabled scholars have voiced the need to reconsider impairment, and why medical
sociologists have pointed at the relational aspect of some impairment with illness
and disability. A different framework is therefore needed and I suggest that looking
at the definitional issue through a different perspective altogether, would provide us
with a more coherent basis for the understanding of impairment, disability, society
and their reciprocal implications. I shall develop elements of this framework in the
following chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Inscribed in the relation between impairment, disability and society is a final critical
point addressing moral and social responsibility. In maintaining that disability is
socially caused the social model of disability attributes the responsibility of
disablement completely to society. In his development of a social understanding of
impairment, Abberley argues that impairment is socially caused; therefore asserting
that society is responsible also for the impairment it produces. However, in the light
of the previous critical points and although the issue of responsibility is very
complex, a few considerations emerge. First, if society causes discrimination, either
politically or economically, therefore causes restriction of activity or participation,
then society is responsible for the disablement in an unacceptable way. The same
applies when society causes impairment, as a consequence of war, for instance.
But there are circumstances when impairment and its effects do not stem from
social causes and many of the examples above have illustrated this claim. There
are, consequently, different considerations related to responsibility with respect to
impairment. How could a congenital impairment unrelated to any endemic condition
be considered society's responsibility? Moreover, even when fully endorsing the
social model position, it is quite questionable how society could be held responsible
in the case of disablement connected to the activity of driving for a visually impaired
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person due to congenital blindness. Finally, there are impairments that are a
consequence of a person's agency, in other words of her particular actions or
activities, some of which can well be highly risky activities, voluntarily undertaken.
When impairment arises from a hang-gliding accident, to mention an extreme case,
considerations of society's responsibility are difficult to sustain. In that case, when
the sport had been voluntarily chosen with full awareness of its potential risks, when
all that could be done to prevent the accident had been done and when rescue had
been provided, what is society's responsibility?
Here again, the social model of disability shows the element of over socialisation
and improper generalisation seen in the causal link established between society and
disability, thus reconfirming the internal limits highlighted so far. These limits are
emerging also from an analysis of the criticism of the social model against concepts
of normality, which I address in the following section.
3.4.2. Normality, Difference and Rehabilitation
The critique of the category of normality in terms of any human average functioning
is a relevant aspect of the social model of disability. Social model theorists frame
their position on a materialist approach that considers also postmodernist
influences, mainly related to binary distinctions produced by the power/knowledge
process (Thomas, 1999:117) and to the role of health care systems in individual and
social control (Oliver, 1996:104, 108).
Normality, writes Oliver, 'is a construct imposed on a reality where there is only
difference' (Oliver, 1996: 88) and the whole ideology of normal function and able-
bodieness stems from the capitalistic forces structuring society and controlling it
through its institutions. Social model theorists oppose any idea of normality seen as
ideologically constructed in order to control and exclude disabled people from the
structure of a society that has no interest in accommodating them. Connected to the
rejection of the concept of normality is the critical stand against issues of cure and
rehabilitation, seen as oppressive powers used to convert created individual
pathological states back into idealised states of normality.
My critique of this approach will, first of all, look at the internal debate within
Disability Studies to then proceed with considerations drawn in from different
frameworks.
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Although disabled people movements and social 'modellists' alike share the critical
rejection of any ideal concept of normality, the debate within Disability Studies sees
different positions on the sameness/difference binary and on the
materialist/postmodernist approach, too. Analyses of the question of social
difference by feminist disabled scholars have played a central role in criticising and
reconsidering the social model original rejection of normality and in reintroducing
issues of difference into the debate. Criticisms have pointed out how the social
model excludes or marginalizes differences associated to particular groups of
disabled people, for instance women and ethnic minorities, and how the model itself
does not represent the interests of people who have particular forms of
impairments, for example learning difficulties or mental illnesses (Thomas,
1999:101).
Some positions, however, expand this point further and aim at reconsidering the
biological differences, which have provided the basis for the discrimination between
disabled and non—disabled people. Disabled feminist scholars like Wendell (1996)
and Morris (1991), for instance, while being well aware of the cultural and social
meanings associated with 'normality' and 'abnormality' and their parallel
postmodernist deconstructions, nevertheless reintroduce in their analysis elements
related to the biological domain. Let us consider them briefly.
Wendell's approach to bodily differences 'appears to accept that there are biological
differences which really do set some bodies apart from others' (Thomas, 1999:105)
and that there are specific experience and knowledge arising from these
differences. According to Wendell, moreover,
it would be cruel, as well as a distortion of people's lives, to erase or ignore the everyday, practical,
experienced limitations of people's disabilities (restrictions of activities) simply because we
recognise that human bodies and their varied conditions are both changeable and highly interpreted
(Wendell, cited in Thomas, 1999:106).
Wendell points to the valuable addition to knowledge and experience that these
differences bring about and suggests how, while setting some people apart from
others, these elements enrich and expand our culture.
Similarly, Morris argues that what prevents a value free use of the word 'normal', in
terms of 'that which is common', is the high prejudice associated with the
recognition of difference in terms of all that is undesirable, wrong, not admirable,
therefore, negative (Morris, 1991:15). This has led to the denial of difference in an
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attempt to overcome discrimination. Nevertheless, Morris argues further that, 'we
are different. We reject the meanings that non-disabled world attach to disability but
we do not reject the differences which are such an important part of our identities'
(Morris, 1991:17). Morris mentions physical and intellectual characteristics that
distinguish disabled people's experience from that of the majority of the population
and the different needs arising from these differences. Moreover, she claims that
assumptions of disabled people's desire to be or become normal are not only utterly
wrong, but one of the main sources of oppression for disabled people themselves.
Finally, in asserting the importance of disability and illness as part of human
experience, like in Wendell's position, Morris reclaims the value of disability and the
celebration of differences (1991: 38).
Despite its important internal articulation, the debate within Disability Studies on
issues of normality and difference can be subsumed in the advocated 'celebration of
differences' as the guiding value for an inclusive society. However, even if at a
prima facie moral level, accepting the celebration of differences appears highly
valuable, at a more critical analysis this position shows its difficulties.
In dealing with the issue of normality the social theory of disability faces two main
limits. First, it seems to deconstruct perfectly the ideology of normality and its social
components, without being able, however, to provide a model or a different scheme
against which evaluate functioning and its implications. This guides us to the second
problem, namely that, in advocating the celebration of differences, disabled scholars
appear to lose sight theoretically of the implications of their own claims, when
referred to their political aims, that is, for instance, their demands for independent
living and personal allowances. Why is this?
The rejection of normality as a guiding concept, if applied consistently, leads to
some untenable conclusions, both theoretically and practically. If we deny normality
seen in terms of average human functioning, how would we evaluate impairment
and disability? Would any functioning or non-functioning be considered equally in a
social theory of disability? What could then constitute impairment/disability? What
constitutes non-impairment? Paradoxically, the social model of disability could be
brought to its limits by saying that if there is no normal functioning, there is not non-
normal functioning therefore impairment and disability do not exist.
Secondly, how can we celebrate differences and then distribute resources
accordingly? Against which principle should resources be devoted to a wheelchair
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user as compared to a non-impaired person? Should we then say that being
different is the guiding principle? A further question would then arise: different from
what? Finally, the rejection of normality could indeed end up creating another
category, that of difference, which, ultimately, appears more problematic and less
coherent with the very aims of disabled people's movements. To illustrate this point
through an example, consider the claims of independent living and the demand for
personal assistance provided and supplied to disabled people as a matter of right.
How could we sustain those claims while at the same time negating a departure
from human average functioning in the case of some impairment and disability?
True, each person experiences some need of assistance in different forms and at
different points in their lives, but there are impairment effects that lead some people
to a more significant and continued use of personal assistance or mobility aids than
others. Ultimately, in my opinion, the total rejection of the concept of normality and
either the lack of a reference concept or its substitution with an unspecified concept
of difference shows, not only theoretical and political limits, but also a mismatch
between the theoretical basis of the social model and some of its practical, political
aims.
The rejection of normality is directly linked to a stringent critique, as seen above, of
the medical professions and of issues of cure and rehabilitation. The social model
clearly articulates its rejection of any form of medicalisation of disability while, at the
same time, but to a much lesser extent, recognising the valuable contribution of
medicine to the well being of many disabled people. In this critical position,
however, the social model shows the oppressive power of medicine and
rehabilitation, somehow unilaterally, without fully acknowledging their benefits to
disabled people.
It is worth recalling Oliver's suggestion that although medicine has increased
survival rates and prolonged life expectancies for many disabled people, the issue is
now not connected to life expectancy, but expectations of life (see above, and
Oliver, 1990: 48). If the meaning of expectations of life is indeed a rendering of the
more general concept of well being, then, it is clear how social theorists have lost
sight of the fact that medical intervention has actually promoted both, life
expectancy and expectancy of life, for disabled people. It is also (although not only)
through the improvement of some medical conditions that disabled people can now
participate in activities once inaccessible to them. For instance, medical
intervention, together, of course, with non-discriminatory policies, has opened the
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possibility of access to labour market for many disabled people, thus providing a
wider range of opportunity than before. This point also sheds an alternative light on
the social analysis of the collusion between medical power and rise of capitalism as
forces of oppression and segregation, restraining disabled people from a full
participation in society, given their presumed inability to sustain pressures in the
workplace. Sure, the same analysis could now point out that it is due to the
impossibility to meet the increased costs associated to the dependency of disabled
people that they are now allowed to re-enter the workforce. However, even when
that sustained, the previous consideration in relation to the wider opportunities
provided by medical intervention, still holds.
Finally, some remarks on the possibility of rehabilitation or, as named by social
theorists, on the 'adjustment industry'. Here the argument goes that if society really
were to give equal respect and consideration to disability, then it would not insist on
the ideology of the able-body in an able-mind and would not conversely see in
rehabilitation the only way out of the personal tragedy of disability. While these
claims are very important insights into the issue of rehabilitation, there is another set
of considerations attached to rehabilitation, which the social model, in its more than
justified rejection of oppression, ends up overlooking. These include both an
element of actuality and a theoretical element. The former is related to the improved
functioning and the increased well being possibly associated to some forms of
rehabilitation. After all, as Oliver himself maintains, the expectation of life for people
with spinal cord injury is now possible due to the improved medical practice and
rehabilitation provided (Oliver, 1988). However, a theoretical perspective on issues
of rehabilitation, which includes a reference to autonomous choices, seems more
important. In his extension of the Rawlsian theory of justice aimed at considering the
position of disabled people, Brighouse sees the notion of rectification of the
disability as one possibility that should be available, but on grounds of it being
'waivable'. 'This reflects the idea that . . . individuals are expected to take appropriate
responsibility for their conception of the good life' (2001: 554). In this case,
individuals could choose - autonomously - whether or not to undergo physical
rehabilitation or whether or not to accept medical intervention as part of their
resource distribution. The important issue, ultimately, is that they should be provided
with that choice and that the option should be therefore left to the autonomous
choice of the individual, a perspective that the social model, in its criticism of
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rehabilitation, has not explicitly stated. This element relates ultimately to
considerations on individual, society and their relation.
3.4.3 Individual, Individualism and Liberalism
Social theorists' basic assumptions about the relation between individual and
society are mainly drawn from a Marxist view. Oliver, for instance, maintains, 'My
own view is that we are only social beings; without society we cannot exist' (Oliver,
1996:146). Within a materialist view of this kind, social model scholars refer the
concept and the analysis of the individual mainly to economic and cultural forces of
capitalism. Throughout Oliver's analysis of the politics of disablement, for instance,
and in further works by different social theorists (see, among others, Oliver, 1990;
Barton, 1996; Barnes, Mercer, Shakespeare 1999; Tremain, 2001), notions of
individuality and individualism are related to the individual model and to the
ideological construction of the disabled individual. The latter, according to social
model theorists, sees individuals 'as commodity for sale in the labour market'
(Burton cited in Oliver, 1990: 67) or as the 'isolated private individual' detached from
larger social groupings (Oliver, 1990: 44). Consequently, the individual in the social
model is inscribed in the parameter of individualism and the accent on individualism
is a negative one; individualism is the ground for the emergence of distorted images
of disability.
In referring to Lukes's discussion of individualism in general, however, Oliver makes
a brief and isolated concession to the gains of individualism. These consist in 'the
breaking down of traditional hierarchies and privileges and in establishing the legal
rights of individuals' (Oliver, 1990: 59). Oliver endorses Lukes's claim that,
If equality and liberty have to be taken seriously, then these gains have to be transcended (through
enforcing) the view of un-abstracted individuals in their concrete, social specificity, who in virtue of
being persons, all require to be treated and to live in a social order which treats them as possessing
dignity, as capable of exercising and increasing their autonomy, of engaging in valued activities
within a private space, and of developing their several potentialities (Oliver, 1990: 59).
Equal dignity, the opportunity to become autonomous and to exercise autonomy,
engaging in one's own valued activities, the developing of one's own potentialities
are all elements of the liberal egalitarian view of the individual. The same liberal
egalitarian view that has been intrinsically deconstructed and rejected by social
theorists as assimilated to the construction of individualism. I suggest that this
rendering of concepts of individual in terms of individualism and the assimilation of
individualism to liberalism is indeed wrongly conceptualised. If we examine this
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claim further, moreover, what emerges is that all the positive elements gained by
what has been named individualism are indeed coinciding with aims of the social
model of disability. It appears clear, therefore, that the negative image of
individualism and, consequently, the implicit rejection of liberalism as a possible
framework for understanding disability need serious reconsideration. Furthermore, I
suggest that, if equality and liberty have to be taken seriously - and no doubt social
theorists and disabled movements do consider them seriously - then they have to
be enforced also at a theoretical level and in a normative way, for individuals
defined as free and equal persons, thus subjects of equal moral worth. When such a
framework has been provided theoretically, then the practical implications at a policy
level are more likely to follow, thus allowing for the un-abstracted disabled individual
to fully claim for her rights in her concrete, social specificity.
The debate in Disability Studies has been recently enriched by a more articulated
reflection on issues of rights and citizenship. Rioux, for instance, maintains, 'Setting
the boundaries for citizenship frames the rights and the responsibilities of citizens
and the elements of both state and individual responsibility.' According to Rioux,
however, disabled people are still lacking in both, rights and capacity to participate
as citizens, due to legal structures and social barriers (Rioux, 2002: 216, 217).
Rioux then explicates an important relation in that she maintains,
The way governments allocate their resources is a reflection of their interpretation of citizenship and
rights and the role of the state. ... Disabled people have never been included in the mainstream of
social rights (Rioux, 2002: 225).
Therefore, considerations of rights and entitlement in Rioux's position are linked to
the importance that the goals of the struggle for social change be recognised as
freedom and autonomy (Rioux, 2001: 47). This shift towards freedom and personal
autonomy opens the discussion within Disability Studies to the concepts
underpinning liberalism. In this recent shift, ultimately, Disability Studies are closer
to the perspective I suggest as fundamental in providing a different framework for a
reconsideration of impairment, disability and society.
Concluding Comments
Trying to engage with the complex debate internal to Disability Studies, my analysis
has presented two main critiques of the social model, an internal and an external
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critique. At the internal level I have addressed issues related to the materialist
framework underpinning the social model, whilst, at the external level, I have
analysed some limits of the model definition and its rejection of normative
categories, as well as concepts of the individual in relation to society.
My main contention is that the social model of disability presents theoretical limits in
its attempt to define disability and its demands of justice for disabled people, which
can be avoided through a different framework. I have illustrated the arguments
supporting my critique by analysing internal and external problems. I have endorsed
an internal critique to the materialist framework underpinning the social model by
claiming that new economic arrangements, and the use and introduction of new
technologies, urge the model to reconsider the accent on materialist structures. I
have argued, furthermore, that the materialist framework and the cooperative
scheme it supports are not the best perspectives to represent the interests of
disabled people in society. This, I have suggested, is due to the model of
redistribution of resources and the concepts of justice implied by the materialist
paradigm, as they are still inscribed in concepts of productivity and reciprocity.
Opposed to that, I have proposed a liberal framework as a more extensive one in
terms of justice and liberties, due to the concept of justice that it implies, namely,
subject-centred justice. As the former is based on the equal moral worth of persons,
I have argued, it is open to a more inclusive view of social cooperation.
I have also maintained that the definition provided by the social model presents
three main limits. First, it over socialises aspects of impairments and disability,
sometimes conflating oppression and disability, and therefore ultimately proposing
improper generalisations. Secondly, I have claimed that the social model overlooks
the effects of impairment and in so doing ends up downplaying the relational aspect
of impairment, disability and society. Furthermore, I have suggested that the
rejection of the concept of normality in its meaning of average human functioning,
although understandable and justified in deconstructing oppression, can
theoretically lead to unwanted conclusions. Finally, I have proposed that the critique
of individualism and its related understanding of the concept of individual has to be
reconsidered, especially in light of the social model's aims. In trying to overcome
these limits, I have touched upon the concepts and principles of a different
framework, the capability approach, as part of the liberal framework underpinning
my critique.
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As a concluding note I suggest that, despite its internal limits, the social model of
disability nevertheless acts as a powerful and important corrective to our
understanding of disability, to simplistic views about the experience of disability and,
more importantly, to the oppressive nature of some social arrangements. This is the
actual powerful core value of the model, its constant reminder to face issues of
inclusion as fundamental moral issues.
In the next chapter, I present and critically analyse perspectives in inclusive




The Social Model of Disability and Inclusive
Education
The social model of disability has substantially influenced the debate on inclusive
education and, in particular, the sociological perspectives of the debate. Whilst
endorsing the social model theoretical and political framework, these perspectives
apply them to the definition of learning disability and to the conceptualisation of
inclusion in education. This chapter critically presents both levels of application of
the social model of disability to education: the definitional level and the level of
policy proposed. More specifically, the chapter outlines some of the limits of
sociological perspectives in inclusive education and maintains that these limits
parallel those identified for the social model of disability. The upshot of the
discussion is that, as in the case of the social model, social theories of inclusive
education operate in the absence of a principled framework. This, whilst related to
the definition of disability they endorse, is of hindrance to the achievement of their
own inclusive aims.
Introduction
The idea of inclusion is currently shaping the debate on disability and special
education. Complex and elusive at the same time, the concept of inclusion is
underpinned by different educational and political perspectives. Its connection to the
idea of an inclusive society, which demands the full participation and equal
recognition of all people and groups in society, has informed the more political
orientation of perspectives of inclusive education, while at the same time forming
the basis for 'bold moral and political rhetoric' used by politicians and bureaucrats to
different purposes in different countries (dough and Corbett, 2000:7).
The idea of inclusion in education has developed alongside changes in special
education, but also, and more fundamentally, in opposition to the theory and
practice of special education itself. As outlined in chapter 2, in the last fifty years
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special education in Western countries has changed considerably17. This change
has taken place in three main phases: from initial perspectives that sought to
educate disabled children in segregated institutions, through an integrationist phase,
which supported the education of disabled children in mainstream schools, until the
more recent emergence of policies of inclusive education. This development in the
provision of special education has been accompanied by a theoretical shift, from
positions based entirely on medical definitions of disability and learning difficulties,
thus centred on the individual child seen as having some 'deficiencies', to positions
analysing the limitations of school contexts and educational practices, through to the
more recent understanding of disability and special educational needs as wholly
socially constructed.
The theoretical underpinnings of ideas of inclusive education reflect their
developments by theorists working in special education, as well as the variety of
approaches that have contributed to their conceptualisation. Psycho-medical
disciplines, sociology of education, curricular approaches and school improvement
strategies and, lately, the area of disability studies have all provided different
theoretical insights to the area of inclusive educatio& 8 While all these perspectives
represent fundamental aspects of the debate, my analysis in this chapter will
intentionally focus only on the contribution from positions informed by disability
studies. More specifically, it will focus on the theoretical convergence of the social
model of disability with sociological perspectives on inclusive education, and on
some of their common theoretical and political claims. The aim of my analysis is to
show how the same theoretical limits identified in the social model of disability
constitute fundamental limits to a coherent theory of inclusive education, too.
This chapter is organised in three sections. The first concerns the conceptualisation
of inclusive education presented by sociological perspectives. The second section
briefly outlines the political claims underpinning this conceptualisation of inclusion,
whilst the third and final part presents elements of a philosophical critique of
sociological perspectives in inclusive education. My critique highlights how these
perspectives operate in the absence of a coherent theoretical and normative
framework, and are consequently unable to sustain the force of their claim for equal
consideration and equal provision for disabled children and children with learning
disabilities.
17 Chapter 2 provides a more detailed analysis of the development in special and inclusive education.
18 See Clough and Corbett, 2000: 3, 51.
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4.1 Inclusive Education: a Process Towards an Inclusive Society
According to perspectives in sociology of education, inclusion in education
represents a fundamental challenge to existing theories and practices, which extend
from special needs education to the broader context of general education. Inclusive
education is directly linked to the idea of an inclusive society and the role of
education is seen as fundamental to that achievement. Barton maintains,
Inclusive education is not and end in itself, it is a means to an end, that of establishing an inclusive
society. Thus, the notion of inclusivity is a radical one in that it places the welfare of all citizens at
the centre of consideration. (Barton, 1998: 84.)
Furthermore, according to the same scholar,
inclusion is a process. Inclusive education is not merely about providing access into mainstream
school for pupils who have previously been excluded. It is not about closing down an unacceptable
system of segregated provision and dumping those pupils in an unchanged mainstream system.
Existing school systems in terms of physical factors, curriculum aspects, teaching expectations and
styles, leadership roles, will have to change. This is because inclusive education is about the
participation of all children and young people and the removal of all forms of exclusionary practice.
(Barton, 1998: 84-85).
This conceptualisation of inclusive education directly and immediately relates it to
perspectives in disability studies and, specifically, to the social model of disability.
The adoption of the social model framework, with its emphasis on disablement as
primarily caused by social structures and institutions, is evident in the definition of
'inclusivity' as the process of removal of all exclusionary and disabling barriers in
education, and in the fundamental role accorded to the latter in the achievement of
an inclusive society'9.
Two further positions, moreover, are theoretically related to the framework of the
social model of disability. The first is the shift from a perspective that individualises
the problem of disability and special educational needs to a view that locates the
difficulty or deficit within social institutions, therefore within individual schools and
education systems more generally. The second position, related to the first one,
conceptualises the social construction of special educational needs and learning
difficulties operated by education and schooling structures. Social theorists claim
that education policies and school settings, in imposing the implementation of
specific structures, curricula and standards of achievements, act as disabling
19 See Oliver, 1996.
86
barriers, excluding de facto a wide number of children from its supposed
mainstream. According to these positions, therefore, the question to be asked is
why schools fail to teach so many pupils successfully. Furthermore, it is through
these positions that issues of inclusive education widen from considerations referred
primarily to disabled children to a more general perspective that encompasses a
response to pupils' diversity in an inclusionary way 2°. Finally, these positions also
situate inclusive education in a larger political movement, which, while considering
technical issues as marginal, primarily questions the organisation of society and
declares the celebration of difterences as its fundamental political aim. But let us
analyse these two positions in more detail.
The first concept relates inclusive education to the critique of the psycho-medical
approach by the social model. According to sociological views special education
originated precisely from the development of the 'pathology of difference' within
medical and psychological disciplines (dough and Corbett, 2000: 11). Thus medical
and psychological views applied to education locate the supposed deficit or the
abnormality within the individual child, while trying to compensate for the inherent
deficit through medical and clinical intervention. Reflected in educational theories,
this position implies the essentialist view that individuals possess inherent
characteristics, thus leading to definitions in terms of the amount of intelligence, or
ability or skills and general capacity proper to the individual child, without any further
consideration for methods of assessments, let alone elements of the wider social
and educational context. Although this approach has informed pervasively special
education and its effects are still currently relevant, a clear example of it is the
educational practice essentially informing the segregationist phase of special
education. During that phase children were assessed by clinically based procedures
and medically categorised. This process of categorisation, while 'pathologising'
pupils' responses, introduced also the discriminatory categories of normality and
abnormality. Pupils identified as abnormal were therefore placed in segregated
institutions and provided with a special education.
Tomlinson (1982: 21) has pointed out how medical and psychological perspectives
in special education can actually become deterministic, especially if the emphasis is
placed on individual causation. Moreover, the same author has addressed the
problems posed by medical and psychological definitions used to special education
20 See Ainscow, 1999:183.
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purposes, in the 'conflation' between normative and non-normative conditions.
Tomlinson adopts here a 'positivistic' account of the concepts of normative and non-
normative situations. In this sense, normative conditions are seen as related to
some clearly identifiable physical and biological states. Non-normative conditions
refer instead to those situations that are not directly related to medical or biological
factors. According to Tomlinson if the application of medical definitions is generally
unanimous in the case of physical disabilities, the situation is rather more
complicated and certainly socially constructed in the case of supposed learning
disabilities. Thus, for instance, if deafness and cerebral palsy are categories
normatively agreed upon by professionals and readily applied to educational
settings, categories used to classify learning difficulties do not have a normative
status, in that they do not relate clearly to biological or medical conditions (as, for
instance, categories like maladjustment or educational sub normality), and are
therefore subject to the structural and cultural factors proper to social interpretation.
This, in turn, is due to the fact that 'there are no adequate measuring instruments or
agreed criteria in the social world to decide upon these particular categories,
whether descriptive or statutory.' (1982: 65.) Moreover, this social interpretation of
non-normative conditions is reflected in the historical changes in the descriptions
and use of these categories.
Tomlinson claims that psychological and mental testing and, later on, the complex
and contentious debate on 1Q 2' are significant examples of the social element
inscribed in categories used to classify learning disabilities. When first established
at the beginning of last century mental testing procedures, while labelling some
children as abnormal or educationally subnormal, had the main purpose of
separating and removing large numbers of children from normal schooling and of
placing them in special educational settings. Data from that period show, however,
that in England the vast majority of children identified as abnormal or uneducable
were mainly from very poor social and economic backgrounds, if not entirely from
the working classes. Later on, the sets of criteria applied became more complex. A
child could be defined as educationally 'backward' but with a high or low IQ; 'he or
she could be ESN (educationally subnormal) without requiring special schooling, or
could be of above average ability and still require special schooling.' (Tomlinson,
1982:63) Still further on, in the early 1970's, psychologists started to rely less on IQ
21 The debate on 0 (Intelligence Quotient) is used here only for the purpose of illustrating the non-
normative status associated to psychological notions.
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testing and to apply instead specific sub-tests in order to provide educational
programmes that could reinforce the defined cognitive disability and compensate for
the assessed deficit.
Social theorists of inclusive education provide these examples to show the
individualisation and 'pathologisation' of disability as consequences of medical
models applied to education. According to social theorists, moreover, these
examples are used to illustrate also the social construction of the presumed deficit
and disability, thus relating to the second main argument connecting the idea of
inclusive education to the social model of disability. Parallel to this model, inclusive
theories in education critically address the exclusion and marginalisation of children
from mainstream schooling through their categorisation as educationally abnormal
and therefore, uneducable. They further link this process, both historically and
sociologically, to the emergence of industrial societies with their requirements in
terms of mass schooling and educated workforce. Furthermore, according to these
inclusive perspectives, this process is also related to the empowerment of medical
and educational professionals. On the one hand, therefore, special institutions were
created to accommodate the children categonsed as different and difficult to
educate in mainstream schooling, while, on the other hand, powerful groups in
society determined, through classifications and institutionalisation, the abnormal
child as opposed to the normally able one. Thus, according to Tomlinson,
sociologically, the history of special education must be viewed in terms of the benefits it brought for
a developing industnal society, the benefits for the normal mass education system of a 'special' sub-
system of education, and the benefits that medical, psychological, educational and other personnel
derived from encouraging new areas of professional expertise (Tomlinson, 1982: 29).
These themes relate consistently to the critical analysis of the individual model
provided by the social model of disability, in that they see the relation of power
between social groups and the dominant, hegemonic imposition of some groups on
others, in this case medical and educational professionals on parents and their
children. In Armstrong's words, 'the traditional special education discourse is one in
which the voices of the profession dominate.' (Armstrong 0. in Armstrong F. &
Armstrong & Barton, 2000:135.)
These perspectives, however, have stressed the social construction of special
educational needs operated not only through medical classifications, but also by
specific educational structures, in terms of policy, curricular approaches and cultural
and relational aspects proper to the learning process and the school environment.
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Thus, touching upon curricular perspectives in inclusive education, for instance, can
help illustrate the claim of the social construction of special needs more concretely.
dough and Armstrong have both pointed out how the curriculum as a 'cultural
scheme' (dough, 2000:18) and as 'concerned with the ways in which different kinds
of knowledge and the values which underpin them are transmitted by schools'
(Armstrong, 1998: 56) can actually either sustain and promote differences between
pupils or, instead, produce students who fail. According to some curricular
perspectives, therefore, the elevation of particular kinds of knowledge as the main
aspect of a curriculum ends up producing unsuccessful students, and therefore
students with different or special needs. Hence, for example, Clough argues that the
elevation of the cognitive-intellectual domain above all the others, 'in valuing and
rewarding a particular form of thinking, typically provides the basis for defining the
students with learning difficulties.' (dough, 1998:7.) Ultimately, the curricular
perspective on inclusive education aims at showing how a curriculum based
uniquely on abstract forms of knowledge would discriminate between students in a
different way and to a different degree from that associated to a broader curriculum,
one including, for instance, aesthetic-creative or physical-motor domains as well.
Consequently, by contrast to psycho-medical positions and in agreement with social
model theorists, social perspectives on inclusive education see the category of
special educational needs as the product of educational processes implying
exclusionary practices and oppressive structures. The key concept at play here,
therefore, is not the difference in individual ability, but the ability of the school
system and of the single school to respond to individual differences. More
specifically, the key concept is the 'celebration of difference' where 'difference is not
a euphemism for defect, for abnormality, for a problem to be worked out through
technical and assimilationist education policies. Diversity is a social fact' (Armstrong
& Barton, 2000:134) and as such, it should be understood and celebrated.
Moreover, according to Barton,
inclusive education is thus about responding to diversity, it is about listening to unfamiliar voices,
being open and empowering all members. It is about learning to live with one another. The question
of listening is a particularly important issue when applied to individuals and groups who have had
their voice marginalized. ... Thus, the importance of listening to disabled pupils is crucial (Barton,
1998: 85).
This last point refers in turn to the importance of creating inclusive learning
(Tomlinson, 1996), based on listening to the voices and the requirements of the
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individuals while adapting educational institutions to the demands posed by different
learners. Male endorses this position by stating that, 'Inclusive learning can be
described as 'the greatest degree of match or fit between the individual learner's
requirements and the provision that is made for them' (Male, 2000: 3).
These considerations lead us to address the themes upon which these views on
inclusive education theorise inclusive schooling. More specifically, the principles
informing inclusive education give way to a certain 'educational culture' (Corbett and
Slee, 2000:143), which is expressed through curriculum, pedagogy and through the
organisational structures and the ethos of the institution. Inclusive schooling,
consequently, demands the reconstruction of schooling in terms of
different approaches to classroom organisation, the way teaching occurs, to the development of
curriculum content and materials, to assessment and reporting to the process of school and
community interaction and decision making (Corbett and Slee, 2000: 144).
The educational culture supported by inclusive education, moreover, does not take
place in a policy vacuum. Inclusive education begins from the context of policy
(Corbett and Slee, 2000:137). However, this should not mean 'to be a technical
problem for resolution through bureaucratic mechanisms and the deployment of
resources and professional expertise' (Corbett and Slee, 2000:142). Inclusive
education begins from the context of policy in that it does imply addressing the
whole educational and schooling culture through addressing the policy underlying it.
What inclusive education is about is a change in the ethos informing educational
policies and, therefore, the schools' culture (Oliver, 1996: 87).
This very last point relates to the more political aim of sociological perspectives in
inclusive education, that of contributing to the realisation of an inclusive society,
which values differences. In Barton's words,
Our own starting point is that inclusive education is inextricably linked to a political critique of social
values and practices and the structures and institutions which they support. The analysis of 'value'
must explicate the role of education in the production and reproduction of different values. . . . In
struggling for the implementation of inclusive practice we are engaging in a political process of
transformation (Barton, 2000:11).
And it is to the political dimension of these perspectives that I shall now turn my
analysis.
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4.2 Inclusive Education: Rights, Entitlements and Opportunities
Inclusive education is primarily political as it is concerned with the inclusion of all
citizens in a participatory democracy (Armstrong et al, 2000; Barton in dough and
Corbett, 2000: 53). Its political dimension stems both from its commitment against
exclusionary policies and practices and from its theoretical convergence with the
social model of disability and the political struggles of disabled people's movements.
The first, important element of this political aspect of social theories on inclusive
education consists in the challenge to the social and educational conditions that
shape difference as disadvantage and abnormality and combine to generate
policies and practices of exclusion. It also consists in understanding and
overcoming oppressive power relations, which, through the categonsation by
professionals, act to relegate disabled people's identities to the ideology of needs
and care. Furthermore, it consists in critically engaging with current practices and
perspectives with the awareness that their institutional settings are neither neutral
nor a-historical. Finally, this political dimension acts against any form of
individualisation of disability or special educational needs while challenging the
alleged expertise of professionals. In doing so, the political struggle of inclusive
education aims at reinstating the voices of disabled people and disabled children
into territories where they have been historically excluded.
These elements of a politics of inclusive education connect issues of inclusion in
education to the political struggle of disabled people's movements identified as part
of the new social movements, whose political aim is that differences should be
respected and promoted. These elements, furthermore, contribute to the outlining of
inclusion in terms of entitlements of disabled people and disabled children to the
benefits and opportunities entailed by rights of citizenship.
Inclusive education as a matter of rights, and, specifically, human rights, is central to
the debate on inclusion. Barton, for instance, starts his challenging questions for a
project of inclusive education by asking precisely: 'In what ways is inclusive
education a human right issue?' (Barton, 1988: 86). Subsumed in this question is a
complex political view characterised principally by theoretical positions that link
human right issues to a project of social justice understood in terms of celebration of
differences, thus in the participation of all groups in the process of democracy. In
other words, this view assumes the politics of difference as central to its project,
while seeing difference in terms of group differences.
92
Moreover, the political dimension advocated by social theorists of inclusive
education, in embracing the stand of disabled people's movements, identifies the
struggle for inclusion in terms of the critique and the removal of the exclusionary
barriers experienced by disabled people in society as well as by disabled pupils in
schools. Here is where the alternative understanding of disability and of special
educational needs comes in, in the uncovering of the social origins of disability
operated by disabling structures; a process, which, in turn, acts as starting point for
the struggle for the recognition of disabled people's and children's human rights.
Social theorists of inclusive education insist on the fundamental importance of
understanding human rights in their precise political dimension, thus related to the
specific historical and social situation experienced by disabled people and children.
In highlighting the concrete 'situatedness' of human right issues, social theorists
express their rejection of an obscure rhetoric of rights, voided of political content
and, therefore, unable in itself to bring about the essential changes required by
inclusion. They maintain that these changes should concern specifically the social
structure causing disability, but also 'the relations of power and control that underpin
the construction of the interests of some as the needs of others' (Armstrong, F. &
Armstrong and Barton, 2000: 9). As the same authors claim, finally,
It is important therefore to understand demands for 'human rights' in terms of specific historically
located objectives. In other words, to organise around demands that contest the embodiment of
dominant social interests as the 'needs' of those who experience discrimination (Armstrong et al,
2000:10).
The political dimension of human rights, according to this view, relates to the politics
of difference in that the rights of disabled people are enacted in the recognition of
their difference as a value and, therefore, in its celebration. This is the main
alternative understanding of disability as proposed by the social model, together
with the struggle against all forms of discrimination. Furthermore, difference in this
context means groups' differences, rather than individual, specific differences, but it
also means all groups in society rather than groups identified on the basis of official
and institutionalised categorisations. (Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton, 2000: 8.)
Thus, 'inclusive education begins from the context of policy and the recognition of
the complexity of identity and difference.' (Corbett & Slee, in Armstrong F. &
Armstrong & Barton 2000:137.)
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This perspective is theoretically outlined against liberalism and the principle of
equality of opportunity, seen as an empty rhetorical stance, which limits the
possibility of inclusion. According to Armstrong and Barton (2000),
Where calls for 'inclusive' schools and practices are limited by a framework which appeals for 'equal
opportunities', or understands the 'rights' of disabled people in universalistic rather than political
terms, no serious challenge is made to the conditions under which discriminatory and exclusionary
social practices operate (Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton, 2000: 11).
Moreover, according to the same authors,
The apparently high profile which has been given to 'equal opportunities' in many European
countries, both at the level of government policy and at the level of institutions over the past 25
years, has masked the real inequalities which exist in between different groups in terms of access to
experience, opportunity and power. This is particularly true of equal opportunities in the context of
education. (Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton 2000: 5.)
Furthermore, policies for equal opportunities are seen as ineffective in changing the
power structures in society, as they have been concerned mainly with improving
opportunities for some groups within certain contexts, rather than promoting
opportunities for all groups in an inclusive project. This has resulted in dividing
policies, which have ameliorated opportunities for some while neglecting others.
Examples of this situation are easily found, according to these theorists, in the case
of priorities accorded to some groups on the basis of certain features, like race or
gender, or, within the same group, in instances where tax benefits have been
conceded to blind people but not to deaf people, thus producing divisive results.
Consequently, while rejecting a liberal concept of equality of opportunities as 'a
bogus discourse' (Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton 2000: 5), at least in the way
government policies, legislations and institutions have concretised it, the political
framework of inclusive education is based instead on the demands of the rights of
disabled children as inscribed in the critique of what constitutes normality. As
Armstrong et al. have pointed out,
in the absence of such a critique, notions of 'opportunities' and 'rights' rest upon an understanding
of 'normality' that reflects the partial self-interest of dominant social groups in our society.
(Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton 2000: 11.)
Is this really the case? In the next paragraph I shall outline my critique of these
positions and provide some arguments showing the difficulties that an inclusive
political project understood in terms of politics of difference will have to address.
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4.3 A Philosophical Critique of Social Perspectives in Inclusive
Education
Inclusion as outlined in the previous section is a powerful moral and political
position, difficult to reject but equally problematic to articulate in its precise content,
both politically and educationally. Fundamentally, my intention is not to reject a
defensible conception of inclusion in education, but rather to endorse a specific
understanding of it in relation to the wider political perspective of a more just
society. An inclusive society appears intuitively more just than an exclusionary one.
However, specifying the precise morality of inclusion, in terms of concepts and
political elements, is fundamental not only for a coherent theoretical position, but
also for an effective political action. My overall critique of social accounts of
inclusive education argues that its unspecified and often confused use of theoretical
and political concepts, leads not only to a limited theory, but to a very questionable
political position, too.
My critique of the concept of inclusion as outlined by sociologists of education will
focus on some elements of the theoretical framework underpinning inclusive
education and will be conducted along the lines of my analysis of the social model
of disability. My aim is to show that, while rightly addressing its moral dimension,
current conceptualisations of inclusive education based on the social model of
disability are hampered, both theoretically and politically, by the same limits
addressed as problematic in the social model of disability. Consequently, my
critique of this conception of inclusive education will address two main points:
i) The social construction of disability and special educational needs;
ii) The adoption of a politics of difference as opposed to and as rejection of a liberal
framework and, within it, the confinement of the problem of resource distribution,
seen as a mere technicality, to what are considered marginal aspects of the process
of inclusion in education.
4.3.1 The Social Construction of Special Educational Needs
In my critique of the social model of disability I have extensively addressed the
theoretical difficulties resulting from defining disability as unilaterally socially caused
22 See chapter 3 for this critique.
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and from rejecting any idea of normality, while adopting the celebration of difference
as main political aim (see chapter 3). As I will show through a specific example, my
critical framework is indeed sustained also when applied to issues of inclusive
education. My analysis, therefore, will focus only briefly on some limits of the social
model of disability applied in the context of education.
According to one sociological perspective in inclusive education, definitions of
special needs provided by the medical model see special needs as arising from
children's own characteristics and the use of medical categories as a means to the
implementation of special educational structures and practices. Different
professional vested interests converged on the social creation of special education
and special needs, which arose in a specific historical, social and economic setting.
Moreover, categories, as Tomlinson says, are socially determined as they 'appear,
change and disappear because of the goals pursued and the decisions made by
people who control the special educational process' (1982: 22). Therefore, 'the
terminology employed to categorise children is complex and ever changing'
(1982:38).
As opposed to this, sociological theories see special needs as the results of social
practices and endorse Oliver's view that, 'The development of a pedagogic practice
based upon the definition of special educational needs as a social creation is... an
urgent and essential task over the next few years' (Oliver, 1988: 29). This should be
part, furthermore, 'of a critique of what constitutes itself as "normal"' (Barton, 2000:
11).
The nature of categorisation is certainly problematic, especially when referred to
education and when concerning those categories identified by Tomlinson as non-
normative, or non-directly arising from medical states, and thus connected to the
vast and controversial area of learning difficulties. Nevertheless, I argue that the
position endorsed by social theorists in relation to inclusive education shows the two
main limits seen in the social model of disability. First, insisting upon the social
construction of special educational needs presents an obvious element of over-
socialisation and, second, the rejection of any concept of normality and the
assertion of the celebration of difference as main educational aim is in itself
problematic. An example will help in illustrating these points.
Beth B. ... expresses interest in people, especially in their faces. She smiles and laughs, responds
positively to music, and has definite likes and dislikes concerning food, which she expresses
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through eye gaze, bodily movements and facial expressions. This is because Beth cannot speak,
but instead communicates primarily through eye gaze. Beth is a child with Brett Syndrome, a form of
autistic disorder invoMng multiple severe disabilities in the area of cognition, communication, and
motor functioning. Beth's parents, her private therapists, and the staff of professional educators who
work with her at school estimate her motor abilities lie within the range of five to seven months
(Ladenson, 2003:1).
Beth has received her education in regular classroom placement until second grade
and her further education is now a legal case in the US Federal District Court. Beth,
like many other children, is 'classified' as having Profound Multiple Learning
Difficulties, and in her education she receives the attention not only of her
classroom teacher and assistant, but also of some professional therapists.
If we apply the understanding of disability proposed by the social model to Beth's
situation, we should define her disability as the result of social and educational
barriers that act as constraints on her development. We should furthermore
recognise the oppressive nature of her medical 'classification' and the ideology of
needs that it promotes. Beth's needs, therefore, would be determined by the
professional intervention defined as necessary in her situation. Finally, we should
identify the oppressive relation that powerful professionals may exercise on those,
like Beth, defined as impaired by Brett Syndrome, or on her parents, influenced by
the configuration of disability as personal tragedy.
Beth's educational needs certainly depend largely also upon the school's structure
and culture, and how the school responds to Beth may create the space for her
thriving or not as individual. But it seems to me difficult to apply the understanding of
special needs as external to the individual child and tout court located in educational
barriers that categorise her. Moreover, Beth's experience in school, her
communication and her socialisation depend to a great extent also on the level of
care and, indeed, of professional expertise that she receives. True, following social
theorists we could argue that every child needs support and care in order to thrive in
educational settings, and that what differentiates Beth in this situation is not that
specific need, but indeed only the fact the she may need a different kind and level of
care from that of other second graders. However, it seems equally difficult not to
argue here that the level of care and expertise provided is associated to Beth's
situation as departing from the average functioning of a child in second grade, thus,
in a way, to her not being included in 'what constitutes itself as normal'. My claim
here is that social perspectives in inclusive education appear at least inadequate to
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a complete understanding of the experience of impairment in the context of
education.
What I argue, ultimately, is that Beth's story illustrates how views theorising the
social creation of special educational needs, in overlooking the experience of
impairment, and in deconstructing and rejecting definitions and references to
average functioning, presents an over socialisation of the experience of impairment
itself. Moreover, in identifying the oppressive nature of professional intervention in
the area of impairment, as in the social model of disability, social perspectives in
education may lead to the underestimation of the important contribution of
professional expertise in children's development. Further, the education of Beth
certainly requires, as admitted by perspectives in inclusive education, an inclusive
culture and ethos, and adequate curriculum and assessment methods, but it equally
requires additional resources in terms of both logistical structures and specific
technology aids (a point that I shall address further on). Finally, my critique here
endorses positions within disability studies that have addressed the limits of the
social model in explaining the experience of children with profound impairment.
Some researchers have pointed out how the social model is inadequate to express
the experience of children with impairment 'with its strong emphasis upon self-
advocacy and collective action, and given that children with profound impairment
may be largely reliant upon others' (Brett, 2002, p.830). And it seems to me that this
critique holds especially when applied to education. The first line of my critique in
now complete: let us now analyse the second aspect of my critique, the political
level of social perspectives on inclusion.
4.3.2. The Politics of Inclusion: Difference, Equal Opportunities and Resource
Distribution
According to the perspectives under discussion, inclusive education is about a
positive self-definition of difference. It asks for the celebration of difference in
opposition to the individualisation and pathologisation of it perpetuated by the
oppressive ideology of normality. Moreover, it defines difference as providing the
basis on which to establish equal entitlements for all groups in society as a matter of
human rights. Finally, inclusion is defined against the rejection of concepts of equal
opportunities as void and rhetorical; therefore, ultimately, against the broad liberal
framework informing equality in terms of equal opportunities.
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My critique of this politics of inclusion articulates three main points: first, it
addresses some problems both within the politics and the celebration of difference
and, second, it argues against the understanding of equality of opportunities
provided by sociological positions in inclusive education. Finally, it addresses the
problem of resource distribution as intrinsic to the first two positions and as
fundamental to the political aims of inclusion.
Let us first address the celebration of difference as proposed by sociological
perspectives in inclusive education. The celebration of difference assumes here
mainly two meanings: on the one hand, it is a partial endorsement of the politics of
group difference as theorised principally by Iris Marion Young, while, on the other
hand, being the celebration of the way people are, as opposed to abstract and
ideological views of normality. These two facets of the meaning of difference are
then related to issues of equal entitlement as human rights. In reclaiming the
meaning of the positive sense of group difference and the necessity of respecting
difference in politics, Young promotes the understanding of the primary goal of
social justice as social equality. In her opinion a fair distribution of goods is not
paramount in issues of justice. Social equality, she argues, entails a fair distribution
of goods but refers primarily 'to the full participation and inclusion of everyone in a
society's major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all
to develop and exercise their capacities to realize their choice' (Young, 1990:173).
According to Young,
justice in a group differentiated society demands social equality of groups, and mutual recognition
and affirmation of group differences. Attending to group-specific needs and providing for group
representation both promotes that social equality and provides the recognition that undermines
cultural imperialism (1990:191).
Sociological views in inclusive education are based on a partial endorsement of
these claims accompanied by the recognition of the fundamental priority of the
political and economical struggle against every form of discrimination, oppression
and exclusion in general (Armstrong. et al. 2000:7). What social theorists in
inclusive education are mainly concerned with, ultimately, is to eradicate the social
and economic structures that provide the basis for exclusion in the domination of
some groups of people on others. This, they claim, is precisely enacted by the
singling out of difference in terms of needs, being them individual or group needs,
23 See Young, M. I. (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press. This aspect will be addressed more thoroughly in chapter 8, where I respond to possible
objections to distributive theories of justice and to the idea of educational equality I defend.
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and by the subsequent domination of the powerful defining groups on those who are
defined. Moreover, priority resides in the social and historical context in which
discrimination and exclusion take place as, in this view, 'it is only within this general
perspective that discrimination as it affects different groups can be understood and
confronted' (Armstrong, et al. 2000:7). Finally, the struggle against discrimination
implies a cultural change in the understanding of notions of normality and difference
and a firm rejection of the individualisation of difference as pathology.
This political position gives rise to some significant difficulties. The first relates to its
emphasis on group differences alongside its parallel celebration of disability, and
leads to possible disparities among sub-groups within groups. As recognised by
disabled theorists, 'because of the division within the disabled population in terms of
age, social class, impairments.... the emergence of a coherent political movement is
unlikely.' (Barnes, 1990:128.) This, in turn, is reflected in the different groups within
the same disabled people's movements, where, for instance, deaf people see
themselves as a distinct group. Consequently, the unspecified theoretical position
that sociological perspectives on inclusion adopt in questions of difference and
group difference appears theoretically problematic and specifically so when applied
to the realm of policy. As I noticed earlier, for instance, governments have enacted
divisive policies in terms of tax benefits accorded to some groups rather than others.
This, however, instead of being only a consequence of some bogus understanding
of notions of equal opportunities, can indeed be seen as related to unspecified and
rather confused political positions that are not substantially underpinned by coherent
normative frameworks. Moreover, the lack of a precise articulation of differences in
relation to groups gives rise to problems of identity and difference. For instance,
certain sectors of the deaf community do not agree on deafness being considered a
disability, and promote instead an understanding of it as cultural difference. Finally,
in promoting the celebration of difference, the politics of inclusive education falls
back on the 'dilemma of difference'24, where difficulties arise both in acknowledging
individual differences, but with the risk of stigmatising, and in ignoring differences,
with the corresponding risk of not providing what is required by the individual. In this
sense, if we ignore the difference of disabled children with reference to education,
we are short of reasons on which to provide them with an adequate education,
whatever that may mean. On the other hand, the risk entailed by acknowledging the
24 I do not reintroduce here the whole controversy on normality, addressed in chapter 3, but these
positions draw consistently on the critique of the idea of normality characterising the social model of
disability. See chapter 3.
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difference resides in a possible singling out of needs, which may be defined by
others (I am here thinking of Beth, for instance), thus we are falling back to the
possible ground of discrimination and exclusion25
Equal opportunities have been highly criticized by these proponents of inclusive
education. In their view, equal opportunities have not only provided the basis for the
substantial undermining of the real inequalities faced by many groups in society, but
also for divisive policies whereby, for instance, disability has not received the same
attention as race or gender issues. Moreover, disabled people, as Armstrong
suggests,
have begun to challenge the representation of disability within an 'opportunities' discourse on the
ground that it discourages a critical stance towards the social conditions underpinning the
experience of disabled people (Armstrong, et al. 2000: 9).
Armstrong maintains that it is in the absence of such a critique that 'the discourse of
opportunities is disempowering in that it does little more than reconstitute earlier
discourse of 'care" (Armstrong F. & Armstrong & Barton 2000: 9), which have
prevented the political and social recognition of disabled people.
Furthermore, when applied to the specific education context, the equal opportunity
framework has been mainly associated with the latest changes in some countries
toward neo-liberal economics and more general libertarian positions. In talking
about school in England and Wales, for instance, Corbett notices,
The current emphasis in England and Wales is upon academic achievement, high standards of
behaviour and consistency of curricular approach. Whilst this can be praised as an equal
opportunity model, it reinforces an individualised, competitive attitude which rests uneasily with the
emphasis on community values, cooperation and social learning which form integral elements of
inclusive education. (Corbett and Slee, 2000: 137.)
Slee reinforces this position by maintaining that Australia, too, 'is entrapped within a
compensatory model of distributive justice (Corbett and Slee, 2000: 138).
In addressing this critical stance against equal opportunities, some specifications
and clarifications are necessary. First, it is important to notice that these criticisms of
the idea and the politics of equal opportunity are provided without a clear and full
understanding of the meaning of 'equal opportunities' and without a significant
operationalisation of it. Second, it is necessary to explicate the difference between
equality of opportunity as enacted by governmental policies and the pnnciple of fair
25 See chapter 2. Kittay, E. F. (1999) has provided an interesting discussion of this dilemma in terms
of justice in her Love's Labor. See pp. 10-11.
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equality of opportunity as theoretically informing liberal egalitarianism. It appears
that equal opportunities as declared in political manifestos have actually promoted
the enactment of a very minimal understanding, if any, of the concept of equality.
Thus, this minimal level implies equal opportunities as the absence of legal
impediment to participate, the absence of preclusion to choice. This minimal level of
opportunities has consequently shifted the debate from the complexity of the liberal
meaning of equality to a very neutral and, therefore, bland conceptualisation. The
first distinction, therefore, needs to acknowledge the difference between normative
theory level and political enactment. At the level of ideal theory, the concept of
equality of opportunities has a normative meaning, in that it provides us with a
specification of it in terms of a set of principles and norms to inform and guide the
design of social institutions. Moreover, in ideal theory, the meaning of equality of
opportunity is certainly far more demanding and more complex than the simple
removal of impediments to participation, since it may be taken to mean, for instance,
the equal life-prospects that individuals with the same level of talent and the same
willingness to exert efforts should have. Not only this, but also a further analysis
may be needed in order to ascertain whether the political level has indeed
proceeded on the basis of a clear liberal framework, as many liberal egalitarians
actually claim that there has been a complete abandonment of egalitarian concerns
by politicians and policy makers27.
Secondly, the importance of addressing principles of resource distribution is
reinstated by the same considerations expressed previously. The bland and
ineffectual politics of equal opportunities in terms of vague legal notions of absence
of impediment to participate has masked not only the real inequalities in society, but
also the real issue behind them. In other words, it has neglected the fundamental
question of a principle of fair distribution of resources informing theories and
policies. This, I argue, is the major limit of sociological perspectives in inclusive
education, the fact they have not only identified policies with liberal positions, thus
somehow mixing normative with policy level, but have also misrepresented the
importance of distributing opportunities and resources according to a principled
framework. And this is precisely what is missing in government policies.
This understanding refers to John Rawis's theory of justice as fairness. See chapter 7 for a more
extensive discussion of this aspect.
27 See, for instance, Dworkin, 2000; Bnghouse, 2000 and 2001.
102
Ultimately, against sociological positions on inclusion that confine the issue of
resource distribution to the secondary aspects and the minor technicalities of
inclusion, as opposed to the importance of values and ethos informing both
education and schools, I suggest that resource distribution is among the primary
concern for a project of inclusion.
Finally, the identification of liberal positions and ideals of equality of opportunities
with recent education trends in terms of standards of achievements and competitive
policies represents a common misunderstanding among educationists28 . This is in
part due to the complexities of the debate within liberalism and to the fact that the
same debate has not addressed specific education questions. However, it is also
due to the lack of attention to normative theories characterising the sociological
debate in education and in inclusive education more specifically. Ultimately, these
aspects highlight the importance of normative structures and, in particular, liberal
egalitarian principles in informing the debate in special and inclusive education.
What emerges from my analysis of the social model of disability and its application
to concepts and ideas of inclusive education highlights the critical need and
importance of a principled framework, conceptualising impairment, disability and
special educational needs and educational equality within a broader concern for
social justice. This is my task for the next chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Concluding Comments
My critical analysis has presented perspectives in inclusive education that are
mainly related, both theoretically and politically, to the social model of disability. In
this chapter I have maintained that social perspectives on inclusive education fail to
provide appropriate grounding for thinking of inclusion not only when referred to
disabled children, but also as a general framework for education. Moreover, I have
addressed the limits shown by concepts of social constructions of impairment and
disability, as well as tensions inherent to the political positions informed by these
views within inclusive education.
For a more extensive discussion of misunderstandings of liberalism in education theory, see
Bnghouse, H. and Swift, A. (2003) 'Defending liberalism in education theory' Journal of Education
Policy, 18 (4), 355-373.
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My main contention is that the social model of disability presents theoretical limits,
which make the model itself problematic to the achievement of its aim of an
inclusive society and equally problematic in its application to the context of
education. This, I maintain, is due both to its failure to recognise the importance of
the question of justice as distributive justice and to its theoretical limits in providing a
definition of disability and impairment that could inform a principled framework for
just distributions.
The result of my analysis of current models underpinning special and inclusive
education points in the direction of the need for a different framework, both at the





Re-Examining Impairment and Disability
This chapter presents elements of a capability perspective on impairment and
disability and refers it to a multidimensional and relational understanding of
disability.
It suggests that the capability approach provides new and fundamental insights to
the conceptualisation of impairment and disability as aspects of human diversity.
This conceptualisation goes beyond the crucial divide between definitions based on
natural or social causal factors informing current perspectives on disability.
The chapter argues that the capability approach is innovative with reference to the
centrality of human diversity in assessing equality in the space of capability. The
specific understanding of human diversity proposed, as well as the democratic
decisional process promoted and, finally, the normative dimension entailed, all have
the potential to take liberal egalitarian and educational theories in directions that can
fruitfully inform the design of a just, thus more inclusive, society.
Introduction
What disability is and how it can be defined in relation to more general
considerations of human diversity and personal heterogeneities is a theme common
to different disciplines. In particular, recent perspectives in socio-medicine and
disability studies, as well as in political philosophy, have all engaged at different
levels with the complexity of disability, outlining some of its dimensions with
reference to the focus of their internal debates. Socio-medical approaches and
disability studies have mainly concentrated their analysis on the definition of
disability and on its causal factors, and have provided contrasting understandings of
what disability is, how it relates to a concept of human diversity and, in turn, to
social and political issues. In their political struggle for equal consideration and
equal entitlements and against any reduction of the complexities of disability to
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biological notions of abnormality, disabled people's movements advocate the
'celebration of difference', that is the positive recognition of disability as part of that
inescapable human diversity that so enriches our life experience as well as our
society As we have seen in chapter 3, in these perspectives the concept of
disability as part of human diversity is articulated in terms of differences to be
positively recognised, rather than stigmatised and discriminated against. The debate
in disability studies is characterised by the interlocking of a theoretical, definitional
level, with a political one, where the provided definition of disability not only
subsumes a specific understanding of disability in terms of differences, but
proposes also a political perspective based on such definition and on promoting the
ideal of an inclusive society.
Conversely, the concept of human diversity, although differently conceived, plays a
crucial role in contemporary theories of social justice and, more specifically, in the
current debate on equality and distributive justice. Theories of social justice that are
mainly concerned with the fairness in the distribution of benefits and burdens in
society address the importance of considering personal heterogeneities in terms of
different natural and social endowments. These theories engage with the questions
of what traits constitute a personal advantage or disadvantage, whether it is
naturally or socially determined, and how and why personal diversity does or does
not have to be accounted for in theories of justice. Within such theories, moreover,
human diversity is generally broadly configured in its elements of different age, sex,
health and social class. In theories of social justice, disability issues are usually
referred to as an individual disadvantage and considered as a further 'complexity' in
the already complex framework of a just distribution of benefits and burdens,
however defined. Aspects of this debate have also addressed the causal factors of
disability, whether natural or social, and mainly so in connection to the evaluation of
disability in terms of individual disadvantage within a metric of interpersonal
comparison and in relation to concerns for social justice. What is a cause of
celebration for disabled scholars and disabled people's movements, ultimately,
becomes a matter of concern for political philosophers, and more so for liberal
egalitarians.
Notwithstanding this contrasting picture and the diversity of approach to the issue,
the debate raises three interrelated questions, which are important both to disability
29 See Corker 1999, Moms: 1991, Shakespeare: 1997, Thomas: 1999, Wendell: 1996.
30 See Dworkin, 2000, Nagel, 2002, Rawls, 1971, 2001, Sen, 1992.
106
studies and to political theories of social justice. What is disability and how can we
think of it within a concept of human diversity?' What relevance have the causal
factors of disability for a theory of justice?' and 'How ought disability to be evaluated
and considered with reference to the design of social and political arrangements
informed by equality?" are the key issues of the debate. These questions are, in
turn, interlocked with two dimensions: a theoretical level of analysis, concerned with
definitional and causal issues of disability, and a political level, where the previous
considerations are translated into matters of equal entitlements and equal rights for
disabled people. These questions, and their respective answers, form a
fundamental framework for rethinking impairment, disability and different abilities or
special educational needs within the context of education.
In this chapter I maintain that the capability approach, as developed by Amartya
Sen and further articulated by Martha Nussbaum, provides an innovative and
important perspective for re-examining and re-conceptualising impairment, disability
and special educational needs. Inscribed in liberal egalitarian theories, the capability
approach is a normative framework for the assessment of inequalities. It claims that
social arrangements should be evaluated in the space of capability, that is, in the
space of the real freedoms people have to promote and achieve their own well-
being. This chapter shows how the three key questions informing the debate on
disability can find fruitful and normatively justified answers within Sen's capability
approach. This analysis focuses intentionally only on Sen's contribution, leaving the
analysis of Nussbaum account for further exploration.
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section outlines Sen's approach
in relation to the centrality of the concept of human diversity and its specific
articulation. The second section re-examines and re-conceptualises impairment and
disability in terms of functionings and capability, It highlights how the capability
approach brings forward the theorisation of impairment and disability with reference
to the questions and the two levels of analysis identified, hence with reference to
definitional and causal issues as well as political ones. Finally, the third section
presents elements of a relational and multidimensional conception of impairment
and disability based on the capability approach.
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5.1 Sen's Capability Approach and the Centrality of Human Diversity
Sen has developed his capability approach throughout his work and mainly by
engaging with two different debates. On the one hand, his priority in theorising the
capability approach is to provide a more accurate and alternative framework for the
conceptualisation of human development and for the analysis and assessment of
poverty, than the ones commonly used in welfare economics and unilaterally based,
for instance, on income generation or income distribution.
On the other hand, in examining poverty, inequality and their relation to social
arrangements, Sen's work critically engages with the philosophical debate on
equality, and, more precisely, with the liberal egalitarian debate, and offers a
specific perspective on how to think of equality in its distributive meaning. In his
monograph Inequality Reexamined, Sen maintains that while equal concern for
individuals in social arrangements is central and common to various egalitarian
views (1992: IX), the differentiating elements within these views consist in the kind
of equality each position is trying to promote.
The capability approach is a complex and compelling answer to the question
'equality of what' (1992:1), and in developing his perspective on equality Sen
provides a framework of thought which, I argue, offers also new and important
elements for a reconsideration of impairment, disability and inclusion. This has
implications, both theoretically, for redefining impairment and disability, and
operationally, for the design of social policies where issues of inclusion are
fundamental moral issues. Since this understanding is not a straightforward reading
of Sen's approach, however, in what follows I shall selectively present some
concepts of the capability approach and then subsequently critically engage with
them by showing how they can inform a capability perspective on impairment and
disability. Let us now proceed, first, with some key concepts of the capability
approach, which can inform a perspective on disability, namely: the space of
capability, the informational basis of the metric used in interpersonal comparisons
and, finally, the democratic decision process entailed by the approach.
Sen develops his capability approach as a framework in which to reconsider what
social arrangements should aim to equalize, therefore in which to reconsider the
'equality of what' question. He maintains that closely linked to this central question
are two fundamental issues: firstly, the choice of the evaluative space in which to
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assess equality and, secondly, the metric that should be used in comparing people's
relative advantages and disadvantages.
Sen's approach identifies the evaluative space for the assessment of inequality and,
conversely, for determining what equality we should seek, in the space of the
freedoms to achieve valuable objectives that people have, that is, in the space of
capability. Rather than aiming at equalizing resources or welfare, Sen argues that
equality should be defined and aimed at in terms of the capability each individual
has to pursue and to achieve well-being, i.e. to pursue and enjoy states and
objectives constitutive of her or his well-being, and therefore valuable. Thus, the
capability approach delimitates a space for the assessment of individual well-being
and the freedom to achieve it.
Within this space, Sen distinguishes functionings and capabilities. Functionings are
defined as 'beings and doings constitutive of a person's being', such as being
adequately nourished, being in good health, being happy and having self-respect, or
taking part in the life of the community (Sen, 1992: 39). Achieved functionings are
the specific functionings that a person has accomplished and realised at any given
time (Alkire, 2002: 6). Since functionings are constitutive of a person's being,
according to Sen, 'an evaluation of a person's well-being has to take the form of an
assessment of these constitutive elements.' (Sen, 1992: 39.)
Capabilities, on the other hand, are capabilities to function and represent a person's
freedoms to achieve valuable functionings, or, they represent
Various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is,
thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or
another (1992: 40).
Sen provides a useful example to understand the meaning of capability. He
considers the situation of a starving person as compared to that of someone fasting.
Clearly the starving person is deprived of the capability to choose whether to eat or
not. On the other hand, the person fasting is in the position to choose, thus she has
the relevant capability. Capabilities emphasise the substantive freedoms a person
has, thus identifying the 'real alternatives' available to the person herself to achieve
well-being. In that respect, capability is related to well-being both instrumentally, in
allowing for judgments on the relative advantage a person has and on her place in
society (Sen, 1992: 41), and intrinsically, since achieved well-being itself depends
on the capability to function (Sen, 1992: 41). Here Sen distinguishes between well-
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being freedom and well-being achievement and maintains that it is the former which
refers more directly to the capability set. Given the exercise of choice and its value
as part of our living, the realised level of well-being, that is well-being achievement,
'need not be the only guide to the opportunities that a person values most.' (Sen,
1992: 62.)
Having so defined the space of the capability approach, which seeks equality of
capabilities and asserts the fundamental importance of capabilities and functionings
as value-objects for the assessment of individual well-being (Sen, 1992: 46), it is
now important to address the basis for interpersonal comparisons implied by the
space of capability.
The space of capability encompasses the use of a 'metric' (Pogge, 2003) to
evaluate people's relative advantages and disadvantages. In other words, the
capability approach theorises a space where considerations of personal
heterogeneities are relevant for the assessment of equality. Sen maintains that the
idea of equality is confronted by the 'basic heterogeneities of human beings' (Sen,
1992:1) and he maintains that the 'empirical fact' of human diversity is crucial in
assessing the demands of equality. In Sen's words,
Human diversity is no secondary complication (to be ignored, or to be introduced 'later on'); it is a
fundamental aspect of our interest in equality (1992: Xl).
Sen addresses human diversity as the interrelation of personal and circumstantial
factors. According to his view, human beings are diverse in three fundamental ways.
First, they are different with respect to their personal, internal characteristics, such
as gender, age, physical and mental abilities, talents, proneness to illness, and so
forth. Second, different individuals are different with respect to external
circumstances, like inherited wealth and assets, environmental factors, including
climatic differences and social and cultural arrangements (Sen, 1992:1, 20, 27-28).
Third, a further and important diversity, defined as inter-individual variation, refers
instead to differences in the conversion of resources into freedoms or to different
individual abilities to convert commodities and resources in order to achieve valued
objectives (1992: 85). To illustrate this last point, Sen provides the example of a
lactating woman, who, due to her specific condition, needs a higher intake of food
for her functionings than a similar but non-lactating woman.
But human beings are diverse, Sen maintains, in another fundamental way as well.
Different individuals have different and often contrasting conceptions of the good
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and therefore aim at different ends and objectives. They have difterent conceptions
of individual well-being, a diversity that Sen names inter-end variation and that leads
his approach to envisage capability as the overall freedoms that people have 'to
achieve actual livings that one can have a reason to value' (1 992:85 and 1999:18),
without further specifying a complete list or set of capabilities. (More on this later
on.)
Within this view of human diversity as central, therefore, according to the capability
approach, it makes a difference whether someone is a man or a woman and if he or
she has physical and mental prowess or weaknesses; if someone lives in a
temperate physical environment or in more adverse climatic zones, and in certain
social and cultural arrangements rather than in others. And the difference entailed
by these variations has to be accounted for, when addressing the demands of
equality. Moreover, Sen maintains that the actual differences in conceptions of
valuable ends and objectives that people may have and their conversion factors
have to be considered, too. Thus, ultimately, the metric used to make interpersonal
comparisons includes the four central aspects to human diversity identified in
personal and external circumstances, inter-individual variations in conversion
factors and inter-end variations related to the pluralistic domain of conceptions of
the good. One example taken directly from Sen's work may help illustrate the use of
this metric and to introduce considerations on disability that will be expanded later
on.
Consider two persons 1 and 2, with 2 disadvantaged in some respect (e.g. physical disability,
mental handicap, greater disease proneness). They do not have the same ends or objectives, or the
same conception of the good. Person 1 values A more than B, while 2 has the opposite valuation.
Each values 2A more than A and 2B more than B. With the given set of primary goods (resources
and opportunities) person 1 can achieve 2A or 2B, also - though there may be no great merit in this
- A or B. On the other hand, given 2's disadvantage, ... she can achieve only A and B (1992: 83).
It is evident here that person 2 finds herself in a situation of inequality even given
the same amount of resources or opportunities to achieve her valued goals, and
that this situation is due to her personal characteristics and to how she converts
resources into functionings. Thus, according to Sen, while evaluating equality or
inequality and in comparing individual shares, neglecting person 2's disadvantage
would fall short of some very substantive demands of equality. (Note here that
disability in this example is considered a substantial disadvantage per se - but more
on this later on.)
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It is this set of considerations relating to human diversity and its centrality in the
metric used to compare individual advantages and disadvantages that have
ultimately led Sen to conceptualise the space of capabilities and functionings as the
relevant space for equality. Sen, nevertheless, has not provided a full set or a list of
relevant functionings referred to capabilities. He maintains that the capability
approach is a framework of thought, a general approach to the assessment of
individual advantage or disadvantage in social schemes. Selecting relevant
functionings would imply, on the one hand, endorsing a specific view of the good life
and of human nature, and, on the other, enacting processes of choice and
reasoning. And if the first dimension would require providing a comprehensive
doctrine of the good, something that contradicted the very scope of the capability
approach and its consideration for human diversity, the second dimension,
according to Sen, should be left to democratic procedures and social policies
designs. Hence the deliberately under-specified character of the capability
approach31
Although intentionally under-specified, Sen's approach nevertheless does
distinguish basic capabilities within capabilities. According to Robeyns,
Basic capabilities are a subset of all capabilities: they refer to the freedom to do some basic things
that are necessary for physical survival and to avoid and to escape poverty (2001: 11).
Sen himself has specified that the distinction between basic capabilities and
capabilities is context-relevant and useful in order to separate out 'the ability to
satisfy certain crucially important functionings up to certain minimally adequate
levels.' (Sen, 1992:11.) Thus, for instance, in evaluating poverty in developing
countries, thinking of basic capabilities as distinct from capabilities is of heuristic
value, value which can be neglected would the same evaluation be made in
developed countries
Not only are capabilities context-relevant, in that they are sensitive to social and
cultural arrangements, but also their selection, according to Sen' s approach, should
be the result of a democratic process of deliberation including forms of public
consultations. This implies that, in considering a person's capability set, attention
should be given to individual conceptions of well-being, in other words to the
objectives and ends that a person has a reason to value, but also to the interlocking
31 See Robeyns, 2001: 15 and also 2003, (2): 6.
32 As we shall see in chapters 6 and 7, this distinction is particularly relevant to education and to the
understanding of educational equality. But more on this later on.
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of this reason with political, social and cultural settings, thus, ultimately, with
conditions that may influence choice and reasoning. Some authors (Alkire 2002,
Robeyns, 2003) have expanded this aspect of the capability approach, envisaging
different perspectives on what forms this process of social deliberation and
democratic participation may take with regard, for instance, to the analysis of
gender inequality or with the operationalisation of capability in poverty reduction.
However, a systematic analysis of this issue goes beyond the immediate focus of
this chapter and shall therefore be left to further analysis. Nevertheless, what is
important to assert here, is the consideration relating to public democratic debate
that informs the capability approach, and the fact that this aspect is connected to the
intentional under-specified character of the approach.
Let us now resume the main points addressed. I have so far outlined three
fundamental components of the capability approach, namely, first, the choice of
space for the assessment and comparison of people's well-being, identified in the
space of capability and functionings; second, the choice of the metric for
interpersonal comparisons, entailing a specific understanding of human diversity,
and, finally, the process encompassed by the capability approach in terms of
democratic decision and participation in the selection of relevant capabilities. The
capability approach identifies capability in the overall freedom people have to
choose the life they have reasons to value, and identifies functionings in the
achieved freedoms. Sen's approach specifies this particular space as the space
where to evaluate equality and theorises equality not in terms of the means to
freedom, but of the extent of freedom. Considerations of human diversity in terms of
personal and circumstantial factors, as well as differences in the conversion of
resources and income into functionings and in terms of different conceptions of the
good play a substantive role in the informational basis for the metric used to
evaluate individual advantages and disadvantages. Finally, democratic participation
and extensive public consultations are envisaged as part of the process to select
the relevant capabilities.
Where does Sen's approach leave us with respect to what impairment and disability
may be taken to mean, and what their weight is in interpersonal comparisons, and
hence in the determination of the equal status and equal entitlements of disabled
people in social arrangements? In the next section I outline a conceptualisation of
impairment and disability within the capability approach, and show how this
framework takes the understanding of disability as specific aspect of human
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diversity, beyond the divide between individual and social elements characterizing
current definitions in socio-medicine and disability studies.
5.2 Reconceptualising Impairment and Disability within the Capability
Approach
What does the capability approach offer to our understanding of impairment and
disability and to our moral quest for an inclusive society? In what follows I shall
outline how aspects of the capability approach can provide a new framework for
thinking of impairment and disability as multidimensional and relational and how this
framework can inform issues of distributive justice and policies of inclusion.
A very first reading of Sen's perspective tends to point in the direction of identifying
disability, in an assumed non-problematic way, as personal disadvantage tout court.
Different examples throughout his work account for disability as disadvantage. So,
for instance, in addressing personal heterogeneities, Sen maintains
People have disparate physical characteristics connected with disability, illness, age or gender, and
these make their needs diverse. For example ... A disabled person may need some prosthesis, an
older person more support and help, a pregnant woman more nutritional intake, and so on. The
'compensation' needed for disadvantages will vary, and furthermore some disadvantages may not
be fully 'correctable' even with income transfer (1999: 70).
And furthermore
Equal income can still leave much inequality in our ability to do what we would value doing. A
disabled person cannot function in the way an able-bodied person can, even if both have exactly the
same income (1992: 20).
And
The extent of comparative deprivation of a physically handicapped person vis-à-vis others cannot
be adequately judged by looking at his or her income, since the person may be greatly
disadvantaged in converting income into the achievements he or she would value (1992: 28).
These examples outline how disability, defined as an individual condition, impacts
on individual functionings, as these are differently correlated to various personal
characteristics and to diverse individual conversion factors. Here, therefore,
disability is equated to an individual disadvantage that should be taken into
consideration in interpersonal comparisons. And if, on the one hand, this position
could be read as an endorsement of the WHO's definition of disability as individual
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limitation causally linked to biological impairment, this seems to be too simplistic a
reading of Sen's approach.
There are two new main insights that Sen's capability approach offers to our
understanding of impairment and disability in relation to human diversity, and to
their assessment in interpersonal comparisons when aiming at equal consideration
and equal freedoms for disabled people. The first insight relates to how we can think
of impairment and disability as aspects of human diversity, or, more precisely, it
relates to the specific understanding of personal heterogeneities provided by Sen's
approach and to its informing the metric for assessing individuals' relative positions
in social arrangements. The second insight brings about consideration of
democratic participation and the possibility of thinking of the capability approach as
exercising the role of an impartial observer in adjudicating what the relevant
capabilities are when thinking about disability. This latter element entails the active
participation of disabled people and disabled people's movements in the process of
determining relevant capability and of evaluating how social policies should be
designed when aiming at inclusion. These two main insights that the capability
approach has to offer to the debate on disability are directly referred to the two
levels of analysis identified as inherent to the debate itself, namely a theoretical
level concerned with definitions and issues of causality and a political level,
concerned with issues of inclusion and equal entitlement. But let us now proceed
to substantiate these claims.
The first reason for considering the capability approach as innovative with respect to
current understandings and models of impairment and disability relates both to the
centrality of human diversity in assessing equality in the space of capability and to
the specific understanding of human diversity proposed by Sen. Firstly, Sen's
capability approach, in repositioning human diversity as central to the evaluation of
individual advantages and disadvantages, promotes an egalitarian perspective,
which deals at its core with the complexities of disability than other egalitarian
perspectives. Secondly, Sen's concept of human diversity, in including personal and
external factors as well as an individual conversion factor of resources into valuable
functionings, implies an interrelation between individual and circumstantial factors of
human diversity. This fundamentally allows overcoming current understandings of
impairment and disability as unilaterally biologically or socially determined34, in that
33 See above my introductory notes.
34 I owe this insight to discussions with Harry Bnghouse.
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the capability approach allows a concept of disability as one of the aspects of
individuals emerging from this interlocking of personal and external factors.
Moreover, the capability approach implies the irrelevance of the causal element of a
presumed disadvantage, either natural or social, as a determinant of entitlement;
rather, the approach goes in the direction of overcoming causality tout court in the
evaluation of relative disadvantage. Thus, it does not matter, in capability terms,
whether a disability is biologically or socially caused as such, what matters is the
relative weight disability has in terms of the full set of capabilities one person can
choose from. And this relative weight is assessed in terms of capability and
functonings, therefore, in a space where difterences are not just rhetorically
celebrated (as in the social model of disability), but substantially evaluated.
Furthermore, the capability framework opens the way to considerations of
impairment and disability as multidimensional and relational (a conception that will
be discussed further on), in that it sees disability as one aspect of the complexity of
human heterogeneities, and therefore as one aspect of the complexity of individuals
in their interaction with their physical, economic, social and cultural environment. In
this respect, the capability approach goes also in the direction of promoting a
conception of disability as one aspect of human diversity, like age or genders are,
without suggesting monolithic and direct notions of diversity as abnormality. And this
appears to be fundamental in overcoming the discrimination and oppression
denounced by disabled people's movements as inherent to current notions of
normality, abnormality and diversity. Finally, the capability approach provides an
egalitarian framework where disability is evaluated in the distributive pattern of
relevant capability.
Thus, rethinking impairment and disability within the capability approach would
entail asking in the space of capability what is the full set of capability one person
can choose from and assessing the value an impairment has on this set of
freedoms. Some examples may be of help at this stage. Walking is a functioning,
and so is moving about from one space to another, and it is a functioning that
enables other functionings, like taking one's children to school, or going to work, or
acting as a state president. In this sense moving about may be seen as a basic
functioning enabling more complex functionings to take place. Now let us think of an
impaired person, a wheelchair user, for instance. In determining the full set of
capabilities that a wheelchair user has to achieve her valued ends, the capability
approach looks at how this specific physical aspect (moving about by wheelchair)
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intertwines with circumstantial factors, like the physical environment where the
person lives and the presence of wheelchair accesses to buildings, and how it
intertwines with personal conversion factors, like general strength or health as well
as attitudinal aspects. It intertwines, finally, with one's most valuable ends, one of
which could be, for example, having an interest in politics and aspiring to act as
state president. The capability approach does not account for the natural versus
social causes of the physical difterence that implies moving about by wheelchair
rather than by walking; rather, it considers this as an aspect of personal
heterogeneities, which has to be included in interpersonal comparisons. Moreover,
the capability approach accounts for this personal aspect of human diversity to be
evaluated in its interlocking with circumstantial factors, thus permitting to say that
moving about by wheelchair relates evidently, for instance, to the design of physical
environment. Ultimately the capability perspective allows us to say that being a
wheelchair user may be considered a disadvantage when the wheelchair is not
provided or the physical environment is not designed appropriately. In the same way
many persons would be disadvantaged would stairs or lift not be fitted between
flights in buildings, since very few people would be able to move from floor to floor
(Perry, 1999: 2). Hence the provision of a wheel chair becomes a matter of justice.
But let us now relate this example to the achievement of more complex functionings,
like acting as a state president. Let us suppose that acting in one's political capacity
is fundamental to the achievement of well-being for the physically impaired person
considered in this example. And let us also assume that the physical environment is
designed so as to prevent her from moving about, thus ultimately preventing her
from the achievement of some basic functionings. This person, although potentially
able to exercise her political role, is prevented from her valued end by the
interrelation of some of her personal features with some of the characteristics of her
physical environment. In this case, not only well-being achievement, but also well-
being freedom appears to be restricted in some fundamental ways, hence the full
set of capabilities available to this person is diminished, since being a politician is
highly constitutive of this person's well-being.
The second main insight provided by the capability approach to considerations of
impairment and disability relates to democratic decisions and participation in
determining relevant capabilities. Here the approach ties in with the demands of
disabled people's movements on one hand, and with questions of the design of
social schemes and policies on the other. Disabled people's organisations have
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long denounced the factual marginalisation from active participation in society they
are subject to and have reclaimed their role in society as a matter of right. The
capability approach, through its reconsideration of human diversity and by
advocating to itself the role of 'neutral observer', seems to provide a substantive
framework to fulfil disabled people's demands. Moreover, in promoting some forms
of public consultations on the choice of relevant capabilities, Sen's approach allows
for a democratic process that avoids exclusion and discrimination in principle and by
practicing active participation. The role accorded to democratic decision, however, if
extremely relevant on issues of democratic empowerment of disabled people,
becomes more problematic at a normative level. On the one hand, it allows for the
social and political empowerment of disabled people through their movements. But
on the other, it leaves open the question of adjudicating the demands of disabled
people with respect, for instance, to the demands of those who are not disabled
people. Sen's approach, ultimately, appears to promote collective self-determination
of disabled people without adequately specifying a normative criterion for
adjudicating competing demands among different groups, thus opening
considerations of democratic participation with respect to liberal constitutional
principle&35.
These considerations on what Sen's capability approach has to offer to our
understanding of impairment and disability, although still in an initial formulation,
provide the basis for a multidimensional and relational concept of impairment and
disability that will be outlined in the next section.
Let us now recap the main elements of the capability approach with respect to what
disability is and how it can be defined within a concept of human diversity, what its
causal factors are and what their relevance is both for definitions and for
considerations of justice, and how disability has to be evaluated and considered
with reference to the design of social and political arrangements informed by
equality. Sen's approach offers a fundamental and important framework for
redefining disability within human diversity and for evaluating its impact on the
reciprocal positions of individuals in society. I have outlined how the centrality of
human diversity and its specific articulation in Sen's work allows overcoming natural
versus social definitions of impairment and disability, and overrides considerations
35 I owe this insight to discussions with Eamonn Callan.
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on the causal origin of impairment and disability. Moreover, I have pointed out how
in his work disability may be seen as one aspect of the complexity of human
heterogeneity, more precisely as one aspect of the complexity of individuals in their
interaction with their environment. Furthermore, I have suggested that Sen's
capability approach, in promoting some forms of public consultation on the choice of
the relevant capabilities, allows for a democratic decisional process long advocated
for by disabled people's movements.
It is within this framework that I suggest considering a multidimensional and
relational view of impairment and disability, a view both concerned with issues of
definition and considerations on the relation with the social and physical
environment as well as with fundamental issues of justice. The next section
presents elements of this perspective.
5.3 A Capability Perspective on Impairment and Disability
The perspective on disability I am suggesting and defending, both allowed by and
stemming from the context of the capability framework, sees disability as inherently
relational and presenting multiple dimensions, and is articulated into definitional
aspects in their interlocking with considerations of justice.
To clarify what this means, let us start off with the definitional aspect, which implies
drawing some distinctions and presenting some definitions as well as
contextualising these definitions within the capability framework. Thus it is important
to distinguish impairment from disability and, subsequently, to see how and why
disability is inherently relational and circumstantial, hence directly referred to the
interfacing between personal characters of the individual and the specific design of
the social and environmental arrangements one finds oneself in, and why it is
multidimensional, too. Some authors, like Allen Buchanan (2000) and John Perry,
(1996, 1999) have presented various accounts of disability in its relational aspect,
and this analysis draws also substantially on their contributions to the debate.
Impairment, therefore, either physical or mental, relates to the loss of some aspects
of functionings for our species. For instance, a lesion of the spinal cord that results
in restricted movements - whether caused by a genetic condition or trauma - is an
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impairment of average movement functioning In this sense Perry defines
impairment as 'a physiological disorder or injury'. (Perry, 1996: 3.) Disability, on the
other hand, is the inability to perform some significant class of functionings that
individuals in someone's reference group (i.e. children or adults) are on average
and ordinarily able to do under favourable conditions, or more specifically, as
Buchanan points out, 'where the inability is not due to simple and easily corrigible
ignorance or to a lack of the tools or means ordinarily available for performing such
task.' (Buchanan, 2000: 286.)
In this sense, according to Buchanan, in defining disability we are referring to a
reference group, and where no members of the reference group is actually able to
function in a specific way, we do not speak of disability. So, for instance, as he
points out, 'because no infants are able to drive cars, we do not say that any infant
is disabled in this regard' (Buchanan, 2000: 286). Deciding on the average group is
in itself a problematic issue, one that can be broadly, although not completely,
addressed by referring to statistical means. Furthermore, disabilities are inabilities
that cannot be overcome by simply supplying relevant information or providing tools
and are, therefore, different matters from being unable to perform a certain activity,
like playing Monopoly, because one does not know the rules of the game or
because one does not have the actual table game available. On the other hand, if
someone cannot perform certain functionings that, on average, people in the
reference group are able to, and if this is connected to certain impairment, then the
person is disabled with respect to that specific functioning. So, for example, if a
blind adult person is unable to drive, whereas on average and under favourable
conditions an adult is able to do so, than the blind person is disabled with respect to
driving.
Disability, as defined above, is distinct from either a physical or a mental
impairment, and the latter do not always result in a disability. Buchanan provides a
very convincing example to illustrate this last point. He suggests considering the
case of a hearing impaired person who has lost the hearing function with regard to a
certain range of frequencies of sounds, range that is detected on average by
individuals. If the range of sounds undetectable by the impaired person is irrelevant
to the functionings in that person's social environment, then the person in question
is not a disabled individual (Buchanan, 2000: 287). Consequently, whether
36 See Buchanan, 2000: 285.
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impairment does or does not result in disability depends on the possible overcoming
of the impairment itself and on the design of the physical and social arrangement
one is in. For example, if through specific tools we could provide cars whereby
being sighted is not relevant as the functions connected to seeing are played, say,
by a computerised monitor, a blind adult person may be able to overcome her
inability to drive, hence her disability with respect to that functioning. Thus, in this
sense, disability can be seen as inherently relational, with respect both to
impairment and to social arrangements, something I am going to address further on.
Other dimensions, moreover, are added to the relational aspect of disability.
Disability involves impairment (but the opposite does not hold necessarily) and
involves also other dimensions. There are different impairment effects, which may
or may not impinge specifically on physical disability, like possible health conditions
associated to certain traumas or indeed illnesses, or the pain and the fatigue
associated to back injuries and to arthritis. In this case, impairment effects may
result in compromising health functioning as well as other functionings, like walking.
There is also a temporal dimension to disability, as the inability to function in a
certain way can be temporary, for instance when one is unable to see after an eye
operation, or more permanent, when the actual impairment and the external,
environmental and social conditions of an individual, do not allow for the inability to
be overcome, like in the blindness resulting from the loss of the optical nerve
function. There is, finally, a dimension of dependency, either on tools or on other
people, to help with carrying out functions that, on average, are done more or less
independently by people in the reference group. So, for instance, a quadriplegic
person may require a personal assistant not necessary to an average individual of
the reference group, or a severely cognitively impaired child, different forms of
consistent support in order to achieve some basic functionings. These various
dimensions of impairment and the relation between them and disability, and, more
importantly, the relation between impairment and disability does not appear to be a
straightforward causality, but rather seems to stand relationally both with respect to
individual features and to the design of the environmental and social arrangement.
Impairments, in this sense, affect functionings and become disabilities in certain
social arrangements but not in others (Buchanan, 2000: 287). The design of
physical infrastructures and social schemes plays a substantial role in the relation
between impairment and disability. Circumstantial elements such as wheelchair
accessible buildings and public transportation, as well as the provision of different
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tools, all allow for the interfacing between the individual and her environment. It
appears, moreover, that the higher the interfacing is, the lower is the possibility for
an impairment to result in disability. So, for instance, blindness becomes a disability
with respect to the functioning of reading text messages on computer screens to
obtain information, when, and if, no use of Braille displays and speech-output
screen readers is provided (Perry, 1999: 4). Moreover, society's attitude and the
dispositions towards severely cognitive disabled people, although more problematic
to outline, have a considerable influence on how mental impairment results in
limitations of functionings and in disability. In this sense, Kittay (2003) has described
how people's indifference to her daughter Sesha and to her attempts to
communicate via the affection and the love she is capable of, has the effect of
narrowing down the range of interactions she can enjoy and to amplify her disability.
In a capability perspective, therefore, impairment may affect functionings and when
it does, then it becomes a disability, and results in restricted functionings. And
impairment becomes restricted functionings within the complex interrelation
between the individual's characters, her conversion factors and her environment.
The higher the interfacing between the individuals' functionings and the social and
physical environment she inhabits, the lower the possibility of an impairment to
result in disability.
Since functionings are constitutive of a person's being and capability represents the
various combinations of functionings that the person can achieve (Sen, 1992: 39-
40), hence her freedom to choose one type of life or another, a restriction in
functioning results in a restriction of the set of functionings a person can choose
from, therefore, in a narrower range of capability. When impairment restricts basic
functionings or when the interaction of the individual with her environment does not
allow for an overcoming of the restriction in functionings, and more complex
functionings are compromised, then the whole capability of the person in achieving
her valued ends seems compromised, too.
This last point relates disability in a distinctive way to dimensions of justice and,
more precisely, to how and why the capability approach provides new and important
answers to my initial questions. What is disability and how can we think of it within a
concept of human diversity; how ought disability be evaluated with respect to the
design of social arrangements and what relevance, if any, do causal factors of
disability have in thinking of justice? The capability framework allows us to think of
disability as inherently relational and multidimensional, as one aspect of human
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diversity that has to be considered when evaluating the reciprocal positions of
individuals and the distribution of benefits and burdens in social arrangements. In
determining that disability is one of the aspects of individuals emerging from the
interlocking of personal and external factors, the capability approach brings the focal
point of the discussions from natural or causal factors of disability more on the
actual disability and on how it has to be accounted for in interpersonal comparisons
based on functionings and capability. In this sense the capability approach provides
a criterion of justice, which is sensitive to disabled people's interests. In this sense,
furthermore, a capability perspective on impairment and disability offers new
insights to conceptualisations of impairment and disability. The definitional aspect of
the perspective seems to have some similarity with the revised WHO International
Classification of Functionings (ICF, 2001) and with its circumstantial elements.
Nevertheless, the capability perspective on impairment and disability provides us
with a framework informed by considerations of justice and equal entitlements for
impaired and disabled people, which is an aspect missing from the WHO
classification. Two elements, ultimately, appear crucial in positioning a capability
perspective on disability with respect to dimensions of justice: the metric chosen in
evaluating people's reciprocal positions in social arrangements and the place of
disability in that metric, and the choice of design of the social framework, too.
The capability approach invokes a metric where taking into account the personal
characteristics that regulates the conversion of resources and goods into valuable
ends should define individual shares. Thus, according to capability theorists,
physical and mental disabilities should receive attention under a just institutional
order and the distribution of resources and goods should correlate with the
distribution of natural features. No difference appears to be accorded to natural or
socially caused disabilities, since in evaluating what a person is actually able to be
and to do with respect to some typical capabilities, this approach is concerned with
the resulting distributive pattern of capabilities (Pogge, 2003: 40). Thus, for
instance, the interest of a wheelchair user - independently from whether her
inability to walking as average moving functioning is related to a congenital
condition or to a trauma - has to be accounted for in comparisons made in the
space of capabilities and, consequently, a wheelchair provided as a matter of
justice. In addition considerations should be extended to the full set of capabilities
available to the person using the wheelchair and when environmental or indeed
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social barriers are of hindrance to her choice of relevant capability, than these
should be removed as a matter of justice, too.
Seeking equality in the space of capability, ultimately, implies using a metric where
disability as a difference in the broader concept of human diversity and as limitation
on relevant capability has to be addressed within the distributive pattern of
functionings and capabilities— therefore implying added provision for disabled
people as a matter of justice. This provision, moreover, does not appear to be a
straightforward 'compensation' for some natural individual deficits, as disability is
considered in its relational aspect, where the design of social frameworks is as
fundamental as the 'design' of natural features. Before addressing how the choice of
the social framework relates to disability and to questions of just institutional orders,
one crucial point has to be addressed.
When evaluating the redistribution pattern in the space of capability, with specific
reference to disability, determining the relevant capability is intertwined with
determining also the level at which redistribution has to be levered, as it were, in
order to avoid the problem of 'infinite demand' or 'infinite redistribution' (Veatch,
1986:159). In this sense, addressing inequalities with reference, say, to poverty
issues appears at least intuitively less complex. There seems to be a cut-off point
whereby individuals' capability is such that individuals are not considered poor
anymore. The dimension implied by disability is more complex. There, the choice of
relevant functionings and capability is as important as the determination of a certain
standard of functionings that has to be assured. With respect to the choice of
capabilities, two considerations seem important here. First, capability theorists often
speak of each individual's capability, but the reference is always to the relevant
capability, hence to the ability to promote typical or standard ends (Pogge, 2003:
34). This aspect is combined to Sen's distinctions of basic capabilities as satisfying
certain important functionings to minimally adequate levels (Sen, 1992:11) and to
Nussbaum's introduction of a threshold level for the core central capabilities
(Nussbaum, 2000). Nussbaum develops and argues for a defined list of 'central
human capabilities' that should be considered constitutional guarantees. All
constitutions should therefore include these capabilities and governments must
ensure that citizens achieve a certain threshold level of capabilities for functionings.
Below this level, according to Nussbaum, the human life loses its dignity
(Nussbaum, 2000: 76-86). Secondly, these considerations open also the
perspective to evaluating what constitutes a minimal adequate level of functioning
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and whether it is appropriate or not to envisage such a level. Here the problem
relates specifically to the claim of disabled people's movements that often threshold
levels are used for discriminatory purposes, thus ending in socially perverse
mechanisms. For instance, the measure of human health through levels of 'Quality
Adjusted Life Years', or QALY's indicators, whilst having the intention of measuring
a nation's health by determining how disease and disabilities diminished the quality
of life for its inhabitants, ended up implying that disabled people's lives were
inherently of a lesser quality than other lives (Kittay, 2003: 5). However, a closer
look at the problem of 'infinite demand' might suggest that a certain level of
functionings, somehow equivalent to a threshold level, has to be introduced as one
of the demands of justice. Let us see why.
Consider, for instance, the situation of certain severe forms of multiple impairments,
where both physical and mental impairments constrain relevant functionings in
substantial ways and therefore result in severe disability and in less capability. Here,
in trying to promote full capability having as reference average functionings may
imply an infinite redistribution, where more and more resources are provided with
the aim of approximating to this referred average. The problem is not only linked to
a bottomless distribution, but also to the relation of this redistribution to the
conditions of justice, hence to scarcity of resources. If redistributing resources and
goods in order to answer the legitimate demand of severely impaired people implies
redistributing indefinitely and if this, in turn, means diverting resources from those
not in the position of demanding infinite redistribution, thus lowering their
opportunities to functionings and capabilities, then the importance of a minimal
adequate level of functionings for severely disabled people appears crucial.
Consequently, the introduction of a certain adequate level of functionings and,
therefore, of capability as reference point for just distributive framework appears
fundamental. In this sense, it appears that a threshold level, when used for
adjudicating distributive criteria, is not only necessary, but also fundamental as a
condition of justice37.
The second fundamental element of a capability perspective on disability specifically
related to determining the demands of disability on a criterion of social justice refers
to the choice and the design of social arrangements. If we agree that the choice of
37 These elements of the debate are reintroduced and discussed in chapter 7, where I outline an
understanding of educational equality for disabled children and children with special educational needs
that specifies such a threshold. See chapter 7.
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the dominant social framework and its design substantially determines who is
competent and who is incompetent (Buchanan, 2000: 290), who is included and
who is excluded, and if we agree on the crucial role played by physical and social
arrangements with respect to whether impairment becomes disability, hence a
limitation of capability, then the relevance of this last point becomes clear.
Buchanan defines the dominant cooperative framework as 'institutional
infrastructure of social interaction' (2000: 288) and describes the framework of most
advanced industrialized societies as extremely complex, and involving institutional
structures as well as economic ones, highly specified symbolic languages and the
dominance of competitive markets in the private sectors. The demands on
individuals in order to be competent - or able - in this society are very high and
require complex arrays of skills and abilities. This specification of the dominant
social framework, therefore, in placing certain demands on individuals already
implies who is excluded and who is included. It is, according to Buchanan, like
choosing which game a group of people is going to play. If the game chosen is, say,
bridge, then young children will be necessarily excluded from the game. Conversely,
if the game chosen is 'family', then participation by children is certainly possible.
The point, in this case, is that in setting the choice of the framework, the level of
inclusion is determined and it is determined in a way that involves competing
interests, namely the interest of those efficiently participating in the scheme and
those excluded from it. Choosing a dominant cooperative social framework and
designing it, consequently, is a matter of justice in that it determines who are
disabled persons. But since being disabled has profound consequences in terms of
status in society, opportunities and well-being, then there is a legitimate interest for
disabled people in inclusion, thus in the choice and design of arrangements geared
at participation. How this has to be traded with the interests of those effectively
participating in the framework relates in turn to a criterion of social justice. Thus, the
slogan of disabled people's movement, 'change society, not the individual', needs to
be evaluated with respect to these considerations, too.
There are, however, two compelling reasons for inclusion, and hence for distributive
patterns aimed at promoting full capability with reference to disability. The first
relates to the devastating consequences of exclusion on the lives and well-being of
those excluded, and the second relates to the balancing of interests that such a
criterion can purport.
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The capability perspective on disability can provide such a criterion for social justice
in evaluating the demands of disability within the space of capability, in considering
disability as having a specific place in the metric used to assess individual shares
and in reinstating the importance of the social framework both in influencing
disability and in determining inclusion. Furthermore, conceptualising disability within
a capability framework has important implications in the context of education. The
role of the next chapter is to highlight such implications.
Concluding Comments
This chapter has presented a reconceptualisation of impairment and disability within
the capability approach. It has shown how this approach takes the understanding of
impairment and disability beyond the divide between individual and social elements
characterising current 'models' of disability, and towards a relational and
multidimensional perspective. In capability terms, disability is seen as a specific
aspect of human diversity emerging from the interlocking of individual with social,
environmental and circumstantial factors. It is furthermore seen as interrelated both
to impairment and to the design of social arrangements.
This conceptualisation is inscribed in a normative framework where considerations
of equality are based on the use of a metric, which gives a central place to human
heterogeneity. Since disability is understood as a specific aspect of human diversity,
the capability metric for the comparison of people's relative position is therefore
sensitive to disabled people's interests. Moreover, the democratic process
advocated by the approach is sensitive also to disabled people's own collective




The Capability Perspective on Disability and Special
Educational Needs: Beyond the Dilemma of
Difference in Education
This chapter applies the capability perspective on disability to the context of
education, and presents a conceptualisation and evaluation of disability and special
educational needs in terms of functionings and capabilities. It shows how the
capability approach provides a theoretical and normative framework within which
disability and special educational needs can be reconsidered and re-evaluated for
justice and equality in education. The chapter furthermore discusses and offers
counterarguments to two critiques of the framework proposed. The first objection
questions the capability approach on grounds of its alleged 'stigmatisation' of
disability, whilst the second argues against its presumed limited understanding of
human flourishing. Against these critiques, the chapter reinstates the capability
approach as a valuable normative framework for evaluating disability and special
educational needs. Finally, it outlines the theoretical reach of the approach, which
has the potential to take the debate on differences and disabilities in learning
beyond the concept of needs and, in particular, special educational needs.
Introduction
In chapter 2 I have outlined the centrality of dilemmas of difference in the debate in
special and inclusive education. More specifically, I have presented elements of
these dilemmas as consisting in the apparently unavoidable choice between
identifying children's differences in order to provide appropriately for their education,
but with the risk of labelling and discriminating them; or emphasising the 'sameness'
and offering a common provision, with the risk of not meeting the variety of
children's learning needs. These dilemmas subsume two fundamental and
interrelated questions: What counts as disability and special needs in education?
What educational provision can best meet the equal entitlements of disabled
children and children with special educational needs? Both questions relate, in turn,
to two interconnected aspects: a theoretical dimension, concerned with issues of
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conceptualisation and definition, and a political one, which refers to questions of
provision in order to meet the equal entitlement of all children to education. In this
sense, the debate in special and inclusive education reflects the different and
polarised theoretical and political perspectives in socio-medicine and disability
studies explored in the previous chapters.
How do theories and policies in education respond to the problem of
conceptualising learners' differences and to the claim of equal entitlement for
disabled children and children with special educational needs, both at the ideal level
of theory and in the actuality of schooling? As outlined in chapter 2, the answer is
rather unsatisfactory. The absence of a principled framework informing both
definitions and equal provision for disabled children and children with special needs,
results in extreme variations in perspectives, policies and practices, thus, ultimately,
in rather widespread unequal conditions. In particular, the absence of a principled
framework is evident specifically in the opposing theoretical perspectives informing
the debate in special and inclusive education. Positions in that debate can be
subsumed in the dichotomy between asserting that learning difficulties are caused
by factors essential to the individual child and, conversely, in maintaining instead
that they are caused by the limitations of schools and by institutional barriers. As
seen, the opposition between individual and social elements presents consistent
theoretical limits, which are mainly related to the unilateral causality and to the fixed
dichotomy proposed. According to Norwich,
Individual difficulty versus the organizational inflexibility is a false causal opposition. The social and
the individual are not exclusive alternatives between which causal accounts are chosen. We need
accounts which can accommodate the individual personal with the social organizational (1993: 20).
I maintain that the capability approach provides exactly a normative framework
where individual personal and social organizational can be accounted for in their
interaction. More specifically, what I argue in this chapter is that the capability
approach offers new and important insights towards the fundamental issue of
conceptualising differences in education, and particularly the differences entailed by
disability and special educational needs, while aiming at social justice. I contend
that re-examining disability and special needs through the concepts of capability
and functionings presents theoretical advantages with respect to current
understandings, thus providing innovative insights in terms of conceptualisations.
Furthermore, the centrality of freedom in this perspective and its approach
specifically based on assessing inequalities in terms of capabilities, constitute a
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normative framework where questions of a just educational provision for disabled
children and children with special needs can best be evaluated. Ultimately, since the
capability approach is fundamentally concerned with justice and equality, it is within
this framework that the crucial questions at the core of dilemmas of difference in
education can find important normative answers.
The chapter addresses also two important objections to the capability approach on
disability and special educational needs, both arguing against its feasibility in
representing the interests of disabled people. The first objection maintains that since
evaluating disability and special needs in terms of capability highlights them as
vertical differences, and hence as differences that entail an evaluation in terms of
disadvantageous individual endowments, the capability approach presents a view
that stigmatises disability as a negative personal aspect. The second objection
argues against the presumed overstated value posed by the approach to functional
capabilities and, therefore, it critiques its validity in adequately representing
disability. If these positions are sustained, than the perspective outlined in my work
loses its theoretical and normative legitimacy. Therefore, in this chapter I analyse
and counter-argue both objections, and reinstate the validity of the framework I
suggest. This clears the path towards showing how this framework has the potential
to extend beyond particular conceptualisations of 'special educational needs'.
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first presents a re-conceptualisation
of special educational needs and learning difficulties within the capability
perspective. The second section discusses the two objections to the framework
outlined, and defends it as the appropriate normative framework for reconsidering
the differences entailed by disability and special educational needs. Finally, the last
section discusses how the idea of capability relates to, and subsumes concepts of
human needs, thus leading to a perspective that has the potential to take the debate
beyond ideas of needs and, more specifically, special educational needs.
As we shall see, this discussion highlights the significance of the two initial
questions, which are not only central to the field of special and inclusive education,
but also fundamental for educational theories and policies in general.
Conceptualising disability or differential abilities within a normative framework that
considers the compelling moral claim of justice, implies addressing the relation of
these concepts to the aims, values and functions of education in general. Thus,
operationalising the capability perspective on disability and special needs in the
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context of education may suggest further theoretical insights on what this approach
has to offer to educational theories and policy in general.
6.1 Re-examining Differences in Education: The Capability Approach
Before suggesting how the capability approach provides us with an alternative
framework for thinking about differences in education, let us recapitulate the main
elements of the capability perspective on impairment and disability developed in
chapter 5.
According to Sen, equality and the relative positions of individuals within social
arrangements should be evaluated in the space of capability. Capabilities are the
actual freedoms and opportunities people have to lead the lives they have reasons
to value, and represent 'what people are actually able to be and to do' (Nussbaum,
2000). Capabilities are capabilities to function, that is, to choose among alternative
bundles or sets of valued functionings. The latter, in turn, are beings and doings
constitutive of a person's being. Walking, reading, writing or being well nourished or
emotionally balanced are all basic functionings, which enable more complex
functionings, like, for instance, practicing medicine or being an environmentalist.
Considerations of human diversity are central to the capability approach, thus
making it a particularly important framework for re-examining disability. The
approach provides a metric to assess people's relative positions, which is sensitive
to the demands of impairment and disability, in that it assumes differences as
central to its informational bases and, more specifically, it includes personal
characteristics also in terms of differences regulating the conversion of resources
into valuable ends. Furthermore, in considering how external, circumstantial factors
interact with individual characteristics, and in placing this aspect as part of the
informational bases of the metric, this approach is open to considerations in relation
to the relevance and impact of the design of social arrangements on issues of
disability.
Within this framework disability is conceptualised as limitation on relevant
capabilities and is seen in its relational aspect, both with respect to impairment and
to the design of environmental and social arrangements. Hence, rethinking
impairment and disability in terms of capabilities implies considering what are the
full sets of capabilities one person can choose from and evaluating the impact of
impairment on these sets of freedoms. It implies, moreover, considering the
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interface between the individual and the environmental characteristics in assessing
what circumstantial elements may lead impairment to become disability, and how
this impacts on capabilities. In this sense, impairment and disability are elements to
be accounted for, both in theories of justice and in social policy, when considering
what a person is actually able to be and to do.
I suggest that this conceptualisation of disability in terms of capability has important
theoretical and normative implications for education. More specifically, what I argue
is that reframing elements of the dilemma of difference through the capability
approach can bring forward the theorisation of what counts as disability in
education. The dilemma of difference relates to the difficult choice between
identifying children's differences in order to provide for their needs, but with the risk
of labelling and stigmatising them, and accentuating what is common among
children, with the risk of not making available what is needed by the individual child.
I maintain that the capability approach provides a framework, which not only
overrides unilateral understandings in terms of individual causal factors as opposed
to social causal factors of learning difficulties, but also and fundamentally considers
dilemmatic aspects in terms of justice. I furthermore suggest that the capability
approach leads the debate in special and inclusive education beyond the
contentious concept of special educational needs. But let us now proceed to
substantiate these claims.
As we have seen, dilemmas of difference consist in the identification of children's
difference in relation to education and schooling systems, when aiming at
appropriate, additional provision in order to achieve the aim of educating all
children. They refer to considerations of learning difficulties as emerging from the
relationship between individual child and schooling system. How can the capability
perspective address aspects of dilemmas in significant ways? I maintain it can do
this in two substantial ways: first, by actually reconsidering the dilemmas through
concepts of functioning and capability and through the capability metric, hence by
substantially conceptualising the relational aspect of disability both to impairment
and to schooling factors. Second, by rethinking disability and learning difficulties
through concepts of functionings and capability and within the framework entailed
by these concepts in their contextualisation in education.
Let us start by taking into account aspects of dilemmas of difference and by
ref raming them within the capability perspective. Disability, as we have seen, results
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in capability limitation, and is relational both to impairments and to the design of
social arrangements. More specifically, impairments affect functionings and
become disability in certain arrangements but not in others, hence disability implies
impairment, but the opposite does not hold necessariIy. Let us now translate this
perspective into education.
Consider, for instance, dyslexia. Dyslexia may considerably affect the achievement
of basic functionings like reading and writing, and hence may result in a consistent
limitation of immediate functioning achievements and of future capabilities (more on
this later on). In this sense, dyslexia is an individual disadvantage in certain aspects
of education, namely all those related to literacy, where the individual may
experience 'learning difficulties'. Yet this potential restriction in functionings may not
become a disability, hence a realised functioning restriction, when the educational
environment is appropriately designed to address the learning modalities of a
dyslexic individual and the individual is receptive to it. The capability framework
looks precisely at this relational aspect of how the individual child interacts with her
schooling environment and how she converts resources into functionings, whilst
considering at the same time how the environment is designed. In this sense, no
emphasis is posed on within-child factors over educational factors or vice versa,
since the focus of the framework is on the interaction between the two elements. In
this sense, moreover, no unilateral causal relation is established between individual
or indeed circumstantial features and disability or learning difficulties. Finally, this
approach takes into account not only their interaction, but also the complexity of
both dimensions, individual and circumstantial.
Before reconsidering how the capability metric evaluates dyslexia, or any other
limitation of capability, it is important to contextualise, albeit in a preliminary way,
elements of the capability approach in education. Contextualising capability in
education entails two dimensions, the first connected to bringing into focus the value
of education and the second related to the expansion of capability (Saito, 2003:18).
With respect to the value of education, the role Sen ascribes to capability, namely
its direct relevance to people's well-being and substantive freedom, relates both to
the intrinsic and instrumental value of education. Although this is not a clear cut and
unproblematic distinction, we can consider two ways in which education is valuable,
38 See chapter 5.
39 Chapter 7 presents an operationalisation of the capability approach in education and deals with
these issues more extensively.
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and in which, therefore, it contributes to personal well-being (Brighouse, 2000,
Saito, 2003, Unterhalter, 2003). Education is instrumentally good in that it yields
other benefits, like better life prospects and career opportunities. In this sense being
educated improves one's opportunities in life. On the other hand, education is good
in itself, in that being educated, other things being equal, enhances the possibility to
engage in a wider range of activities and to fully participate in social life. Thus being
educated relates to a more fulfilling life. This first aspect of the relationship between
education and capability relates substantially to the second and more relevant one,
that is, to the role education plays in expanding capabilities.
Education expands capabilities in terms of capacity or ability as well as in terms of
opportunity, hence in terms of capability sets available to individuals (Saito, 2003:
27). For example, learning maths not only expands various capacities connected to
mathematical reasoning and problem solving, but also widens the individuals' set of
opportunities and capabilities with respect, for instance, to choices of occupation.
Furthermore, the broadening in capability entailed by education extends to the
advancement of complex capabilities. While promoting reflection, understanding,
information and awareness of one's capacity, education promotes at the same time
the capacity to formulate exactly the valued beings and doings the individual has
reasons to value. In this sense, ultimately, education enhances capability in terms of
achieved functionings, hence well-being achievements, as well as in terms of well-
being freedoms.
In this respect, however, contextualising the capability approach becomes more
problematic when relating to the education of children. This is due to the particular
status of children, which requires adults to protect children's interests, but also does
not allow for agency freedom or the exercise of autonomous choices 40. Sen has
emphasised the importance of concentrating not on the freedom the child has, but
on the freedom she will have in the future. Thus, in dealing with education, and
specifically with compulsory education, Sen argues
I think the main argument for compulsory education is that it will give the child when grown up much
more freedom and, therefore, the educational argument is a very future oriented argument (Sen,
quoted in Saito, 2003: 27).
4° See Shapiro, 2003 and also Archard, D. and MacLeod, C. (2002) The Moral and Political Status of
Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Consequently, while expanding capabilities, education plays a very important role in
promoting the future freedoms children will have to choose their valued beings and
doings.
This prospective dimension of education as a capability that expands capabilities
has fundamental implications for the theorisation of what the capability approach
can offer to educational theory in general. Moreover, this future-oriented perspective
has interesting connections to the determination of the aims and the values of
education itself; a point, however, that goes well beyond the immediate scope of this
section. In relation to this specific point, this future dimension is particularly
significant in terms of highlighting the importance of achieving certain functionings in
education, hence in pointing out that the implications for learning of the interaction
between individual differences and educational systems have to be carefully
evaluated. It is in this sense, ultimately, that the capability metric in assessing
diversity is particularly significant.
In view of these considerations, let us now analyse how the capability metric
evaluates, for instance, dyslexia in relation to education 41 . Dyslexia, as seen,
impairs reading and writing functionings, hence a child with dyslexia is
disadvantaged in certain aspects of her education when compared to a non-dyslexic
child. Since being literate has intrinsically and instrumentally important values,
dyslexia limits not only the achievement of reading and writing functionings, but also
of prospective relevant capabilities. Consequently, dyslexia is considered a
difference, which, in affecting functionings, constitutes an identifiable disadvantage.
Is it an absolute disadvantage? No, it is relational with respect to the design of
educational systems. Suppose, for example, that there be an educational system
completely based on singing and musical curricula. In that educational design,
dyslexia would certainly have a very different impact than the one it has on literacy
based systems. Furthermore, dyslexia is a relational limitation also in a second
sense, in that literacy based systems can and indeed have to provide specifically
and appropriately for it. The capability metric provides this fundamental insight. It
furthermore highlights how additional and appropriate provision in the case of
dyslexia, as in any other restriction of functioning and capability, becomes a matter
of justice. Moreover, it is not in terms of assistance that differential resources are
41 These and following considerations draw from Unterhalter and Bnghouse, 2003.
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due, but in terms of equality in the space of capability, aspects that I shall address in
the next chapter.
The reframing of elements of the dilemma of difference in terms of capability is
complete. Let us now focus, therefore, on the reconsideration of other learning
difficulties, in addition to the case of dyslexia already addressed, through concepts
of functionings and capability within the educational framework identified. Let us
analyse three 'categories', namely physical disability: sensory impairment in terms
of hearing impairment, severe learning difficulties, and autism.
Taking into account hearing impairment means looking at how it has an impact upon
education on related functionings and capabilities sets. Hearing enables basic
functionings like, for instance, listening and communicating. The latter, whilst being
fundamental to all dimensions of learning, play a specific role for example in
language and foreign language acquisition. Hence, prima facie, a complete hearing
loss, like in the case of deafness, significantly restricts basic functionings and
relevant capabilities. However, there may be a second way of considering hearing
impairment and of looking at the specific dimension entailed in this case by
education. We need to introduce here a concept proposed by disabled people
movements and specifically by disabled scholars, namely the concept of doing the
same thing in different ways, or alternative functioning. It is well accredited that deaf
people can effectively 'listen' to vocal messages by way of 'lip-reading' and
communicate through sign language. For example, in the community of Martha's
Vineyard, the wider population commonly and effectively adopted both English and
sign language, learning them from infancy and thus virtually nullifying the
functioning restriction of the deaf group of the community (Ree, 2000: 201). Yet our
social arrangements are not designed like Martha's Vineyard and are instead based
almost exclusively on vocal languages. Without exploring here the reasons and the
implications of such arrangements, it is worth considering the concept of alternative
functioning in education. In particular, education can play a significant role in
expanding capabilities for hearing impaired children while providing for the
functionings as well as alternative functionings they can achieve; after all, many
hearing impaired people are effectively literate in the understanding, albeit some
may not be in the production, of two languages. How does the capability metric
compare functionings to 'alternative' ones? It considers functioning in alternative
ways a personal feature, which stands as a vertical inequality with respect to
functioning in relation to the design of educational arrangements and therefore as a
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disadvantage. The same consideration extends to other physical and sensory
impairments.
A consideration of severe learning difficulties entails a more complex situation.
Severe learning difficulties refer to a potentially wider limitation in functionings, from
basics to more complex ones, hence in relevant and substantial capability
limitations. Basic functionings like independent mobility, making friendships or
communicating can be limited, as well as functionings like choice making and
participation. Consequently, given the complex characteristics of contemporary
educational systems, a child with severe learning difficulties is at a considerable
disadvantage. Here again, severe learning difficulties constitute a vertical inequality,
which the capability framework highlights in its relational aspect to the design of
educational systems.
Finally, consider the complex case of autism. As in previous examples, the two
dimensions highlighted by the capability approach, i.e. considering autism in terms
of functionings and capabilities and evaluating it through a capability metric, not only
capture the complexity of autism both in itself and with respect to the design of
educational systems, but also fundamentally show how autism stands as vertical
inequality with respect to non-autism. Let us see how. Although 'experts differ on
the range and the severity of behaviours identified with autism' (Alderson & Goodey,
2003: 73), and despite the fact that autism has a vast array of different
manifestations, the condition is generally defined in terms of a disorder in the
development of mental functionings. It is characterised as a qualitative impairment,
which affects functionings of social interactions and social integration, the
acquisition of language, and verbal and non-verbal communication (Frith, 2003: 9-
10). This impairment may be accompanied by strengths in other functionings, like 'a
style of information processing that is focussed on detail' or excellent selective
memorizing functionings, and fluent and articulate language related to specific
individual interests. However, none of these possible functionings seem to act as
alternative functionings, counteracting the qualitative impairment itself. Moreover,
the level and significance of the impairment vary from severe to mild in relation to
the child's development and differ at different ages (Frith, 2003:206-207). A child
with autism, therefore, may present significant limitations In functionings such as
talking, understanding ordinary communication, understanding verbal and non-
verbal cues, attributing thoughts to others and intentions to their actions and, more
generally, understanding and participating in ordinary social interactions. Moreover,
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reading functionings, especially those related to reading for meaning and to
processing content may be significantly limited, as is the capacity to relate
meanings to contexts. Notwithstanding the complexity of the condition, in the case
of autism too, education can play a crucial role in expanding functionings, hence
future capabilities. Explicit learning activities such as promoting the knowledge of
own and others' thoughts or the emphasis on conscious rules to reach the ability of
understanding non-literal remarks in social utterances, have all proven to be
effective ways, among others, of enhancing communicative functionings in children
with autism (Frith, 2003: 218). Although more difficult to highlight in its relation to the
design of educational systems, given its foundational and consistent limitation in
functionings, autism presents some relational aspects to the choice of educational
arrangements. Let us imagine, for instance, an educational system characterised by
uniquely promoting and strengthening the child's specific individual ability and
interest, irrespective of a wide array of activities and of the achievements of broader
educational aims. Suppose, moreover, that the school environment were designed
as to limit or even nullify social interactions by focussing on the assignment of
specific individual tasks only. In this educational system the impact of autism would
certainly be less significant than the one it has on a system characterised by a wide
range of learning activities and by the substantial promotion of forms of social
interactions. This reconceptualisation of autism in terms of capability leads us to the
fundamental evaluation implied by the capability metric with respect to the
functioning restrictions of autism. The limitations experienced by children with
autism markedly restrict their tunctionings achievements and their future choice
among sets of valuable beings and doings, hence of valuable capabilities. In this
sense, autism is a vertical inequality, or an inequality that relates to a disadvantage,
and a child with autism is at a considerable and pervasive disadvantage when
compared to a non-autistic child. Here again, this is the fundamental insight of the
capability metric.
Let us now try to provide a first answer to the question of what counts as disability
and special needs in education. Seen within a capability framework, disability and
special educational needs are restrictions in functioning achievements, such as
those analysed in the previous examples, which relate to the design of educational
systems. In light of the specific role of education as a basic capability and in
expanding capabilities, a child's functionings limitations result in limitation of the
child's future capabilities. Consequently, the capability metric highlights disability,
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and indeed special educational needs, as a vertical inequality when compared to
non-disability and to the absence of special needs, or, at a normative level, as a
kind of difference that, in limiting functionings, has to be addressed as a matter of
justice. This yields fundamental implications for the conceptualisation of justice in
education for disabled children and children with special educational needs, which is
the subject of my next chapter.
Before analysing questions of equality and justice, however, two further issues have
to be examined. The first concerns addressing some objections to the
conceptualisation of disability and special educational needs in terms of functionings
and capabilities. Since these objections relate directly to the position I have been
outlining in this and last chapter, it is important to offer a counterargument before
proceeding with our analysis of how the capability approach responds to compelling
issues of justice for disabled children and children with special educational needs.
The second important issue reconsiders the capability approach and specifically the
ways in which a capability-based framework may theoretically extend beyond
notions of human needs and, therefore, special educational needs, as the term is
currently understood in educational debates. Let us start by analysing and
responding to some objections that have been raised against the capability
approach and its use of a metric that is sensitive to individual differences.
6.2 Defending the Capability Approach on Disability and Special
Educational Needs
In this section I discuss and offer counterarguments to two important objections to
the capability approach, presented respectively by Thomas Pogge (2003) and by
David Wasserman (1998). These objections question the evaluation of impairment
and disability within the framework proposed by the capability approach and its
assessment of inequalities in terms of people's capabilities. Whilst Pogge raises his
critique of the approach on the grounds of its alleged stigmatisation of disability,
Wasserman expresses doubts about its 'rigid and dogmatic account of human
flourishing' (Wasserman, 1998: 196). More specifically, on the one hand, according
to Pogge the capability approach, in considering disabilities in terms of vertical
inequalities, ends up highlighting them as negative characteristics. This leads to a
view of disabled people as less well endowed than able-bodied persons, hence to a
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'stigmatising' position whereby disabled people are seen as 'naturally disfavoured',
and overall 'less valuable'. On the other hand, according to Wasserman, the
capability approach tends to exaggerate the value of certain functional capabilities,
and presents questionable comparisons between different ways of flourishing, which
may be incommensurable. For instance, he argues that the flourishing of a visually
disabled person is difficult to compare to the flourishing of a sighted person, given
the wide differential formation of life plans related to different conditions.
Consequently, Wasserman claims that the emphasis of the capability approach on
opportunities for functionings leads to a rather fixed and restricted view of human
flourishing, and wrongly presumes that a wider set of possible functionings is
intrinsically more valuable than a restricted one.
Against these objections, in this section I restate that the capability approach
provides a valuable and normatively justified framework for reconsidering disability
and special needs. First, in addressing Pogge's position, I maintain that the
approach does not necessarily lead to a stigmatising and negative view of disabled
people, but presents instead the elements for a reconsideration of disability and
special needs as specific traits of human heterogeneity, which, in being relational to
the design of institutions, have to be addressed fundamentally as matters of justice.
And the latter is a distinct insight of the capability approach. Furthermore, I argue
that the capability approach provides a framework for reconsidering the impact of
disability and special needs on individuals' advantage, both in terms of justice as
distribution of resources and in terms of justice as recognition of differences 42 , thus
setting a framework specifically apt to considerations related to disability. Second, I
maintain that Wasserman's critique represents not only a partial understanding of
the capability approach, but also a questionable position with respect to the
possibility of establishing comparisons between people's states, and more so since
these comparisons are fundamental to issues of justice. Furthermore, I defend the
notion of human flourishing inherent to the capability approach from Wasserman's
conclusions. Let us start by addressing the more radical of the two objections,
Pogge's critique, and then proceed to analyse Wasserman's concern.
In his essay Can the Capability Approach be Justified? (2003) Thomas Pogge
proposes a set of critiques of the capability perspective based on what is known as
the primary goods approach. It is worth here briefly outlining some elements of this
42 This aspect is discussed in more details in chapter 8, where I address broader objections to the
egalitarian framework based on the capability approach developed in my work.
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approach, which may help clarifying Pogge's position. Proposed by John Rawis,
the primary goods approach maintains that in evaluating people's relative positions
for the purpose of justice, we should compare individuals' holding of social primary
goods. Social primary goods are features of institutions and resources that free and
equal citizens need in order to live a complete life (Rawls, 2001:58). The list of
social primary goods includes the basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement
and choice of occupation against a background of fair equality of opportunity,
powers and prerogatives of office, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-
respect (Rawls, 2001: 57-60). According to the primary goods approach, our
concern for justice requires institutions designed to give people equal holding of
these social primary goods, hence two people with the same shares of primary
goods should be judged equally well off. Furthermore, considerations about
people's natural endowments, what Rawls calls the results of the 'natural lottery'
(Rawls, 2001: 89), are not part of the assessment of inequalities among individuals,
and the metric upon which individuals' positions are evaluated is not sensitive to
personal heterogeneities. It follows that the primary goods approach evaluates, for
instance, the positions of a visually disabled person and an able-bodied person as
equal, providing they have the same holding of primary goods.
The capability approach challenges this perspective by stating that what is relevant
to justice is not people's access to valuable social primary goods, which are always
resources, but people's access to valuable functionings, that is, people's capabilities
for functionings (Pogge, 2003: 23). For the capability approach, fundamental in the
evaluation of people's relative advantage is the centrality of human diversity, since
different people have different conversion factors of resources into valuable
functionings. Hence the capability metric is sensitive to personal heterogeneities. In
this sense, the capability approach evaluates the position of a visually disabled
person as unequal when compared to the position of an able-bodied individual, and
considers disability a difference that, whilst being relational to the design of social
and institutional schemes' has an impact on people's sets of capabilities and
constitutes, therefore, a vertical inequality. Ultimately, impairment and disability
have to be taken into account in evaluating people's relative advantage in capability
terms, both in the design of institutions and the distribution of resources. The key
43 I focus here primarily on the elements that are foundational to Pogge's critique, whilst leaving a
more detailed account of this approach to chapter 7. My discussion of Pogge's argument draws
extensively on Unterhalter and Brighouse, 2003: 10-12.
44 See above and also chapter 5.
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difference between the two approaches lies exactly in this element of sensitivity to
personal differences in evaluating individuals' positions within a concern for justice.
Whilst the primary goods approach does not take into account personal
heterogeneities as relevant determinants of people's shares of resources, the
capability approach argues instead that personal heterogeneities are fundamental to
the evaluation of such shares.
Pogge maintains that these contrasting positions lead to a crucial difference in the
considerations of individuals' natural features. More specifically, he claims that the
capability approach, in including individual natural differences among the elements
of moral concern, ends up identifying disability and special needs always as vertical
inequalities and, thus, stigmatising disabled people and people with special needs
as somehow overall worse endowed than other people. In Pogge's words,
The capability approach seeks to give such a person (disabled person) a claim in justice, so she
need not ask for extra resources as a special favour, but can come forward proudly, with her head
held high, insisting on additional resources as her due. (...) To have a valid claim that she is owed
compensation as a matter of justice, she must present her special limitation, need, or handicap as
one that outweighs all other particular vertical inequalities and entitles her to count as worse
endowed all things considered (2003: 55).
Conversely, the primary goods approach considers personal inequalities in natural
endowments irrelevant to moral concerns, and equates disability to individual
natural features, like the colour of the hair, or the eyes, or one's height. In seeing
these features as horizontal, this approach avoids any stigmatisation of people on
the bases of their natural characteristics (Pogge, 2003: 54-5). Hence the alleged
superiority of the primary goods over the capability approach in considering
disability and special needs without stigmatising them.
Can the capability approach respond to this objection? A first consideration refers
to a possible agreement between the two approaches in evaluating the impact of
the design of social and institutional arrangements on disability. The extent to which
impairment becomes disability relates evidently to the ways the environment or the
social scheme are organised. For instance, a visual impairment determines an
individual's lack of reading functionings, hence becomes a disability, when Braille
facilities are unavailable. In this case, both approaches would converge on the
necessary environmental and institutional adjustments for the elimination of
inequalities. However, the differences between the two approaches emerge starkly
45 See Unterhalter and Bnghouse (2003), pp. 9-10-11.
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when considering cases in which there is real inequality of functionings that cannot
be overcome with social and environmental adjustments. In this case, Pogge's claim
loses its force, and not only the primary goods view appears less apt to evaluating
individuals' relative positions within a concern for justice, but also notions of
functionings and capabilities appear more suited to this evaluation. Let us examine
why.
Consider, for instance, the restrictions related to visual impairments with respect to
the possibilities of recognising people, or reading social and non-verbal cues in
social interactions. Clearly, no environmental or institutional reform could currently
be conceived to the extent of overcoming the limitations in social functionings
experienced and expressed by visually disabled people in these cases. How does
the primary goods approach evaluate this situation? In order to avoid the presumed
stigmatisation in considering the limitation a vertical inequality, this approach needs
to think of the disadvantage either as socially determined or as irrelevant. However,
both positions appear evidently problematic. First, the specific disadvantage of the
visually disabled person, in the situation mentioned above, cannot be overcome by
changing the design of social institutions, and might be possible only by overcoming
the impairment itself. The primary goods approach runs therefore into a difficulty
here, since there are restrictions related to certain impairments, which are not
socially determined, and where a modification of the environmental and social
design would not lead to a levelling down of inequalities among individuals. Second,
and consequently, the primary goods approach, in maintaining that personal
differences associated to impairments and disability are horizontal inequalities,
hence are irrelevant to questions of justice, ends up seriously overlooking those
substantive inequalities related to certain restrictions in functionings. Finally, it
seems also that appealing to notions of functionings and capabilities can capture
these inequalities in a far more just perspective than the primary goods one, since
the restriction experienced by the visually disabled person of the previous example
is a limitation in certain functionings, and not in any social primary goods. The
capability approach captures this dimension and, rightly, maintains not only that a
visual impairment is a vertical inequality with respect to certain functionings, but also
that additional resources are due in this case as a matter of justice.
46 See chapter 3, and French, 1993.
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A further example can confirm this position. Consider again the case of moderate
learning difficulties explored previously, and specifically the case of dyslexia. Why
should we devote additional resources or adopt specific learning techniques in
teaching dyslexic children, if dyslexia is indeed a horizontal inequality, comparable,
for instance, to being medium built? Here again, it seems that Pogge's position
presents problems in considering this case, or any other learning difficulties, since in
order to deny that dyslexia is a vertical inequality, it needs either considering it
entirely socially determined or maintaining, as it tends to do, that it is a horizontal
inequality. Yet both positions are evidently problematic. Dyslexia, as seen
previously, may limit the achievement of important functionings, like reading and
writing hence it may affect the individual's functionings and the individual can
experience learning difficulties. In this sense, dyslexia is an individual disadvantage,
which is relational to the design of the educational system. Taking this example
further, one can argue that dyslexia would not constitute a disadvantage in non-
literacy curricula. Whilst the condition that relates to dyslexia would still be inherent
to the individual, in such a system its implications in terms of possible disadvantage
would not appear. It follows that the choice of educational system and curriculum
contributes to the possible disadvantage experienced by a dyslexic persbn. As
such, the choice of educational system has to be justified to the disadvantaged
person in terms of the additional benefits that such a system provides to her overall
well-being, since there are undeniable higher levels of well-being associated to
living in a literate society (Unterhalter and Brighouse, 2003: 12). However, it does
not follow from the previous elements that dyslexia is either entirely socially
determined, nor that it is irrelevant to questions of justice. On the contrary, the
relational aspect of dyslexia requires its recognition as vertical inequality when
compared to non-dyslexia, in light of its impact on fundamental literacy functionings.
It furthermore requires the provision of additional resources as a matter of justice,
hence as a just way of addressing the real disadvantage associated to it.
One aspect of defence against Pogge's critique is accomplished. However, this
aspect does not address entirely the stigmatisation Pogge ascribes to the capability
perspective on disability and special educational needs, and a second level of
argument is therefore required here. I start by noting that, recognising, as the
capability approach does, that certain personal characteristics, in interacting with
environmental and social factors, may lead to a vertical inequality, does not
establish a causal relation between such inequality and any stigmatising effect.
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Nevertheless, disabled people's movements have long denounced the
discrimination and the oppression embedded in any evaluation of disadvantage and,
in this sense, Pogge's critique of the capability approach presents some similarities
with that position, in that it appears to argue against establishing any correlation
between impairment, disability and disadvantage. But does the evaluation of
disability and special educational needs in terms of functionings and capabilities
restrictions, hence in terms of vertical inequalities, really correlate to a stigmatising
view? I maintain that the capability approach can respond to this element of Pogge's
critique on the bases of its encompassing not only elements of justice in terms of
redistribution of resources, but also, and importantly, elements of justice in terms of
recognition of differences (Robeyns, 2003).
Recall here the fundamental framework of the capability approach: what counts for
justice and equality is what real and effective opportunities people have to choose
the life they have reasons to value, hence to do what they value doing, and to be
the kind of person they want to be (Robeyns, 2003: 545). Attention is not given to a
standardised list of resources, as in the case of primary goods, which are arrived at
on the basis of what, on average, normal individuals would need to lead a complete
life. In the capability approach, attention is given to the specific sets of functionings
and capabilities of each person. In this sense, recognition is given to any sets of
valuable capabilities for functionings, encompassing any personal diversity, with a
view of expanding individuals' freedoms. Hence sets of capabilities that society
should aim to enable can be specified for visually disabled people, or for mentally
disabled persons, all with the goal of expanding freedoms and well-being.
Expressed aims of the approach are exactly the expansion of people's overall
capabilities, as well as equality in the space of basic capabilities. The latter are
those fundamental beings and doings crucially important to people's well-being, like
being in good health, well nourished and sheltered, educated and able to participate
in society without shame. Within the capability approach disability and special
educational needs, whilst being evaluated in terms of vertical inequalities, or real
disadvantages that require additional resources, are also considered in relation to
the individual well-being and to the possibility for individuals of choosing valued
functionings.
47 As mentioned above, this aspect is addressed in more detail also in chapter 8.
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It seems, therefore, that the capability approach does not necessarily stigmatise
disability and special educational needs, but reconsiders them in their specificity
with a view on the person's choice over her life. And undeniably such a choice
would be compromised, should disability and special needs considered in terms of
primary goods or resources only, since in the latter case the person's specific
difference and its related possible disadvantage would remain not addressed.
Ultimately, in recognising the importance of human flourishing and well-being, and
in allowing in considerations on valuable different sets of capabilities, not exclusively
related to an average person but instead encompassing human heterogeneity, the
capability approach is sensitive to issues of positive recognition of differences.
Although this line represents only a partial response to Pogge's critique, I maintain
that it suggests themes for further exploration of issues of recognition as
fundamentally interrelated to issues of redistribution. It seems therefore that the
capability approach has the potential to address both dimensions in fruitful and
morally significant ways.
In the light of these considerations, let us now turn our attention to Wasserman's
critique of the capability perspective on disability and special needs. Although
Wasserman refers primarily to Nussbaum's position, his critique questions the
foundation of the approach by raising two important issues. The first relates to the
exaggerated value the approach places on standard sensory and motor functionings
for human flourishing, whilst presenting questionable comparisons between different
ways of flourishing in life. In this sense, Wasserman claims, being sighted and being
blind lead to rather incommensurable ways of flourishing, and it is unclear why a
larger set of functionings should determine a better flourishing. The second
argument, interrelated to the first, refers to the rather fixed version of human
flourishing presented by the approach, whereby a restricted set of capabilities for
functionings is seen as less valuable than a broader one. Ultimately, according to
Wasserman, the capability approach is difficult to translate into a usable metric for
comparative well-being (1998: 199).
Can the capability approach address these problems in significant ways? I maintain
that the arguments discussed with reference to Pogge's critique can effectively be
used to counter-argue Wasserman's concerns. Hence, here I will only add some
considerations to those already outlined above. First, on the rather
incommensurability of human flourishing based on comparing sets of functionings. It
seems that Wasserman tends here not only to overstate the importance accorded to
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sensor and motor functionings by the approach, but also, and more importantly, to
overlook how the elements of capabilities, hence of opportunities for functionings,
relate to questions of justice. The capability approach considers the individuals'
opportunities for functionings and the element of choice among valuable sets, whilst
evaluating individuals' advantage with respect to them. Recall here the example of
the visually disabled person experiencing restrictions in her functionings of reading
non-verbal cues in social interactions. Whilst it is perfectly acceptable to maintain
that a person can flourish in the absence of these functionings, it is conversely
rather evident that reading non-verbal languages enhances people's social
interactions, which, in turn, may contribute to personal well-being. Here the
capability approach does not impose a set of functionings as intrinsically more
valuable than another, but acknowledges the possible disadvantage associated to
certain restrictions in capabilities. After all, whilst the visually disabled person
cannot, at least under present circumstances, arrive at reading non-verbal
messages, an able-bodied person could always choose not to read these cues. The
acknowledgment of this restriction is relevant for issues of justice. Furthermore, and
interrelated to the previous point, the capability approach does not deny the
flourishing of the lives of disabled people per se, but outlines how certain functioning
restrictions may need additional or appropriate resources exactly when aiming at
human well-being and flourishing. And the importance of this last point is recognised
by Wasserman when he states,
A society in which people with atypical functions enjoyed roughly the same standard of living as the
general population, in terms of food, clothing, housing, work, security, and leisure, would clearly be
more just than our own society (1998: 200).
This kind of society, however, is really one of the core aims of the capability
approach hence Wasserman's first concern is actually appropriately addressed
within the approach itself.
But Wasserman's critique goes further, and questions the understanding of human
flourishing in terms of well-being, since he maintains,
But that society could still be faulted if its impaired citizens, despite their comfort, security and
leisure, had little opportunity for friendships, adventure, or cultural enrichment. It is unclear, though,
how we could assess their comparative disadvantage without recourse to a more comprehensive
account of human flourishing (1998: 200).
48 I am referring here to technical and environmental designs as they are now.
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Here again, I maintain that Wasserman's position reflects an under-specified
account of the capability approach, and, in particular, of its conceptualisation of
people's well-being. Whilst Wasserman does not express what a more
comprehensive account of human flourishing would involve, thus somehow eluding
his own challenge, he also seems to present a partial account of the concept of
well-being as conceptualised within the capability approach, and of how it relates to
people's freedom. Recall here that, according to Sen, 'The well-being of a person
can be seen in terms of the quality (the well-ness, as it were) of the person's being'
(1992: 39). Further, fundamental to the approach is the well-being freedom enjoyed
by individuals. This, in turn, translates into the possibility of choosing among
valuable beings and doings, hence into the actual and effective opportunities to
choose one's valued way of flourishing. All the capability approach maintains is that
people should be given equal and effective access to these opportunities. Moreover,
inequalities among them should be assessed in terms of these effective and real
opportunities for functionings, and any inequality in this space be considered a
matter of justice. Ultimately, the capability approach in no way excludes
considerations of 'opportunities for friendships, adventure and cultural activities' for
disabled people, but, whilst providing equal and effective access to these
functionings, leaves choosing them to the individual. In this sense, it appears that
the capability approach can, and indeed finds appropriate answers to Wasserman's
concerns.
This section has addressed two main objections to the capability perspective on
disability and special educational needs and has shown how the approach presents
a theoretically and morally justified account of the kinds of differences entailed by
these dimensions of human heterogeneity. Having defended the capability approach
against these two main critiques and somehow 'cleared' its path, in the final section
of this chapter I outline a further important theoretical insight inherent to it, which
has the potential to bring theories and conceptualisations beyond the idea of needs,
and, more specifically, special educational needs.
6.3 Beyond the Concept of Special Educational Needs? Capabilities,
Basic Capabilities and Education
Reconceptualising the dilemma of difference within the capability framework has
outlined important dimensions for the definition and the evaluation of disability and
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special educational needs. In this section I highlight how this reconceptualisation
implies further theoretical and normative elements, which have the potential of
bringing the debate in education beyond concepts of needs, whilst being at the
same time fundamental for the operationalisation of capability in education. More
specifically, I argue that the idea of capability provides us with a conceptual
framework, which extends beyond notions of needs in a theoretically and
normatively rigorous way. Here my analysis draws parallels from insights developed
by Sabina Alkire in her discussion of how basic capabilities, as subsets of all
capabilities, relate to and include concepts of basic human needs, while providing a
wider and more valuable philosophical perspective through the emphasis on choice
and participation and in relation to well-being (2002:170). Given the problematic and
contentious status of the concept of needs, and, in particular, special educational
needs, as the term is currently used and understood in educational debates, I
maintain that this insight of the capability approach constitutes an important
dimension for our discussion. This section considers, first, the concepts of capability
and basic capability as articulated by Sen, and it subsequently analyses Alkire's
understanding of basic capabilities in their relation to the concept of human needs.
Finally, it addresses these considerations with reference to the debate in education.
Analysing how Sen's concept of capability entails a philosophically broader and
more rigorous perspective than those based on notions of needs implies
considering first, the concept of basic capability, and second, its relation to the
concept of basic human needs. The question of determining basic capabilities
relates to the possibility
that some capabilities may be so basic to human welfare that they can be identified without any
prior knowledge of the particular commitments that are held and expressed by an individual or
group (Alkire, 2002: 154).
Sen has addressed issues of basic capabilities in his analysis of poverty (Alkire,
2002, Robeyns, 2001). According to Sen, rather than in terms of income
inadequacy and relatively to the position enjoyed by others in society, poverty is
best addressed in terms of 'basic capability failure', that is, as the absolute 'inability
of individuals and communities to choose some valuable beings and doings that are
basic to human life.' In this sense basic capabilities are a subset of all capabilities
(Robeyns, 2001: 11) and refer to the possibility of satisfying 'certain crucially
important functionings up to certain minimally adequate levels' (Sen, 1980: 41,
Robeyns, 2001: 11). Sen has not provided a definite list of basic capabilities, nor a
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justified account of how to identify them, but has mentioned several elementary
capabilities as way of example, including the capability to be sheltered, nourished,
educated and clothed (Sen, 1999: 20; 1993: 36).
Sabina Alkire's work on the operationalisation of capability for poverty reduction
(2002) presents an interesting understanding of basic capabilities and of how this
concept relates to the idea of basic needs, while also highlighting why the former is
more valuable than the latter. In this sense Alkire's account provides us with an
important perspective on the wider theoretical reach of the capability approach over
theories based on needs. Let us explore why.
In her operationalisation of capability, Alkire rightly points out how Sen's definition of
poverty as absolute capability deprivation, independent of a relative account or
knowledge of the circumstantial picture, necessarily implies addressing the criteria
for selecting and identifying those basic capabilities whose absence constitutes
poverty (2002: 157). To that end, and following procedures less controversial or less
theoretically incomplete than referring to areas of consensus or material
dependence, Alkire draws from the literature on human needs and specifically from
the work of David Wiggins and develops
a conception of basic human needs that closely relates to Sen's work. It defines basic need with
reference to absolute harm rather than to wants, 'needs', desires or preferences (2002: 157).
Alkire understands basic needs in terms of those enabling conditions or
prerequisites to the full life that, in her view, inform both Rawis' idea of primary
goods and Sen's concept of capability (Alkire, 2002: 158). In her account basic
needs are described, firstly, with reference to the substantive functioning that is
harmed if the basic need is unmet. For example, not meeting the functionings of
being well nourished or being clothed fundamentally harms the individual. Secondly,
basic needs are expressed at a sufficient level of generality, in that they refer to
'what is needed at a general level', for instance, and following Sen's own indication,
shelter, nutrition, education and clothes (Alkire, 2002: 160). Alkire's two criteria for
identifying basic capabilities relate to what is fundamental in order to avoid harm,
and to a sufficient level of generality, which allows basic capabilities 'to be true for
all those whom they refer' (Alkire, 2002: 160). While fulfilling the demand of
ascertaining capability in 'absolute' terms, i.e. without any prior knowledge of the
relative picture, Alkire maintains that this set of criteria nevertheless has to be
specified when applied to certain situations and in certain societies rather than
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others, thus meeting Sen's important emphasis on the element of culture-
dependency of basic capabilities (Alkire, 2002:161).
Based on these criteria, Alkire sets forward the following conceptualisation of basic
capability, which includes a specific concept of basic needs but inscribes it in the
framework of capability. Hence,
If y has a basic need for x (defined generally) and f is a basic functioning which entirely and only
reflects the relationship between y and x, then x is a basic functioning. Likewise, if c is the capability
to f then c would be a basic need capability. It is this sort of capabilities which will represent basic
needs (Alkire, 2002:160).
And furthermore
A basic capability is a capability to enjoy a functioning that is defined at a general level and refers to
a basic need, in other words a capability to meet a basic need (a capability to avoid
malnourishment; a capability to be educated, and so on). The set of basic capabilities might be
thought of as capabilities to meet basic human needs (2002:163).
Notice here that Alkire's reconceptualisation of basic capability retains the strong
sense of needs as one's fundamental requirements while, at the same time,
grounding it on the important concept of potential for intentional choice implied in
the idea of capability (Alkire, 2002: 163). In this sense, Alkire's conceptualisation
allows for people's deliberate choice to refrain from meeting certain basic needs in
order to enjoy other goods, providing they still retain the relevant capabilities of
meeting basic needs. As she illustrates,
For example a hunger stnker or a Brahmin may regularly refrain from eating, because they
personally value the religious discipline or the exercise of justice-seeking agency, but the side
effects of pursuing these is that they will not be well nourished. ... while the Brahmin' 'functioning' of
being well-fed would indeed be blighted by fasting, her life might be regal and radiant (2002: 171).
Thus, what Alkire brings to the fore is the fundamental element of choice,
constitutive of and explicit in the concept of capability, and its relation to the pursuit
of people's valuable ends and objectives, hence of their well-being. Both are
fundamental dimensions that the capability approach explicitly provides with respect
to accounts based on basic human needs.
Alkire maintains, furthermore, that another crucially important element highlighted
by the capability approach is to make explicit the fundamental dimension of
participation. She illustrates this point by providing the example of two countries, A
and B, whose goal is identified in terms of meeting basic needs such as
nourishment, sheltering, education and health. If country A had higher increase in
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meeting these basic needs than country B, we would say that A is better than B.
And we would have to reach this conclusion even when A had achieved its increase
by means of coercion. To evaluate this situation differently, we should reframe the
initial aims to include among the basic needs also elements of choice, participation
and freedom, all elements fundamentally implied by the concept of capability (Alkire,
2002: 170). The important insight of the capability approach, when compared to
needs based theory, consists exactly in this explicit and crucial focus on choice and
participation related to the element of freedom, which is constitutive of the concept
of capability.
These considerations allow Alkire to conclude that the capability approach, when
compared to human needs perspectives, and in operational terms, 'is a wider,
philosophically more rigorous way of conceiving poverty reduction in relation to the
full life'. This is due to the explicit and consistent value it assigns to choice and
participation and their relation to freedom in the pursuit of well-being (Alkire, 2002:
170). I maintain that Alkire's account has important and substantial implications for
conceptualising differences in education within the capability framework. However,
before analysing this aspect, some further, albeit brief reference to the relation
between theories based on needs and the capability approach are due.
Sen has outlined a number of critiques of theories based on human needs and
claims that the concept of basic needs is subsumed in the capability approach (Sen,
1984; Alkire, 2002: 166-170). The relation between the two approaches is a matter
of debate and Alkire herself, among others, has offered a counterargument to some
of Sen's critiques with reference to the literature on human needs. Nevertheless,
two of Sen's critiques of basic needs perspectives are particularly significant for the
issue at stake. The first relates to the supposed passive element inscribed in the
concept of needs when compared to capability, while the second concerns the lack
of philosophical foundations in needs theories (Sen, 1984: 514). Sen's argument on
the passivity encouraged by the language of needs has similarities with the critique
proposed, for instance, by disabled people's movements with reference to concepts
of special needs. Sen maintains,
Needs is a more passive concept than 'capability' and it is arguable that the perspective of positive
freedom links naturally with capabilities (what can the person do?) rather than with the fulfilment of
their needs (what can be done for the person?) (1984:514).
However, as Alkire notices, this critique is valid insofar as the language of needs
does actually assigns passivity and helplessness to the needy, a condition which
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she does not ascribe to theories of basic human needs. Moreover, even if valid at
semantic level, the passivity inscribed in needs has to be analysed, since 'to say
that one has a need is not to say that one lacks the capacity to go out and fulfil it'49.
Yet in this sense, the concepts of capability and indeed of basic capabilities as
outlined by Alkire, seem to better capture this element of opportunity of fulfilment
both theoretically and operationally.
The second critique concerns the absence of philosophical foundation and accounts
of well-being and the 'good life' from theories of needs. Alkire maintains that this
appears to be substantive at least with reference to development economics (2002:
170), where theorisation followed more practical responses to contingent conditions.
This critique appears to be sustained also in relation to conceptualisations of needs
in education, where a broad theoretical framework, while aiming at answering some
pressing concerns, has nevertheless introduced concepts that require qualifications
and specifications. Conversely, Sen's approach provides a complex framework
where concepts of functionings and capability are theoretically and normatively
linked to the aim of well-being. Ultimately, the capability approach relates to
philosophical foundations in ways, which frame conceptual aspects of basic
requirements and needs in a theoretically rigorous and morally justified account.
These elements make the capability approach a fruitful and flexible paradigm. In
what follows I shall address the theoretical and normative implications of these
elements for the limits of the concept of special educational needs.
Recall here the main limits of the concept both at theoretical and policy level 50. Still
inscribed in a 'within-child model', at theoretical level the concept of special needs
does not succeed in abolishing categories of disability, but ends up establishing a
new category, that of special needs. Furthermore, the theoretically unspecified
status of the concept entails a further problem in that it leaves the qualifier 'special'
somehow unqualified both with respect to disability and to non-disability, thus,
although indirectly, resulting in a proliferation of kinds of needs, from special to
individual, from common to exceptional, which indeed does little to help clarifying
issues. This is reflected at a policy level, where difticulties in operationalising the
concept have led to the reintroduction of categories, for example sensory
impairments or autism. As we have discussed, the concept of special educational
49 I owe this insight to H. Bnghouse (Brighouse, 2004, personal communication) and T. McLaughlin.
50 See chapter 2, p. 17 and pp. 23-24.
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needs presents operationalisation problems that may indicate the necessity to
reconsider the elements of the debate through a different framework.
I maintain that the capability approach better responds to theoretical and operational
requirements. Central to my argument at this stage is that this approach, in addition
to the fundamental insights for definitions and evaluation of disability and special
needs already addressed, provides theoretical and normative concetps, which
extends beyond the notion of educational needs, and particularly of special
educational needs, in three interrelated ways. Firstly, by incorporating some
conceptual elements of needs within the wider theoretical breadth of basic
capabilities. Secondly, by defining disabilities and learning difficulties in terms of
functionings and capabilities restrictions, thus avoiding the unwanted effects of
needs proliferations. Thirdly and finally, by providing a framework for the
conceptualisation and operationalisation of education as a basic capability, essential
to the expansion of future capabilities, and upon which to outline elements of a
basic capability entitlement in education. Let us analyse the first two insights of the
capability approach, whilst leaving the discussion of the third, fundamental aspect of
operationalising education as basic capability to the next chapter.
Addressing these issues implies applying some of Alkire's insights to education. In
relation to the first point, considerations of the capability approach as wider and
theoretically more rigorous than perspectives based on needs, seem sustained also
when transposed into education. In particular, evaluating basic requirements in
education in terms of functionings and capabilities highlights both the force of the
requirements and the importance of actually meeting them, in light of the
prospective dimensions of choice inherent to the concept of capability. More
specifically, the 'capability to be educated', as basic capability, theoretically
subsumes the 'need to be educated', whilst outlining the prospective choice aimed
at well-being achievement and well-being freedom. Furthermore, needs are not
distinguished, for instance in common and special as certain perspectives in
education would suggest, since the idea of needs is subsumed in a conceptual
framework based on basic functionings and capability.
Secondly, reframing educational needs in terms of functioning and capability
restrictions has important conceptual implications. I have already outlined how this
approach highlights the relational aspects of disability and learning difficulties, both
with respect to the child and the school system, thus avoiding unilateral
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understandings or oppositions between individual and social elements. In addition to
that, it allows overcoming the conceptual proliferation of needs, in that functionings
and capabilities are the terms of reference of the framework. Whilst this aspect may
open up to other problems in terms of definition and evaluation, the surpassing of
conceptual proliferation of needs appears an important theoretical step. One final
implication is the avoidance of the idea of 'special' as negative label, and as such
criticised by disabled academics and disabled people's movements. Evaluating
differences in terms of functionings and capabilities means ultimately referring
precisely to these concepts and to the metric they entail, both for considering
disability and non-disability, thus providing a 'unified' framework within which to
define and evaluate differences.
These considerations lead to the third and particularly important implication for
education as basic capability that enhances other capabilities. Addressing this final
point entails operationalising the capability approach in education, a task that I shall
outline, albeit in a preliminary way, in the next chapter, where I present a possible
conceptualisation of educational equality within the capability approach.
Concluding Comments
In this chapter I have applied the capability perspective on impairment and disability
to the context of education. More specifically, I have re-conceptualised learning
difficulties and special educational needs in terms of functionings and capabilities
and shown that the capability approach allows for evaluating them as vertical
inequalities, related to the design of educational arrangements and demanding to be
addressed as a matter of justice.
Furthermore, I have discussed two main objections to the perspective outlined and
defended the theoretical and normative reach of the capability framework on
disability and special educational needs. Against the critiques of stigmatisation and
the inadequate evaluation of impairments and disability in relation to functional
capabilities, I have shown that the approach, in recognising the importance of
human flourishing and well-being, and in allowing in considerations on valuable sets
of different capabilities related to human heterogeneity, provides a justified account
of justice for disabled people, together with the positive recognition of differences.
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Finally, I have outlined how the approach could be significantly extended to
overcome, whilst still embracing, concepts of human needs, and, therefore, special
educational needs. These considerations reinstate the validity of the approach and
its operationalisation in education. The next chapter takes these insights further and
addresses the contentious and difficult question of what constitutes educational
equality for disabled children and children with special educational needs.
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Chapter 7
Equality, Capability and Social Justice in Education:
Towards a Principled Framework for a Just
Distribution of Educational Resources
The last two chapters explored the conceptualisation of impairment, disability and
special educational needs in terms of functionings and capabilities. They highlighted
how, in capability terms, disability is seen as emerging from the interlocking of
personal features with social, circumstantial and environmental factors. Further, on
this view, disability and learning difficulties constitute vertical inequalities, and thus
have to be addressed as a matter of justice. In short, the previous two chapters
presented the theoretical aspect of the framework I suggest, related to the
conceptualisation of disability and learning difficulties. This chapter explores the
more normative dimension of the framework, and addresses the difficult question of
what constitutes educational equality for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. More specifically, it outlines elements of a just distribution of
educational opportunities and suggests a possible understanding of an educational
entitlement for these children. The chapter starts by addressing what constitutes
equality, and educational equality, and by analysing different normative
perspectives on it. It shows how the capability approach provides a successful
framework that enables us to reconsider the broader demands of equality, and the
specific demands of equality in education for disabled children and children with
special educational needs.
Introduction
What constitutes educational equality? This question subsumes two main normative
issues, which relate respectively to two areas of debate: liberal egalitarian theories
of equality and educational perspectives. The first normative issue concerns how we
conceptualise equality. Liberal egalitarian theories defend the value of equality
whilst presenting different views on the kind of equality that should inform the design
of social institutions. Hence the first dimension of our initial question requires
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addressing the reasons for equality and clarifying, among different conceptions,
what kind of equality we think valuable. Interrelated to this is the second facet of the
question: conceptualising equality in education. Whilst inequalities in education are
much researched and theorized, the concept of educational equality is not only less
conceptualised, but also difficult to determine. Education presents some specific
features that prove challenging to ideals of equality. For instance, the influence of
socio-economic backgrounds on learning, or students' different levels of ability, are
some of the elements, which make theorising equality in education a complex and
difficult matter. A possible way of thinking about aspects of educational equality
implies considering a certain concept of equality and operationalising it in education.
Among different perspectives in the debate on equality, the capability approach
presents an important and interesting framework not only for the re-examination of
equality, but also for the reconsideration of some of the demands of equality in
education. According to the capability approach, equality and the just design of
social and institutional arrangements should be evaluated in the space of
capabilities, that is in the space of the real and actual freedoms people have to be
and to do what they value being and doing. Valuable beings and doings, or
functionings, are constitutive of people's well-being, and capabilities represent the
real opportunities that people have to achieve them. For instance, reading, walking
or acting in one's political capacity are all functionings for which people should have
the relevant capabilities, which are the real and effective opportunities to achieve
them.
In Sen's approach, among the countless capabilities that people may have reasons
to value, some are considered fundamentally essential to well-being. Being well
nourished, sheltered, clothed, as well as being in good health and educated are all
basic capabilities, and hence essential to people's well-being. Sen maintains that
equality has to be sought primarily in the space of these capabilities, which are,
therefore, a fundamental concern of justice. Included among these fundamental
capabilities, the capability to be educated is considered essential to people's
flourishing and, as such, is a fundamental matter of equality and justice, too.
In this chapter I address what constitutes educational equality with reference to the
capability approach 51 . I argue that the capability approach helps in conceptualising
educational equality by focussing on the fundamental educational capabilities that
51 For this and following arguments I have greatly benefited from extensive and enlightening
discussions with Hany Bnghouse as well as from his incisive suggestions.
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are essential prerequisites for functioning as an independent person in society. My
argument has three interrelated parts. First, I maintain that, in so far as we can, we
should educate people in order to develop those educational capabilities that, once
secured, will ensure that individuals are not at a disadvantage in society. Second, I
argue that seeking equality in the space of fundamental educational capabilities
helps substantially in considering the demands of educational equality for disabled
children and children with special educational needs. More specifically, it helps in
answering what constitutes a just educational entitlement for these children. Finally,
I maintain that, beyond the level of educational capabilities identified as a just
entitlement, considerations of efficiency, or an efficient distribution of opportunities
and resources, may be applied to the necessary promotion of higher or more
complex educational capabilities. These considerations, drawn on principles of
justice, help in outlining a framework for a just distribution of educational
opportunities with specific reference to disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Whilst what I am presenting in this chapter does not offer a full
theory of educational equality, I maintain that it provides some partial, but useful
answers to some of the more challenging aspects of conceptualising educational
equality.
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first presents an overview of some
important arguments for caring about equality and, whilst discussing different
answers to the 'equality of what' question, it defends the space of capabilities as the
appropriate one within which to seek equality. In the second section I discuss my
central claim about seeking equality in the space of the fundamental educational
capabilities. I furthermore analyse the demands of disability and special educational
needs with reference to this conception of educational equality and outline elements
of an educational capability entitlement for disabled children and children with
special educational needs. This implies addressing the implications of proposing a
threshold level of fundamental educational capabilities. Finally, the last section
provides elements of a principled framework for a just distribution of resources to
disabled students and students with special educational needs, and discusses some
of its main implications.
52 This formulation draws partially on Elizabeth Anderson's concept of democratic equality. See
Anderson, 1999.
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7.1 The Debate on Equality and the Capability Approach
The fundamental reasons that support equality as a valuable ideal are related to the
form of equality that should be achieved through the design of social and
institutional arrangements. In this section I engage with the reasons for valuing
equality in itself and with some of the possible perspectives on what form of equality
we should value. My analysis illustrates why equality within the space of capabilities
is the best interpretation of the ideal of equality.
Theories of social justice are concerned with how the design of social and
institutional arrangements determines the distribution of benefits and burdens
among individuals (Swift, 2001:19). Egalitarians maintain that equality is the correct
distributional principle and argue that social and institutional arrangements should
be designed to give equal consideration to all. Subsumed in this position are two
interrelated questions. The first concerns why we should treat people as equals, and
hence relates to the reasons for valuing equality in itself. I shall refer to this as the
'why equality' question. The second concerns how we should treat people as
equals, namely what form of equality would best enact the equal consideration due
to individuals. Let us refer to this second as the 'equality of what' question. These
two questions are interdependent, since knowing the reasons for caring about
equality may help understand what form of equality we should care about. Let us
analyse each of these issues in more detail, and start by looking at the question
'why equality'.
Why, then, should we care about equality? According to egalitarians, for two
interdependent reasons, which relate respectively to the intrinsic and instrumental
value of equality. There is primarily only one truly intrinsic reason for equality:
equality is good in itself, is the correct principle to respond to conflicting demands,
and as such is a fundamental element of justice TM. This intrinsic reason is
complemented by several instrumental reasons supporting equality as distributional
ideal. First, there is a theoretical reason: equality is instrumentally valuable because
it provides plausibility to theories of justice. In order to be theoretically plausible,
these theories have to justify any distribution of benefits and burdens showing that it
meets a stipulated ideal of equality. Lacking that, would result in the theory being
53 See for instance Nagel, 1979: 107, Dworkin, 2000: 1-2, 11-12 and Sen. 1992:17.
The intrinsic value of equality is a complex aspect of the debate, and has been addressed by several
authors. Whilst some maintain that equality is good in itself and there are no more arguments to
provide, others find this answer unsatisfactory. For a more detailed discussion see, among others,
Nagel, 1979 and Sen, 1992.
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arbitrarily discriminating and, therefore, difficult to defend (Sen, 1992: 18-19).
Second, equality is instrumentally valuable because it is a necessary precondition of
political legitimacy. In order to be legitimate in their exercise of power, governments
have to provide evidence that their decisions, regulations and actions show and
enact the equal concern due to individuals. For instance, any scheme of taxation, to
be legitimate, has to be designed in accordance with equality and justice, and
governments have to provide reasons for the aggravations in some people's
circumstances or the added constraint any tax scheme may cause (Dworkin,
2000:1). Linked to this, a further instrumental reason for equality is that it defends
the costs likely to be associated to any particular enforcement of regulations, tax
schemes or law. When such costs are justified on ground of equal concern, they are
made acceptable to those who may otherwise find them unjust. For instance, the
regulation to wear seat belts has the added cost of installing such a device. Its
implementation, however, enacts equal concern for citizens, albeit of a paternalistic
kind, hence it may be shown to be a just cost. These intrinsic and instrumental
reasons provide important answers to the question 'why equality?' and confirm the
egalitarian position that seeking equality as a political and distributional ideal is a
fundamental matter. However, the importance of equality is also interconnected to
the specific kind of equality valued, hence it relates to the second crucial question:
what kind of equality could best enact the equal concern due to individuals?
If egalitarians agree to a considerable extent on the value of equality, they disagree
rather substantially on this second fundamental issue: the 'equality of what'
question. There are different important views on the kind of equality that would best
enact the equal consideration due to individuals, and each view focuses on the
equalization of rather different variables. These variables constitute, at the same
time, the metric against which to evaluate people's relative advantages and
disadvantages. In what follows I discuss three main positions in the debate on
equality: equality of resources, equality of welfare and equality of capabilities. I try
to illustrate in what form and to what extent these positions give equal consideration
to citizens. Generally, theories supporting equality of resources maintain that equal
consideration to individuals obtains when any distribution leaves people equal in the
amount of resources they hold. Conversely, those advocating for equality of welfare
support the view that any distribution should aim at leaving people equal in their
55 See Dworkin, 2000: Ch. 1& 2. This general distinction, although not exhaustive of all possible
positions, is the main framework often used in egalitarian debates.
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welfare, seen for instance as happiness or preference satisfaction. Whilst these are
only the main abstract ideas underpinning these theories of equality, their more
precise specification entails different understandings of resources, as well as of the
nature of welfare. Positions inscribed in either resourcist or welfare theories appeal
to what is known as equality of opportunity, where equality is specified in terms of
the equal chances people have to get, for instance, either resources or welfare. The
argument for equality of opportunity of some sort is that opportunities hold
individuals morally responsible for their voluntary choices and the possible
consequences of these choices. Finally, the third theory, equality in capabilities
requires equality in the actual effective opportunities people have to choose the life
they value. I now proceed to analyse these perspectives. First, the 'resourcist
approach'.
7.1.1 The 'Resourcist Approach': Equality of Primary Goods
An important position related to resourcist views is the conception of equality as
equal shares of primary goods. In this view, primary goods are social conditions,
features of institutions and resources that free and equal citizens need in order to
live a complete life (Rawls: 2001:58, 1982:166). These conditions and resources
include:
i) 'Basic rights and liberties', like freedom of thought, liberty of conscience and expression,
freedom of association, etc.
ii) 'Freedom of movement and choice of occupations against a background of fair equality of
opportunity'.
iii) 'Power and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility'.
iv) 'Income and wealth'.
v) 'The social bases of self-respect'.
The index is inscribed in a theory of justice that ensures that citizens are equal in
their basic liberties, including political liberties, and in fair opportunities. Inequalities
are permissible only if they are to the advantage of the least well off people in
society, who are identified as those with the lowest holding of primary goods.
Furthermore, no compromise is acceptable with fair equality of opportunity in order
to achieve higher material wealth or income (Rawls: 2001). Moreover, this index of
primary goods constitutes a way not only of evaluating whether people have these
56 See, for instance, Ameson, 1989.
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lifelong necessary means to lead a complete life, but also of assessing inequalities
among individuals (Daniels, 2003: 242). According to this view, it is precisely
against this same index of primary goods that individuals' relative positions are
compared. At the same time, equal shares of these goods, following the principles
outlined, constitute the kind of equality that we should seek to achieve.
How valuable is this conception in actually determining individuals' relative
positions? Primary goods are features of institutions and kinds of resources people
need to live fulfilling lives, hence they measure people's advantage primarily in
relation to these resources, like income and wealth or the social bases of self-
respect. However, by measuring people's advantage with reference to resources,
the primary goods approach neglects the fundamental aspect of human diversity
and its implications in terms of advantages. Let us consider, for instance, a specific
difference, say disability, by comparing the position of two people: Bob, a visually
disabled person, and Sally, an able-bodied woman. According to the primary goods
approach, if their holding of primary goods is equal, Bob and Sally are equally well
off, hence they have equal all-purpose means to live complete lives. However, it
seems plausible to argue that, notwithstanding equality in primary goods, Bob is at a
disadvantage with respect to Sally. This is due to some of his individual
characteristics and to the ways they interact with the social and physical
environment he inhabits. His index of primary goods may be the same as Sally's,
yet he does not have the same advantages in order to live a complete life. For
instance, his opportunity for independent mobility, say using a car, is presumably
not the same as Sally's. In addition, there are certain activities and indeed
professions that, not only because of current designs of environmental and social
institutions, but also because of his individual characteristics, may prove
unattainable to Bob, whilst being available to Sally. Consider the aspect of
communication related to non-verbal behaviour and its weight in social interactions.
Let us further assume that Bob and Sally are both university lecturers. In this
instance, Bob cannot detect non-verbal cues in communicating with his students;
hence an important dimension of social interaction is unavailable to him. Sally does
not experience this restriction and enjoys a non-verbal feedback, which may be
important to her effectiveness as lecturer. Even with an equal share of primary
goods, Bob does not have the same advantage that Sally has, since due to his
visual impairment his social functioning is restricted in some fundamental ways. The
index of primary goods is insensitive to this fundamental difference in people's
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relative advantages. What this example ultimately aims to highlight is that the
primary goods accent on resources, in being insensitive to people's diversity,
presents limits in comparing their relative positions, hence it does not account for
certain variables that are relevant to justice. This appears to question, at least to a
certain extent, an equal share of primary goods as the correct and exhaustive
answer to our initial question: 'equality of what?'
Further, how does this approach consider educational equality and its specific
question of equality for disabled children and children with special educational
needs? As we have seen, individuals' positions are compared on the basis of their
holdings of primary goods. Fair equality of opportunity, defined as the possibility of
equal chances for those with equal talent and willingness to exert efforts, is
fundamental for accessing occupations, power and prerogative of offices, and
income and wealth. Inequalities are permissible only if they are to the benefit of the
least well off members of society. It follows that, on this view, fair equality of
opportunity underpins the concept of educational equality, and requires that
educational opportunities be provided equally and independently of family
circumstances (Rawls, 2001: 44; Brighouse, 2000: 147). Moreover, in establishing
that inequalities are allowed if they are to the benefits of the disadvantaged, it
requires that more resources be devoted to those with the initial lowest share of
primary goods, either due to their lower natural talent or their initial place in the
social arrangements.
Although providing an extremely valuable framework for the conceptualisation of
educational equality in terms of equal opportunity for educational resources, this
approach presents the same limits noted in its evaluation of people's relative
advantage. More specifically, its insensitivity to individual characteristics leads to the
difficulty of providing a guiding criterion for a fair distribution of resources to disabled
children and children with special educational needs. Here the example of Bob and
Sally can be reframed in terms of educational resources. Again, Bob is at a
disadvantage because of a fundamental restriction in functioning, but his index of
primary goods does not account for this situation, since it focuses fundamentally on
resources. Ultimately, the limits outlined in the way the primary goods approach is
insensitive to personal heterogeneities hinder its conceptualisation of educational
equality, and specifically in relation to its ability in providing guidance for equality for
disabled children and children with special educational needs.
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Let us now turn to another understanding of resources and consider its answer to
the same question: what kind of equality are we seeking?
7.1.2 Equality of Resources
Resources can be conceptualised in several ways, which in turn determine different
meanings of equality of resources. A first straightforward way is to conceptualise
them in the broad sense of equal goods to be distributed. Equality of resources is
therefore the distribution of equal identical bundles of goods to people. However,
this interpretation runs into an immediate difficulty, which relates again to people's
heterogeneity. Hence, if we consider our previous example, and we provide Bob
and Sally with an identical share of resources, we can immediately see that Bob is
at a disadvantage, since presumably he needs to spend a consistent part of his
bundle of goods on certain forms of resources, for example speech output screen
readers for his laptop. Similarly, the same educational resources distributed to Bob
and Sally would still put Bob at a disadvantage, since presumably he should be
given Braille resources. Therefore, this understanding of equality of resources does
not provide Bob and Sally with the same consideration, and does not appear to be a
valuable kind of equality, or an appropriate framework for theorising educational
equality.
A more complex understanding considers resources as personal and impersonal
ones. It specifies personal resources to include people's health, strength and
talents, and impersonal ones in terms of material goods, wealth, and legal and other
opportunities (Dworkin, 2000). Here the term 'resources' refers to the means that
contribute to people's opportunities to lead fulfilling and worthwhile lives according
to their own conceptions (Robeyns, 2001: 4). Thus equality of resources
corresponds to equal, not identical shares of resources privately owned by
individuals and devoted to make of people's lives what they decide to make of them
(Dworkin, 2000:65-66). However, what does 'equal' mean according to this
position? Due to the 'natural lottery', people find themselves with different
impersonal resources, for instance inherited wealth and assets. These resources
can, and therefore should, in principle, be equally redistributed. Furthermore, people
differ also and fundamentally in their personal resources like talents and
weaknesses, health and general strength. For instance, being able to see is a
resource that is unavailable to a person whose vision is totally impaired; being
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talented in literacy is another resource that different people may have at very
different levels, some very low. Since personal resources cannot be distributed, and
since lack or low levels of them constitutes an objective disadvantage, according to
this view people with low natural endowments or disabled people should be
compensated. The extent of this compensation is determined by the amount that
people would be willing to pay to insure themselves against these circumstances -
low talents and disability - in a hypothetical insurance market. This hypothetical
insurance determines the compensation for people's unequal personal resources,
and thus it constitutes an equalization device. The equalization of people's
circumstances, personal and impersonal resources, is therefore assured.
In this understanding people's circumstances, however, do not include choices,
preferences or ambitions: this conception of equality of resources does not consider
inequalities deriving from these variables. Rather, it sees freely made choices and
preferences, which imply different outcomes in terms of unequal shares of
resources, as pertaining to people's responsibility, hence morally legitimate.
Consider Sue and Alan, who have equal shares of resources and both enjoy a
highly remunerated job. However, Sue is a keen risk taker who chooses to invest
her resources in high-risk funds and ends up losing a considerable part of her
assets. Alan, instead, is prudent, and chooses to invest his money only in secure
state funds, hence maintains or steadily increases his stakes. According to the
equality of resources view, the inequalities arising between Sue and Alan due to
their free choices are not subject of justice. Consider now Kate and Tom, both with
equal shares of resources. Kate has a specific taste for a sybaritic lifestyle, whereas
Tom prefers a frugal and basic existence. Here again, equality of resources does
not account for Kate's and Tom's preferences or tastes, since it holds those traits of
people's personality not pertaining to the concern of justice. Equality of resources
maintains that the holding of personal and impersonal resources, or people's
circumstances, is the appropriate variable upon which to evaluate their relative
position. Free choices, preferences and tastes are excluded from the variables of a
resourcist metric.
How does this conceptualisation fare in terms of the equal consideration due to
individuals? Let us reconsider the case of personal differences through the example
of Bob and Sally. How would equality of resources evaluate their position?
Remember that Bob is a visually impaired person, whereas Sally is able-bodied.
Clearly, under this understanding of equality of resources, Bob lacks an important
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personal resource, his sight, and therefore is at a disadvantage, since his personal
resources are limited when compared to Sally's ones. Prima facie, equality of
resources seems to include a wider range of variables in its evaluation than the
primary goods approach. Bob and Sally are not considered equally well off under
the metric of equality of resources as they are in terms of primary goods. However,
despite this attention to personal differences, equality of resources does not avoid
two consistent objections. The first relates to the partial understanding of human
diversity implied by considering talents and disabilities as personal resources,
detached from any relation with the social and circumstantial arrangements or from
the different ways in which people make use of resources. For instance, according
to the equality of resources view, Bob's visual impairment, whilst being a personal
feature, becomes a disability with respect to certain functionings and in certain
environments, for example those lacking speech output screen readers or Braille
resources. Second, equality of resources overlooks the fundamental facts that
people have different ways of converting resources into objectives they value, and
that this conversion varies in relation to the different design of the social and
physical environment people inhabit. Hence, providing people with an equal share
of resources, even when specified as personal and impersonal ones, does not
account for this crucial variation.
These limits of equality of resources extend to its possible conceptualisation of
educational equality, and specifically when considering children with disabilities and
special educational needs. By understanding talents and disabilities as inherently
personal characteristics, the resourcist approach overlooks the important relational
aspect of certain learning disabilities and special educational needs, and ends up
missing a fundamental dimension of justice. Recall, for instance, the example of
dyslexia discussed in chapter 6. Dyslexia is a clear learning difficulty emerging from
the interlocking of personal features and literate settings, and therefore cannot be
completely and unilaterally ascribed to the individual's lower level of talent. The
resourcist approach does not account for this important dimension. Nor does it
account, as we have seen, for individuals' different conversion of resources, thus
presenting somehow a fixed view of disability, similar to the individual model.
Nevertheless, the resourcist approach provides the heuristic device of the
hypothetical insurance market, which may seem a valuable insight for the
distribution of resources to those considered less talented. The hypothetical amount
that people, on average, would be willing to pay to insure themselves in the event of
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a prospective disability could constitute the additional resources devoted to the
education of disabled children and children with special educational needs. At the
same time, these additional resources would act as an equalizing device for
disabled children and children with special needs. However, this solution falls short
of its own aims, given individuals' differential conversion of resources into objectives
they value and still overlooks the fundamental importance of social and
environmental elements in this conversion.
Ultimately, equality of resources, like primary goods, provides a limited
understanding of equal concern to all and does not lead to a satisfying
understanding of educational equality, either. More specifically, a primary goods
approach neglects the fundamental fact of human diversity, whereas equality of
resources presents a partial account of it and does not consider individuals' different
ways of converting resources into valuable objectives in their lives. Both views
furthermore remain focussed on the means to leading worthwhile lives, rather than
on the extent to which people are free to choose the kind of life they value. The
latter, as we shall see, represents a more exhaustive account of equality. (Sen,
1992: 37) This leads us to conclude that primary goods and resources do not
constitute fully appropriate variables upon which to evaluate people's relative
advantage, and provide partial answers to the question 'equality of what'. Further,
whilst both views suggest important elements towards a conceptualisation of
equality in education, they are still unable to provide significant guidance in
important situations, such as disability, for instance. I now turn to theories of welfare
in order to analyse their position on this fundamental question and to determine
whether their answer is a more complete one.
7.1.3 The Welfare Approach: Equality of Welfare
Broadly speaking, the principle of equality of welfare holds that any distribution
should aim to leave people equal in their welfare. However, what constitutes
welfare? Intuitively, the concept of welfare has an immediate positive connotation
related to people's success, happiness and overall satisfaction with their lives.
Economists introduced this idea precisely in order to mark a distinction between
what is fundamental to people's lives and what is merely instrumental, and to assign
a proper value to resources. Resources, they claim, are valuable insofar as they
produce welfare (Dworkin, 2000:14). Although there are different understandings of
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welfare, they relate fundamentally to two main conceptions, which, in turn, allow for
two main reformulations of the general principle of equality of welfare. On the one
hand, welfare is seen as success in achieving one's life plans, and hence refers to
one's achievements in fulfilling preferences, goals and ambitions. On the other
hand, welfare relates to the achievement of personal conscious states, like
pleasure, happiness or enjoyment. In this sense people's welfare constitutes their
quality of conscious life, like a life pleasant and happy insofar as it avoids pain and
dissatisfaction. Correlated to these main understandings of welfare, equality can be
conceptualised as equality in people's success with regard to their preference
satisfaction and life plans, or as equality in satisfaction with some aspects of their
conscious life, like happiness and enjoyment. How valuable are these conceptions
of equality of welfare in evaluating people's relative positions and in giving them
equal consideration?
Let us analyse the first conception, equality of welfare intended as equality of
people's preference satisfaction and success in their overall life plans. Consider
here the case of people who have a very different judgement of what makes a life
successful.57 Suppose that Laura and Ryan have equal resources and are
otherwise roughly similar in many aspects, including their achievements. However,
Laura has high expectations and considers a life successful only if it achieves
breakthrough scientific discoveries. Ryan, instead, considers any kind of life
worthwhile, no matter the levels of achievement. If asked to assess their overall
satisfaction, Laura, due to her concept of success, would rate her welfare lower than
Ryan. Hence, in this respect, and following equality of welfare thus conceptualised,
Laura should receive higher levels of resources to compensate for her lower
welfare. However, it is not really clear why this should be the case. After all, it might
be claimed that differences between Laura and Ryan's welfare are only differences
in beliefs, rather than in their actual lives (Dworkin, 2000: 38). Should we then
provide people with resources according to their different beliefs about their
welfare? It appears evident that conceptualising equality of welfare in terms of
equality in overall success and preference satisfaction with one's life runs into the
problem of how to adjudicate between people's conceptions of what makes a life
successful and what makes preferences satisfied. This conception of welfare,
therefore, presents elements in too subjective a way in order to evaluate people's
relative positions effectively.
57 This and following arguments are based on Dworkin, 2000, Chapter 2.
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Let us now consider the second conception of equality of welfare. Here equality is
seen as equality in desirable states of pleasure and happiness. However, even this
second understanding presents the problem of the subjective element seen in the
previous conception. In this case the subjectivity relates to the different importance
and meaning people attach to pleasure and enjoyment. Here the example of Laura
and Ryan can be reconsidered with reference to happiness and enjoyment, but with
no different conclusion. Hence, we can think of Laura as having a very demanding
expectation of what happiness consists of, and Ryan being easily and happily
content. Here again, should Laura receive more resources in light of her demanding
conception of happiness? It seems that insisting on equality of welfare, in terms of
equal levels of pleasure and happiness also represents a poor framework upon
which to evaluate people's relative positions and leads therefore to a flawed
conception of equality.
The subjective nature of these conceptions of welfare leads to problematic
consequences. Let us then consider a further approach to welfare, which, whilst still
specifying welfare as preference satisfaction, implies a precise definition of
preferences and a complex interpretation of equality as equal opportunity for welfare
(Arneson, 1989: 83). This approach stipulates that equality of welfare holds when
people face 'effectively equivalent ranges of options' for their preference
satisfaction. Preferences are defined as hypothetical, ideal and rational deliberated
ones, with fully relevant information (Arneson, 1989: 86). Moreover, effectively
equivalent arrays of options include equivalent awareness of these options, ability to
choose reasonably among them and character's traits in order to act on the chosen
option. From this conception, a model can be drawn in the form of a decision tree
that gives an individual's possible complete life history and by adding up the
preference satisfaction expectations for each possible life history. According to this
approach, furthermore, any inequality of welfare arising from voluntary choices or
personal responsibility appears to be morally legitimate (Arneson, 1989). Consider,
for instance, that Laura and Ryan enjoy equal welfare in term of effectively equal
arrays of options, but at a certain point Ryan behaves in a negligent way and his
welfare decreases. Provided he had the relevant effective arrays of options at his
disposal at the point in time when he misbehaved, any inequality derived from his
personal choice is not a matter of justice.
Although considered as opportunity for preference satisfaction and with these
further specifications, this conception of welfare runs into fundamentally troubling
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objections: the first concerns how to consider people's expensive tastes in
assessing individuals' relative positions, whereas the second relates to the
evaluation of disability. Let us analyse the first. Reconsider the case of Laura and
Ryan, both with equal shares of resources and roughly similar circumstances.
Suppose that Laura, unlike Ryan, has very expensive tastes in living
accommodation, and her welfare is badly compromised unless she can live in an
elegant penthouse in a leafy area of town. Ryan, on the other hand, is satisfied with
a modest accommodation in a less expensive area. Should Laura receive additional
resources in order to have the same level of welfare as Ryan? What if Laura set out
voluntarily to cultivate her expensive tastes? Insisting on equality of welfare in this
case appears intuitively wrong. Moreover, this problem does not seem to be solved
by appealing to equivalent and effective arrays of options for preference
satisfaction. In order to give Laura and Ryan an effective and equivalent array of
options, whilst still taking into account Laura's expensive preferences, we need to
consider a possible bottomless level of resources to be distributed among people,
since, at least theoretically, the possibility of expensive preferences has no
boundaries. However, the last is a counterintuitive situation for conditions of justice,
which arise exactly given scarcity of resources. Furthermore, if we consider welfare
as related to what is fundamental in life, it appears that satisfying highly expensive
preferences is questionable, and especially so in the case of scarcity of resources
related to principles of justice.
Let us now analyse the second objection, and consider how disability should be
evaluated with reference to this general conception of equality as equivalent arrays
of options for preference satisfaction. Remember here the example of Bob, a
visually impaired lecturer and Sally, an able-bodied one. What role would Bob's
impairment have in this account of welfare? Suppose the university gives Bob a
larger amount of money than Sally for laptops screen readers. However, Bob
prefers to invest his sum in something else that, he maintains, will increase his
welfare rather considerably. How should this preference be evaluated? Should
additional resources be further distributed to Bob for his speech output screen
readers? What principle could or should adjudicate among these preferences?
Furthermore, how would additional resources fare with respect to the equivalent
effective options due to individuals? This account of welfare does not seem to make
clear how to evaluate disability as personal difference in the equivalent effective
arrays of options for preference satisfaction.
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Ultimately, these two objections show how equality of welfare, in the sense of
general preference satisfaction, is still an unconvincing framework upon which to
evaluate people's relative positions or to determine the equal consideration due to
individuals. I maintain that even in this last, complex account, the focus on
preference satisfaction in determining people's welfare is a restricted and limited
understanding of the ideal of equality. Based on the subjective and questionable
variable of preference satisfaction, welfare theories of equality fail to provide a
consistent account of the kind of equality we should aim to achieve among
individuals. The specific cases of expensive preferences and disability constitute
powerful objections against this account of equality.
Furthermore, these objections seem also to hamper fundamentally a
conceptualisation of educational equality based on welfare accounts. How would
such accounts consider the demands of disabled children and children with special
educational needs in the absence of a clear understanding on how to adjudicate
between competing desires and preferences? And moreover, what role would
education have in forming and shaping tastes and preferences? What role in
providing equal arrays of possibility for preference satisfaction? These questions
serve here only the purpose of highlighting the difficulties that welfarist theories face
when confronted with the compelling moral demands of disability and learning
difficulties, and hence highlight the limits of these approaches in informing a
conceptualisation of equality in education.
Let me now summarise the main points of the discussion so far. This long analysis
of possible answers to the 'equality of what' question has outlined how both
resourcist and welfarist approaches, with their variations and internal specifications,
lead to limited conceptions of equality, which do not appear to give people equal
considerations in some substantial ways. I now turn my analysis to the capability
approach and to its answer to the equality of what question. I maintain that
conceptualising equality in the space of capabilities provides an important and
significant answer to our debated issues.
7.1.4 The Capability Approach: Equality in Capabilities
Sen maintains that in addressing equality we need to deal with two kinds of
diversity: the different variables upon which we can assess equality, and people's
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fundamental heterogeneity. The evaluation of equality implies comparing people's
relative positions according to specified variables, for instance individuals' resources
or their happiness. These variables and their internal specifications constitute and
delimitate the space for comparing people's positions; hence upon which to
evaluate equality. Recall here again the main tenets of the approach. The capability
approach argues that equality and social arrangements should be evaluated in the
space of capabilities, that is, in the space of the real freedoms people have to
achieve valued functionings. It maintains that rather than the means to freedom,
what is fundamental in assessing equality is the extent of people's freedom to
choose among valuable functionings. For the capability approach what is
fundamental in the assessment of equality is 'what people are actually able to be
and to do' (Nussbaum, 2000:40), hence the sets of capabilities available to them,
rather than the sets of achieved functionings they can enjoy at any given time. The
focus of the capability approach is therefore on the real effective freedoms people
have and on their choice among possible bundles of functionings. This allows for
the pursuit of people's individual well-being and the making of their life planning
through individual choices (Robeyns, 2003).
Among the countless capabilities that people may have reason to value, Sen
identifies basic capabilities as a specific subset of all capabilities. Basic capabilities,
in his approach, are centrally important beings and doings that are crucial to well-
being (1992: 44). They include the capability to be well nourished, sheltered, to
escape avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, to be educated and in good
health, and to be able to participate in society without shame. Given their
fundamental importance for people's well-being, Sen maintains that equality has to
be sought primarily in the space of basic capabilities. These capabilities, therefore,
are of particular concern for egalitarians.
The evaluation of equality, and the comparisons of individuals' relative advantages
and disadvantages within the space of capability entail the use of a metric.
Fundamental to the capability metric is the centrality of human diversity. The latter
encompasses personal, external and circumstantial elements, including the
individual differential conversion of resources into valuable functionings. I maintain
that this intrinsic interest in human heterogeneity is crucial for evaluating people's
58Sen, 1992:1.
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relative positions and leads to a valuable conception of equality as equal
consideration to all.
In which ways is this account of equality a more comprehensive one than the
approaches outlined so far? Let us address some of the limits identified within
resourcist and welfarist positions through the insights of the capability approach.
More specifically, let us analyse the evaluation of people's diversity, the value of
resources and the nature of well-being. As we shall see, the capability approach
provides an important and more justified account of each of these issues in relation
to the demands of justice and equality than the conceptions analysed so far. First,
the evaluation of people's diversity.
I have already outlined the centrality of people's diversity and its specific
understanding, which is central to the capability metric. How would this metric
consider, for instance, disability in terms of personal difterence? As we have seen in
chapter 5, the capability approach suggests a conceptualisation of disability as
emerging from the interlocking of personal, social and circumstantial factors.
Considering impairment as a personal feature, as the capability metric would
suggest, implies that how this feature intertwines with social and environmental
factors determines whether impairment becomes disability or not. In this sense,
therefore, disability results from the interlocking of individual and circumstantial
elements. For instance, a visual impairment becomes a disability with respect to the
functioning of reading texts on computer screens when, and if, no use of Braille
displays and speech output screen readers is provided. Hence, asserting the
centrality of human diversity for assessing equality implies positioning the
complexities of disability, as an aspect of human diversity, at the core of the
normative demands of equality. This allows overcoming the limitations outlined with
respect to disability as human diversity within the primary goods metric and the
more general resourcist metric, too. It furthermore allows a precise evaluation of
disability that overcomes the under-specified consideration entailed by welfare
theories.
A further fundamental aspect of the capability approach is that it evaluates equality
in terms of the extent of people's freedom to choose among kinds of lives they have
reasons to value. Therefore the capability approach provides a wider and more
relevant perspective within which to consider the demands of equality, than
positions still focussed on the means to freedom. This, on the one hand, goes
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beyond the resourcist views. On the other, it gives weight to the claim that
resources have an instrumental value for the achievement of people's objectives.
Finally, in specifying the space of equality in terms of capability for functionings that
people have reasons to value, the capability approach overcomes the problems
related to the subjective element inscribed in conceptualising equality as equal
opportunities for preference satisfaction or for happiness. Capabilities are
opportunities for valued functionings that are constitutive of individual well-being,
where the latter is defined as the quality, the 'well-ness', of the person's being (Sen,
1992: 39). Hence the capability approach provides an account of what is
fundamental in people's life which, whilst respecting individual choices and including
aspects of responsibility for one's choices, nevertheless gives a comprehensive and
normatively justified account that is not focussed on a single, objectionable element.
Ultimately, the capability approach represents a theoretically and normatively
justified perspective on the kind of equality we should achieve.
There is, however, a potentially problematic aspect of the capability approach: the
problem of indexing capabilities. There are countless capabilities that people may
have reasons to value. If comparisons among individuals have to take place in the
space of capabilities, how can this comparison be theoretically and operationally
feasible? Consider, for instance, the case of Sally, a visually impaired person in
good health, and Jenny, a non-disabled woman suffering from chronic arthritis. How
can we compare their two sets of capabilities? And how can this comparison take
place with regard to other individuals who have relevant capabilities but lack Sally
and Jenny's ones? Capabilities are, ex definition, beings and doings that people
have reasons to value. The element of having reasons in support of one's capability
choice limits the problem of indexing capabilities among those capabilities deemed
valuable in this sense. However, it does little to help in comparing people's positions
on the basis of their sets of capabilities, since the same problem of indexing occurs
within the domain of capabilities that people have reasons to value. This problem,
as we shall see, has implications also in the evaluation of sets of educational
capabilities. However, notwithstanding the latter problematic aspect, seeking
equality in the space of capabilities represents a valuable and comprehensive
answer to our initial question. As I have argued in this long section, equality of
capabilities is the kind of equality that best realises the equal consideration due to
people. Social and institutional arrangements, therefore, should be designed to
promote people's equality of relevant capabilities.
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I maintain that this conception of equality provides important elements for
reconsidering some of the demands of equality in education. The next section
addresses this claim in more detail, whilst briefly outlining what kind of education is
appropriate given the requirements of the capability approach.
7.2. Equality in the Space of Educational Capabilities: Elements of a
Fundamental Educational Entitlement
According to Sen, egalitarians should seek equality in the space of capabilities.
Therefore, whilst representing the best ideal of distributional equality, equality in the
relevant sets of capabilities represents also the appropriate equal consideration due
to citizens. But what are the relevant capabilities that should be equalized for all?
Sen has not provided a list of fundamental capabilities and maintains that the latter
should be the result of democratic participation and decisions making processes.
However, in his evaluation of poverty, he has outlined a small number of basic
capabilities, which are fundamentally essential to people's well-being. According to
Sen poverty is best evaluated as absolute capability deprivation with reference to
these essential capabilities. These basic beings and doings include the capability to
be well-nourished and sheltered, to escape avoidable morbidity and premature
mortality, to be educated and in good health, and to be able to participate in society
without shame (1992:44). Although these basic capabilities are particularly relevant
in the context of poverty assessment, Sen maintains that equality has to be sought
primarily in these capabilities. They constitute, therefore, areas of specific concern
for egalitarians.
Within the capability approach education is included among basic capabilities,
hence among the essential constituents of people's well being. The capability to be
educated, therefore, is of special concern for egalitarians. But what are the
implications of conceptualising education within the space of capabilities and, more
specifically, in terms of a basic capability? Furthermore, how can we think of
equality in education within the space of capabilities? And finally, are there specific
educational capabilities that society has an obligation to equalize among
individuals? I maintain that the capability approach provides us with an interesting
and important framework within which to reconsider some of the demands of
equality in education. More specifically, I argue that the capability approach leads to
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an understanding of equality in education in terms of the equal effective
opportunities and access to levels of fundamental educational capabilities, which
are essential to functioning as an independent person in society. Furthermore, I
argue that this conceptualisation provides fundamental insights for reconsidering the
equal entitlement to education for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. My argument proceeds in three stages:
i) First, I analyse the implications related to the conceptualisation of education as a
basic, fundamental capability. Identifying education as basic capability implies
asserting its importance for people's well being, both in the sense of meeting a
basic need to be educated, and for the promotion and expansion of other
capabilities. Moreover, thinking of education as basic capability entails specifying
the subsets of enabling conditions, capabilities for functionings, that are essentially
constitutive of it. These educational capabilities constitute the transformational
resources that, once obtained, allow individuals to be effective and independent
participants in society.
ii) Second, I maintain that, by focussing our attention exactly on these fundamental
educational capabilities, the capability approach allows us to think of educational
equality in terms of the equal effective access to educational capabilities for
functionings that are necessary and sufficient to participate as an independent
person in society. Hence, the set of fundamental educational capabilities identified
represents an educational entitlement.
iii) Third, this understanding, in turn, allows fundamental considerations related to
the important question of what additional educational resources should be devoted
to disabled children and children with special educational needs. More specifically, it
legitimates their entitlement to additional resources as a matter of justice. It
furthermore identifies a level of functioning whose achievement should be aimed at
for every child, thus setting an effective threshold of functionings and capabilities.
In the next sections I proceed to substantiate these claims.
7.2.1 On Education as Basic Capability
Sen identifies education among basic capabilities, and thus among centrally
important beings and doings that are crucial to well-being (1992: 44 and above).
How can we think of education as basic capability, and what are the normative
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implications of this conception? I argue that the capability to be educated can be
considered basic in two interrelated respects. First, in that absence or lack of
education would essentially harm or substantially disadvantage the individual. In this
first facet, education is a basic capability in that it relates to the fundamental, basic
need to be educated. Failing to have this need met results in harm and
disadvantage for the individual. Second, since education plays a substantial role in
the expansion of other capabilities as well as future ones, it can be considered basic
in the sense of being fundamental and foundational to other capabilities, too.
Following this conceptualisation, I maintain that the capability to be educated entails
the selection59 of specific subsets of enabling conditions, which are fundamental to
it. Ultimately, conceptualising education within the capability approach suggests a
specific understanding of education and its role in an egalitarian society. This view,
moreover, differs rather consistently from other egalitarian positions. Let us analyse
this understanding in more detail.
The first facet in which education can be considered a basic capability relates to its
crucial importance for people's well-being. The capability to be educated is basic,
since absence or lack of education would essentially harm and disadvantage the
individual. This is specifically, albeit not solely the case for childhood, where
absence of education, both in terms of informal learning and schooling, constitutes a
disadvantage, which proves difficult, and in some cases impossible, to compensate
for in later life. Perhaps the most striking example of this need to education is
represented by the case of feral children. Studies of feral children 60, children who
lived in the wild or in cages, and deprived of any form of learning for a substantial
part of their childhood, show the profound harm caused by the absence of
education. In these cases, not only language functionings and broader
communicative functionings are substantially harmed, but also reasoning and
learning functionings are compromised. This highlights the importance of education
for the formation of human capabilities and, more generally, appears to confirm our
understanding of the capability to be educated as fundamental to people's well
being.
However, a further aspect of the capability to be educated relates to its more
context-dependence when compared, for instance, to the capability to be well
Sen maintains that the selection of relevant capabilities should be left to democratic decision
processes. See above, chapter 5.
60 See for example Curtiss (1997) and Lieber (2001).
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nourished. It seems that the capability to be educated, in order to avoid
disadvantage to the individual, implies considerations related to the design of social
arrangements, which are more relevant in the case of education than in that of
hunger. Hence, determining the level at which a person is considered well-
nourished seems more straightforward than adjudicating the level at which a person
is educated. This relates to considerations on the evaluative complexity of
education, which are well captured in the second understanding of education as
basic capability.
Education is basic also in the sense of being a fundamental capability, and
foundational to other capabilities as well as future ones. As seen in chapter 6, the
broadening of capabilities entailed by education extends to the advancement of
complex capabilities, since while promoting reflection, understanding, information
and awareness of one's capabilities, education promotes at the same time the
possibility of formulating exactly the valued beings and doings that the individual
has reasons to value. On the other hand, the expansion of capabilities entailed by
education extends to choices of occupations and certain levels of social and political
participation. These considerations lead to an understanding of education as
fundamental capability, which includes basic capabilities, in terms of those enabling
beings and doings that are fundamental in meeting the basic requirement to be
educated, but equally foundational to the promotion and expansion of higher, more
complex capabilities.
Thinking of education as fundamental capability in the above sense, relates
substantially to the understanding of education as a complex good entailing
instrumental and intrinsic values, explored in chapter 6. (See Brighouse, 2000;
Saito, 2003; Unterhalter and Brighouse, 2003; Swift 2003.) Education has an
instrumental aspect, since it is a means to other valuable goods, like better life
prospects, career opportunities and civic participation. It improves one's
opportunities in life. In this sense education, and specifically schooling, promotes
the achievement of important levels of knowledge and skills acquisition, which play
a vital role in agency and well-being. On the other hand, education is intrinsically
good, is valuable in itself, in that being educated, other things equal, enhances the
possibility of appreciating and engaging in a wide range of activities, which are
fulfilling for their own sake. For instance, being initiated through education into the
appreciation of poetry, or aspects of the wildlife in natural environments, or different
kinds of music, relates to a personal fulfilment which is not instrumental in securing
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better jobs or positions, but brings about a more fulfilling life. Ultimately, the
instrumental and intrinsic aspects of education relate to the enhancement of
freedom, both in terms of well-being freedom and agency freedom.
Having addressed, albeit only very provisionally, the ways in which the capability to
be educated can be considered a basic capability, my task is now to outline what
functionings and capabilities are constitutive of education thus conceptualised. This
task has two interrelated dimensions. The first consists in determining what is the
subset of functionings and capabilities basically constitutive of education, whereas
the second refers to the criteria for determining these constituents. It is, in short, the
problem of providing a possible list of basic functionings and capabilities in
education and of determining the principles underlying it. This is a contested and
much debated problem, since, as mentioned in chapter 5, on the one hand, Sen has
not provided a definite list of valuable capabilities, since he maintains that such a list
should be the result of a democratic process involving debate and participation by
those who will be affected by the choice61 . In this sense, the list would be context-
dependent. On the other hand, however, Sen has also recognised how basic
capabilities imply an absolute level, which is not related to the specification of the
context and which can be therefore identified independently of the relative picture.
Robeyns argues that Sen's approach, as a general normative framework, is not in
conflict with specifying a list of capabilities aimed at a determined purpose
(Robeyns, 2003: 15). In this sense, my task is trying to ascertain what functionings
and capabilities are constitutive of education as basic capability, and hence
independent of determined contexts, whilst also aiming at operationalising capability
for the purpose of education. Finally, this task highlights how the criteria for
selecting relevant functionings and capabilities play a fundamental role. Let us start
by analysing the criteria.
In order to address how criteria are fundamental for selecting functionings and
capabilities and what criteria we should adopt in education, I shall refer again to
Alkire's monograph (2002), analysed in chapter 6. Recall here Alkire's two main
principles in outlining basic capabilities for poverty reduction: capabilities should be
identified in terms of capabilities to meet basic needs, hence avoiding harm to the
person, and they should be expressed at a general level. I maintain that these two
principles by which education is selected as a basic capability are workable also at
61 See chapter 5.
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the level of identifying the subset of capabilities constitutive of it. If education is
basic in terms of fundamental for well-being, then its components are equally
fundamental to it, since they all contribute to avoid harm or disadvantage, thus
meeting the first criterion. Furthermore, they can be expressed at the requested
level of generality, thus meeting the second criterion (an aspect that I shall address
in more detail below).
However, applying these two criteria at the level of identification of functionings and
capabilities constitutive of a capability —education - that is already expressed as
basic implies explicitly addressing a potential theoretical problem. This consists in
avoiding the possibility of an infinite regress to basic and yet more basic
components. Say we think of education as basic capability and then subsequently
specify among its fundamental components thinking, and we then proceed to define
thinking as a functioning that depends on a more basic functioning, that of wanting
to think, and so on, we are caught in a conceptual infinite regress. We need to make
sure that the functioning specified is basic and does not imply more basic
components to it. Here the identified criteria for selection are crucial in that they
have to determine specifically those functionings and capabilities, which are
absolutely constitutive of education. It is in this sense that the two criteria chosen by
Alkire are necessary and applicable to my task, yet perhaps not entirely sufficient to
it. In my view, in order to avoid the potential danger of 'infinite regress', the criteria
have to explicitly include the principle of exhaustion and non-reducibility, as
presented by Robeyns in her account of relevant capabilities for gender inequalities.
The criterion of exhaustion and non-reducibility requires the elements of the list to
be comprehensive, thus including all the important ones, and not overlapping (2003:
17). True, the criterion of avoiding harm could necessarily and sufficiently select
only those elements that are basically constitutive of education. Yet, given the
complex dimension of education, it seems that a principle explicitly eliciting
elements that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and hence elements that
include all the important and relevant components and that are non reducible to
others, can more effectively select basic capabilities in education.
To sum up, the criteria for identifying basic functionings and capabilities in education
include the following:
62 See Crocker, 0. (1995) for a clarification of this theoretical problem.
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I) Functionings and capabilities should be identified in terms of meeting basic needs,
hence avoiding harm and disadvantage;
ii) They should be identified at an ideal level of generality;
iii) They should be exhaustive and non-reducible.
These criteria for selecting relevant functionings and capabilities in education
provide us with a methodological basis on which to proceed to the core of the task
at hand, which consists in determining what subsets of enabling conditions - beings
and doings - are fundamental to education.
Conceptualising education as basic capability, therefore, entails the selection of
educational functionings and capabilities, which are fundamentally constitutive of
education. More specifically, selecting basic capabilities in education means looking
at what beings and doings are at the same time crucial to avoiding disadvantage for
the individual, and foundational to the enhancement of other beings and doings,
both in education and for other capabilities. We are looking here at certain enabling
conditions that allow individuals to function effectively in society and whose absence
would put the individual at a considerable disadvantage. At the same time,
moreover, we are looking at enabling conditions whose exercise is particularly,
albeit not solely, important in childhood, since, as Nussbaum notices, 'exercising a
functioning in childhood is frequently necessary to produce a mature adult
capability.' (Nussbaum, 2000: 90.)
Interesting insights for selecting educational functionings and capabilities can be
drawn on the concept of 'serving competencies' developed by Charles Bailey (1984)
in his analysis of the aims and content of liberal education. Bailey suggests that a
considerable part of education should of necessity be based on and promoting
certain functional capacities, or serving competencies, which allow the achievement
of subsequent educational objectives (1984: 111). This concept presents important
similarities with that of basic educational functionings and capabilities, which are
fundamental in themselves and for the promotion of subsequent more complex
capabilities.
What are, ultimately, these enabling conditions constitutive of education? At the
ideal level, I suggest the following fundamental educational functionings and
capabilities:
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• Literacy: being able to read and to write, to use language and discursive
reasoning functionings.
Numeracy: being able to count, to measure, to solve mathematical problems
and to use logical reasoning functionings.
• Sociality and participation: being able to establish positive relationships with
others and to participate without shame.
• Learning dispositions: being able to concentrate, to pursue interests, to
accomplish tasks, to enquire.
Physical activities: being able to exercise and being able to engage in sports
activities.
• Science and technology: being able to understand natural phenomena,
being knowledgeable in technology and being able to use technological
tools.
• Practical reason: being able to relate means and ends and being able to
critically reflect on one's and others' actions.
While presenting relevant similarities with Bailey's serving competencies, this
subset of basic capabilities in education complies with the principles outlined as
important to its selection, in that absence of these elements would constitute
disadvantage for the individual. Moreover, none of the capabilities appears
essentially reducible to others and the list is fairly exhaustive with respect to the
foundational elements relevant to education. Furthermore, the list is expressed at a
certain level of generality, hence allowing for more specific lists to be drawn from it
in relation to the relevant context. Finally, the use of 'being able to' in expressing
capabilities implies here also the opportunity and the possibility entailed by the
concept of capability, rather than simply the common understanding of 'to be able
to' in terms of ability. A more detailed analysis of each capability can help in better
substantiating this position.
There is indeed little dispute about literacy as fundamental in education. Listening,
speaking, reading and writing are all essential functionings as well as constitutive of
communication functionings and entailing discursive reasoning at different levels.
The capability to participate without shame is a particularly interesting one. In presenting it, Sen
refers to Adam Smith's example of the men who cannot appear in public without shame unless he has
a linen shirt, given society's arrangements and expectations. Williams discusses this example in his
comments on Sen's Tanner Lectures, 1985. See Sen et al. 1985.
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Furthermore, being able to express oneself in different forms, with respect to
thoughts as well as imagination, creativity and belief, is also constitutive of literacy
broadly conceived. In this sense, as Bailey notices, 'here is the first great practice of
human agents into which children must be initiated.' (Bailey, 1984: 111.) Numeracy,
also, pertains to the core of education, and with it functionings such as counting,
ordering, comparing, estimating, measuring, and all the functionings related to
logical reasoning as one of the ways of making sense of the world and of one's
agency in it. Sociality and participation are fundamental functionings in education in
different, but related ways. Establishing positive relationships with others allows for
personal and social development, which is consistently proven by educators as
fundamental to learning. Much learning is promoted and sustained by social
functionings such as cooperating, being part of a group, supporting or being
supported by others. Related to sociality, participation is also crucial in education
and more so, when considering the essential role it plays in the exercise of agency.
In this sense, the capability of positively participating in educational activities, may
well promote the adult mature capability so important for Sen's approach. Learning
dispositions entail functionings related to the actual learning process, including
possibilities of concentrating, accomplishing tasks and achieving aims, as well as
enquiring and imagining. Physical activities play the important role of maintaining
health and general bodily well-being, while also developing bodily awareness and
mobility. Science and technology apply to all those possibilities to engage in the
understanding of the natural world and its manifestation, as well as developing
functionings related to the knowledge and use of technology. Finally, practical
reason. Analysing what constitutes practical reason and its role as an educational
capability would take this discussion too far from its main focus. However, some
considerations may help in justifying its inclusion in this subset of enabling
conditions. Nussbaum suggests a notion of practical reason in terms of 'the ability to
form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning
of one's life' (2000: 97). She furthermore assigns practical reason a central and
crucial role among capabilities, maintaining that it is this kind of reason that makes a
life truly human. Although I endorse Nussbaum's position on the importance of
practical reason, hers is a substantial notion, whose promotion through education
would entail complex and high levels of capabilities. It appears, therefore, that In
selecting basic constituents of education, a 'thinner' understanding of practical
reason may comply more with the task, whilst still retaining its crucial importance as
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a capability. Hence practical reason in this context is specified as the ability to relate
means and ends and to reflect on actions. This, on the one hand relates to the
ability to evaluate and to form independent judgements, whilst, on the other, it
establishes the prerequisites for the more mature capability to exercise practical
reason in terms of forming a conception of the good and planning one's life.
Having analysed the elements of the list let me now address two sets of
considerations: a comparison with Bailey's proposal, and a broader objection to
some elements of the list.
There are evident overlaps between this list and Bailey's serving competencies, as
well as notable differences. Among the latter, one needs to be addressed. Bailey
selected logical reasoning among the competencies he deemed necessary for a
certain kind of liberal education. I have instead maintained reasoning as subsumed
in literacy and numeracy, thus presenting it contextualised in terms of discursive
and logical reasoning. Furthermore, I have included the capability of practical
reason in terms of relating means and ends and evaluating actions, thus implying a
form of logical reasoning, albeit more morally oriented. This is a debatable position,
since some educationists argue that learning reasoning skills has to be done per Se,
as well in association to other skills. However, at a basic level the reasoning
entailed by literacy and numeracy, as well as by other capabilities like sociality and
practical reason seems to respond adequately to the task of identifying educational
enabling conditions.
Before addressing the implications for equality and justice entailed by this
understanding, let us consider some important elements related to the kind of
education implied by the capability approach. First, it appears that an autonomy-
promoting education would best enact the requirements of the capability approach
with respect to the individuals' possibilities of choosing among possible valuable
functionings and the kind of life one has reasons to value. Second, there is a level of
context-dependency that seems to be required both in relation to the instrumental
value of education as highlighted by the approach, and in relation to the importance
accorded to people's exercise of freedom within their relevant social and institutional
context. Finally, the conceptualisation of education as basic capability and the focus
of the capability approach on well-being freedom and agency freedom, confirm the
foundational role of education for individuals' effective functioning and participation
in society.
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First, on autonomy-promoting education. The capability approach is concerned with
people's freedom, both in terms of well-being freedom and agency freedom. Central
to the approach is the extent to which people are free to choose among functionings
they value. It appears that the kind of education that would best enable individuals
to make relevant choices and to know and deliberate about their options, as well as
to give them the foundations for the social bases of self respect, relates to what is
known as autonomy-promoting educationM. While expanding capabilities, education
plays a very important role in promoting also the future freedom individuals and,
specifically, children will have to choose their valued beings and doings. Broadly
speaking, therefore, the elements constitutive of an autonomy-promoting education,
like critical reflection and the capacity to make informed choices, appear to be
relevant also for education as a basic capability. This relates substantially to the
inclusion of the basic capability of practical reason in terms of critical reflection
among the essential educational capabilities.
Second, there is an element of context-dependency related to the fundamental
educational capabilities selected. Although these capabilities are expressed at a
general level, the exact content of each of them is interrelated both to the
geographical and cultural areas where the capabilities are applied, as well as to the
instrumentally valuable education provided. For instance, complex post-industrial
societies require a high general level of knowledge and specific abilities related to
information and communication technology which may be unnecessary in less
complex societies. Moreover, the fundamental capability of sociality and
participation is particularly context-dependent, in that different cultures imply rather
different ways of social interactions and participation. Therefore, whilst the
educational capabilities outlined represent essential elements for the individual's
effective functioning in society at a general and ideal level, their exact specifications
and the achieved functionings implied show important dimensions of specific
context-dependency.
Finally, conceptualising education within the capability approach differs consistently
from other views. What is important in capability terms is not simply the amount of
resources spent on education or a consideration of education as a resource in itself,
64 I am considenng here only some insights derived from the vast debate and literature on autonomy-
promoting and autonomy-facilitating education, constitutive of liberal education. I am therefore not
addressing any implication related either to this distinction or to the arguments supporting autonomy in
education. See, among others, Brighouse, 2000; Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999 and
Saito, 2003.
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as a resourcist approach may propose, for instance. It is not even the simple
production of educational 'outputs' in terms of qualifications and years of schooling,
as evaluated by economics approaches to education. Rather, the capability
approach requires focussing on the contribution that the basic capability to be
educated makes to the formation and the expansion of human capabilities, hence
on the contribution that it makes to people's opportunity to function effectively and to
participate as equals in society. Ultimately, the fundamental educational
functionings and capabilities identified, in promoting human agency, knowledge and
skills, as well as the ability to deliberate about means and ends and basic conditions
of autonomy, contribute substantially to peoples' effective functioning as
independent and equal participants in their dominant social and institutional
framework.
To sum up at this point. Conceptualising education as basic capability highlights its
importance for people's well being. It furthermore helps in outlining those basic
educational functionings and capabilities, which are essential prerequisites in
enabling people to function effectively in the dominant social and institutional
framework. The next section addresses the reasons for seeking equality in the
space of these basic functionings and capabilities and the meaning of equality in
this space.
7.2.2 Elements of a Fundamental Educational Entitlement: Equal
Opportunities for Basic Educational Capabilities
The capability approach allows the identification of educational capabilities that are
fundamental in providing individuals with the transformational resources necessary
to function and to participate effectively in society. In this sense education and its
equal provision is one of the concerns of egalitarians. In this section of the chapter I
analyse the demands of equality in relation to the fundamental educational
capabilities. I maintain that the capability approach provides important reasons for
seeking equality in the space of basic educational capabilities and that it
furthermore suggests a possible understanding of educational equality in terms of
equal opportunities for these educational capabilities. This, I maintain, constitutes a
fundamental educational entitlement for individuals.
65 This view relates to Anderson's concept of democratic equality. Anderson develops a conception of
equality as equal effective access to levels of functionings necessary to stand as equals in society.
Ethics, 1999: 316-7.
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Let us start by analysing the reasons in support of equality in the fundamental
educational capabilities. There are three important interrelated reasons in support of
equality in this space. The first concerns the equal consideration due to citizens.
Recall here that seeking equality in the space of capabilities constitutes the more
appropriate enactment of the equal consideration due to individuals (see above).
Education as basic capability is a crucial element for people's well-being and plays
a substantial role for the promotion of those capabilities necessary for individuals to
participate effectively in society. Unequal provision in basic educational capabilities
would lead to people having unequal freedom to develop their effective functionings
in society. Whilst being an obvious inequality of consideration, this would at the
same time undermine the legitimacy of social and institutional arrangements.
Consequently, opportunities for educational capabilities should be equally provided.
Interrelated to this reason is the fundamental importance of education for people's
freedoms. Within the space of capabilities, the variable we are trying to equalize is
the substantive freedom people have to choose the life they value, hence their
substantive well-being freedom. It therefore follows that the capability to be
educated, as fundamentally constitutive of well-being, has to be part of the
equalization, too. There is, finally, another aspect of education, which supports
equality in the space of fundamental educational capabilities. Thinking of education,
and especially the education of children, implies considering the future-oriented
dimensions entailed by education. Education has a prospective value for the child in
the future, whilst also entailing considerations of the present, contingent value it
yields for the child as a child, now. It follows that unequal provision in educational
capabilities would substantially put individuals at a disadvantage in a consistent and
pervasive way, both contingently and for future prospects. These important reasons
support seeking equality in the space of basic educational capabilities, and point in
the direction of its possible meaning. Let us analyse it.
What does equality in educational capabilities consist in? Addressing this question
requires a far more extensive analysis than the one I propose in my work.
Nevertheless, I maintain that the capability approach suggests an understanding of
educational equality in terms of equal access to those fundamental educational
capabilities that are necessary to the individual for effectively functioning and
participating as an independent person in society. This understanding, whilst
drawing on the conceptualisation of education as basic capability, relates
substantially to the dimension of opportunity inscribed in the idea of capability. Let
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me proceed to analyse this point by outlining the opportunity dimension of
capability.
Capabilities represent the substantive freedoms people have to choose among
valuable functionings: they are capability to function. Inscribed in people's
substantive freedom are the opportunities to enact this freedom in achieving
functionings. Sen maintains,
(F)reedom is concerned with processes of decision making as well as opportunities to achieve
valued outcomes.. .we have to examine ... the extent to which people have the opportunity to
achieve outcomes (1999: 291).
Applied to education, this view translates into considering the extent to which people
have opportunities to achieve fundamental educational outcomes. The insight of the
capability approach is that people should have the same extent, in terms of equal
opportunities, to achieve fundamental educational functionings, like being able to
read and to write, or to concentrate and accomplish task, or to reflect critically on
one's own actions. Opportunities are here considered in a broad sense. They
include: educational resources, both in terms of physical resources and human
resources; settings, like school buildings and facilities; and external conditions, like
policies and regulations that are necessary to promote educational achievement.
Hence, the kind of freedom we are equalising encompasses the opportunity to
achieve a valued functioning and the conditions for that functioning to be achieved
(Unterhalter and Brighouse, 2003: 21).
The aspect of opportunity within the idea of capability emphasises furthermore that
what we are equalizing is not actual achieved functionings, but the effective access
to the achievement of these functionings. For instance, people should have equal
effective opportunities to achieve reading, writing, and reasoning functionings. This
allows considering the individuals' freedom to choose to achieve certain
functionings by 'deploying means at their disposal' and, furthermore it leaves open
the possibility of choosing whether to achieve certain educational functionings or
not. An example may illustrate the important distinction between equal effective
access to functionings and achieved functionings. Consider, for instance, Len and
Josh, who have achieved different mathematical outcomes. Len has high numerical
reasoning, whereas Josh has achieved basic counting functionings. Suppose they
66 Anderson, 1999: 316.
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have similar personal characteristics67 and both have attended a very well equipped
school, with highly motivated and qualified teachers, and wide possibilities to learn
in a stimulating environment. Suppose furthermore that Josh has achieved lower
outcomes since he has decided to spend his time in leisure activities rather than in
learning maths. Here the capability approach does not consider the different
achieved functionings as a matter of equality, since difference in achievement in this
case relates to the individual's choice. Suppose instead that Len and Josh have
different achieved functionings due to the fact that Len's school could provide for
additional courses aimed at improving levels of achievements. The differential
outcomes in this instance relates to a substantial inequality of capabilities. The
capability approach captures this difference and insists on equality as equal
effective opportunities for functionings. What is important in terms of equality of
capabilities is the equal freedoms and access that people have to achieve
educational functionings, rather than equality in achieved functionings. This position
allows people the possibility of choosing whether or not to achieve certain
functionings, providing the relevant opportunities are available.
There is, however, a tension in this position, which relates primarily to the possibility
of choice when considering the education of children. There are levels of choice
that, given their status, are unavailable to children. As we have seen, children's
status requires adults to protect their interests and meet their needs, and hence
children's agency freedom or the exercise of autonomous choices are
fundamentally limited. Hence, when operationalising the capability approach in
relation to the education of children, the emphasis is on providing a kind of
education, which, whilst considering the actual well-being of children during their
childhood, can, at the same time, equip them with the fundamental capabilities that
they will exercise in future. On the one hand, this endorses the importance of equal
access to fundamental educational capabilities, and therefore to a kind of education
that will provide children with the capabilities to function effectively in society (See
above.) On the other hand, however, it raises the problem of justifying choices
actually made for children and not by children. For instance, children cannot choose
not to be educated and cannot choose among educational functionings and
67 Note here that the presupposition in this example is the similar personal characteristics assumed for
Len and Josh. A fundamental insight of this approach to educational equality relates to the importance
of personal characteristics, including abilities and disabilities, in the metric upon which individuals are
compared. But more on this later on.
See above, p.134.
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capabilities. In this case, the parent and guardian, as well as the state for certain
capabilities, exercise the actual choice for the child. A possible way of solving this
tension is to consider that parents' choices and the enforcement of certain
regulations by the state, for instance schooling requirements, are actually made in
the child's best interest, hence for the child's present and future well-being, and
therefore can be seen as proxy-choices. This solution, albeit partial, allows
considering equality in terms of equal opportunities to educational capabilities valid
and justified also in the case of children's education.
Drawing on these considerations, we can now outline a first, provisional
understanding of what constitutes a fundamental educational entitlement. I maintain
that the capability approach allows the conceptualisation of a fundamental
educational entitlement in terms of the equal opportunities and equal effective
access to levels of educational capabilities necessary to function and to participate
effectively in society. Basic educational capabilities form the necessary enabling
conditions that, once achieved, allow individuals to function effectively in their
dominant framework. In so far as we can, ultimately, we should provide people with
equal effective access to these educational capabilities and the relative achieved
functionings, which constitute the transformational resources necessary to function
and participate effectively in society. Whilst conceptualising equality in terms of the
equal opportunities for functionings, this view highlights the importance of the
prospective educational achievements in terms of levels of capabilities necessary to
function effectively in society. This fundamental educational entitlement implies
therefore a threshold level of capabilities that educational institutions should
promote and foster. This threshold of basic capabilities is set at the level, which is
necessary for individual to participate effectively in society.
This position presents evident similarities with the threshold level of Central Human
Capabilities proposed by Martha Nussbaum 69 in her account of the Capabilities
Approach. Nussbaum maintains that her list of human capabilities 'gives us the
basis for determining a decent social minimum in a variety of areas' (2000:75),
which constitutes at the same time the underpinnings of basic political principles
informing constitutional guarantees. In her view, therefore, governments should
provide a threshold level of Central Human Capabilities, and this provision should
be a constitutional requirement. The threshold of educational capabilities I suggest
69 See Nussbaum, 2000: 75, 86.
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is more specific and circumscribed in scope, since it aims primarily at selecting
levels of capabilities which are essential prerequisites for functioning in society,
hence it aims at outlining those educational capabilities that are of central
egalitarian concern and, as such, that should be equally distributed. Furthermore,
the educational entitlement proposed, as we shall see, aims also at addressing
issues of equal educational entitlement for disabled children and children with
special educational needs. Nevertheless, despite the more restricted scope of my
proposal, its underlying idea draws on Nussbaum's conception.
Thinking of an educational entitlement in terms of equal access to capabilities for
functioning at a level necessary to participate effectively in society, although already
demanding a goal for social and institutional arrangements, may raise objections.
Two in particular, are significant. The first relates to the provision of a subset of
basic fundamental capabilities rather than the full range of possible educational
ones. Should individuals be equally entitled to higher educational capabilities? Or to
a wider range of capabilities? This issue relates directly to the problem of indexing
capabilities inherent to the approach, whilst also implying considerations about
education. The capability approach faces the problem of deciding which capabilities
society should aim to equalize. (Anderson, 1999: 316 and above.) At the same time,
the presumptive dimension proper to education compounds this problem, since
deciding in advance what capabilities and what level of achieved functionings will
allow a person to flourish is a very difficult task. Nevertheless, I maintain that the
fundamental educational entitlement outlined can withstand this objection for two
important reasons. First, selecting basic fundamental capabilities, which are
essential to functioning independently and effectively in society, means giving
people those transformational resources that will allow them to choose the kind of
life they have reasons to value. It therefore means expanding their freedoms. Since
this is the fundamental variable upon which people's relative positions in social
arrangements should be evaluated, this meets the requirements of the approach
and the demands of equality. Second, since the basic educational capabilities are
at the same time fundamental in expanding other and future capabilities, providing
people with this subset means giving them those enabling conditions upon which to
base higher educational as well as other capabilities. After all, higher educational
functionings cannot be achieved without the prior achievement of these fundamental
enabling conditions. However, setting this basic educational entitlement leaves open
the important issue of the promotion and distribution of higher levels of capabilities
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and functionings beyond the basic entitlement outlined, which is a matter that I will
analyse in a further section of this chapter.
The second objection concerns how to conceptualise this educational entitlement in
relation to disability and special educational needs, and hence whilst evaluating
functionings and capabilities restrictions. More specifically it concerns how we can
think of equality of sets of educational capabilities when certain disabilities may limit
functionings and capabilities sometime in consistent ways. I maintain that the
perspective outlined provides important insights about the entitlement of disabled
children and children with special educational needs. The next section addresses
this issue in more detail.
7.2.3 Elements of a Fundamental Educational Entitlement for Disabled
Children and Children with Special Educational Needs
In this section I analyse the demands of disability and special educational needs in
relation to equality. I maintain that the capability approach helps in answering the
question of what constitutes an educational entitlement for disabled learners and,
more specifically, it provides useful insights in determining what allocation of
resources meets the requirements of equality and justice for these students.
Let us recall here the conceptualisation of disability and special educational needs
in terms of functionings and capabilities. As seen in chapters 5 and 6, within the
capability approach disability and learning difficulties are considered as inherently
relational, or, more specifically, as emerging from the interlocking of personal and
circumstantial elements. Furthermore, they are conceptualised as functionings and
capabilities limitations, and evaluated in terms of vertical inequalities with respect to
'normal' functioning. What are the implications of this conceptualisation of disability
and special educational needs for educational equality? Recall here also that the
capability approach helps in considering aspects of educational equality in terms of
equal effective opportunities and access to levels of basic fundamental capabilities
that are necessary for the individual to participate as equal in society. Furthermore,
the capability approach allows the identification of a fundamental educational
entitlement, which establishes a threshold level of basic capabilities that should be
guaranteed to individuals. Disabled children and children with special educational
needs are entitled to the achievement of educational capabilities established as a
matter of justice for all individuals. However, disability and special educational
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needs imply functionings and capabilities limitations, which may result in difficulties
in the achievements of those levels of educational functionings. It follows, therefore,
that disabled learners should receive educational opportunities and resources
necessary to achieve effective levels of functionings in their dominant social
framework. This implies the provision of additional opportunities and resources,
where necessary, as a matter of justice. Ultimately, equalizing opportunities and
effective access to basic educational capabilities in the case of disabled children
and children with special educational needs means exactly providing those
additional opportunities and resources necessary to these children for the
achievement of levels of functionings as independent participants in the social
structure.
Following these considerations we can now conceptualise more precisely the
educational entitlement with specific reference to disabled children and children with
special educational needs. A fundamental educational entitlement for these children
consists in levels of opportunities and resources required to allow them to achieve
those basic educational functionings that are prerequisites for effective participation
in the dominant social and institutional framework. In this sense, therefore, a
dyslexic child is entitled to additional opportunities and resources that will allow her
to achieve reading and writing functionings appropriate to participate effectively in
her social framework.
Whilst helping substantially in answering one of the most difficult problems related
to educational equality, i.e. what allocation of resources is just for disabled children
and children with special educational needs, this perspective presents fundamental
positive insights, both normatively and for more practice-oriented issues. First, the
educational entitlement is set within a normative framework where competing
demands of equality for disabled and non-disabled children are evaluated
comparatively. In providing the normative basis upon which to reconsider the
contentious issue of resource allocation, the capability approach presents a justified
answer to long debated issues. More specifically, identifying an educational
entitlement allows considering the additional requirements of resources for disabled
children and children with special educational needs as requirements of justice.
Second, determining an educational entitlement that indicates a threshold level of
capabilities, necessary to the individual to function effectively in society, helps in
avoiding a possible problem related to the resource provision for disabled people,
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i.e. the problem of infinite demand. This problem arises, for instance, in relation to
severe impairments, like multiple cognitive impairments, when compensatory
models would imply an infinite allocation of resources in order to get the individual to
an even starting point, as compared to other individuals, so that she had a real
chance for equality over a lifetime 70. In setting a threshold level within the basic
educational capabilities and in specifying this as the level of capabilities required as
prerequisites for functioning effectively in society, we avoid the problem of infinite
demand in two ways. First, we set an actual limit on how much resource should be
distributed, and that limit corresponds to the opportunities and resources necessary
to the individual's effective functioning in society. Second, the demand of disability is
considered within a framework of equality and justice, which evaluates it in relation
to the demands of other individuals. Hence an infinite allocation of resources to a
disabled child that would deplete the others of resources necessary to achieve
levels of functionings to participate effectively in society is not possible, since it is
contrary to the same principle upon which the distribution takes place in the first
instance.
Third, the educational entitlement proposed provides a possible, although
provisional, answer to the problem of indexing capabilities, or, more specifically, to
the question of what capabilities to foster and promote in relation to the limitations of
disability and special educational needs. Recall here that the capability approach
faces the problem of which capabilities to promote equally among individuals, hence
which capabilities are of egalitarian concern. The proposed entitlement suggests a
possible answer by outlining basic educational capabilities essential to function
effectively in society, and which should therefore be provided as a matter of justice.
However, this answer needs further specification when related to some of the
complexities of disability and special educational needs. Consider, for instance,
severe and multiple cognitive disabilities. There are situations where teachers and
parents of severely cognitive disabled children decide privileging the promotion of
certain capabilities and the achievement of certain functionings, for instance that of
establishing positive social relationship, over capabilities and achieved functionings
like being knowledgeable in technology and understanding natural phenomena. In
such cases, therefore, teachers and parents, under external resource constraints
and considering the child's individual characteristics, apply perfectionist
considerations in deciding which capabilities would help the child flourish in life.
70 See Veatch, 1986: 159 and the discussion of this problem in chapter 5.
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Here the meaning of perfectionist relates to ideals of what kind of person teachers
and parents would aim to educate, and therefore they apply a mode of thinking that
might be described as perfectionism in technical terms. On the one hand, the
educational entitlement outlined applies exactly this kind of perfectionist
considerations: it selects a list of capabilities that, once fostered, will allow
individuals to function effectively in society, therefore to flourish. In this sense, the
capability approach is here very useful, not only because it allows us to focus on
those essential freedoms, but also because it provides for considerations relating to
means-ends, where ends are the expansion of the individual's freedom to choose
the life she has reason to value. Perfectionist considerations, ultimately, are
necessary to the project and lead to useful answers. However, on the other hand,
the same considerations constitute also the limit of the approach. More specifically,
the selection of basic capabilities as constitutive of the educational entitlement may
present problems. Reconsider here the example of the severely cognitively disabled
child. Suppose the child's flourishing rests almost entirely on her enjoyment and
fruition of music, and hence on functionings like listening to music and singing, and
on her swimming and exercising in water. Obviously, the child's well-being is
paramount; and hence the promotion of these functionings becomes a matter of
justice. However, the educational entitlement proposed does not account for these
capabilities, or not consistently, thus presenting a substantial limit. But more on this
later on.
Finally, a further positive insight of this perspective concerns its important practice-
oriented implications, which relate primarily to the distribution of resources for the
education of disabled children and children with special educational needs. The
educational entitlement determines the additional opportunities and resources for
these children as a matter of justice, and it furthermore specifies a threshold level
for the distribution to take place. The threshold is set at the level of the individuals'
effective functioning in society. I believe that this constitutes an important insight for
the design of educational policies, in that it suggests a normative framework upon
which to draw more precise funding formulae for special and inclusive education.
The latter, moreover, is drawn on a framework that considers the competing
demands of disabled and non-disabled students, and hence on a comprehensive
perspective on some of the demands of equality in education.
Having discussed some of the more positive insights of this perspective, I now turn
to address its substantial limits.
196
There are two main and consistent limits to this perspective. The first concerns the
possible element of 'reductionism' implied in an educational entitlement and in the
related selection of basic capabilities. Reconsider here the case of severe cognitive
disabilities: in this case supporting the achievement of musical and swimming
functionings enhances the well-being of the child. Why should we propose an
educational entitlement based on basic capabilities necessary to an effective
functioning in society, when some impairments restrict functionings in such
substantial ways that the actual well-being of the individual is better promoted
through fostering other, non-basic capabilities? Shouldn't we instead reconsider the
full set of educational capabilities and promote it? Moreover, are we not suggesting
an idealised and somehow 'normalised' view of what 'effective functioning and
participating in society' may mean? This first limit is interrelated to the second one,
which concerns the possible discriminatory and oppressive use of any threshold
level, however carefully designed, in separating those individuals that achieve the
set levels from those who do not. Disabled people's movements have long
denounced these discriminatory and stigmatising perspectives and oppose the idea
of threshold levels, however well intentioned it may be. Why not propose the
promotion of capabilities and functioning achievements and abandon any idea of
threshold levels?
I shall admit at once that I do not have a full defence of the proposed framework
against these questions, and that I share many of the perplexities they raise.
However, some considerations may clarify the reasons supporting an educational
entitlement. First, there are considerations of justice and equality that endorse the
proposed entitlement. Questions of justice and equality arise in situations of scarcity
of resources and the just design of social and institutional arrangements implies an
evaluation of the distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals. Society, or
the design of social and institutional arrangements cannot promote equally the
countless possible capabilities that people may have reasons to value. A selection
criterion is needed when considering issues of equality. In the specific case of
education, the criterion chosen relates to the possibility of functioning effectively and
participating as equals in society, and the basic educational capabilities selected
respond to this requirement. The aim and the criterion meet egalitarian ideals, and
seem justified for selecting both the capabilities and the level at which they should
be distributed: remember that we are providing people with the transformational
resources that will allow them to choose the life they have reasons to value.
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Moreover, in promoting people's functioning and participation in society, we provide
them with the effective freedom for exercising citizenship, which is one of the aims
of disabled people's movements and activisms. Second, the entitlement is based
on an idea of educational equality as equal opportunities and presents the threshold
level as an indication of the proposed achieved functionings in order to set levels of
distributions that, for instance, do not incur in the problem of infinite demand. In this
sense, the threshold level is not meant to discriminate between people or to
evaluate their competence in a range of functionings (as certain understandings of
the medical model of disability, for instance). Rather, it establishes a presumptive
aim for the distribution to be at the same time equal and effective. Whilst these
considerations do not fully respond to the objections raised, I believe they provide
useful specifications to attenuate the force of such objections.
In conclusion, I maintain that the capability approach helps in answering one of the
most difficult normative questions related to educational equality: what and how
much educational resources should be devoted to disabled children and children
with special educational needs. It suggests an understanding of educational equality
in terms of equal opportunities to fundamental educational capabilities at levels
necessary to function and participate effectively in society. This leads to the
requirement, as a matter of justice, of additional opportunities and resources for
disabled children and children with special educational needs. Whilst this view does
not constitute a theory of educational equality, it presents an exploration of its
complexities and a possible useful answer to some of its hardest problems. This
view, however, leaves open the fundamental aspect of providing and promoting
higher levels of educational capabilities, which appears important in itself, for the
intrinsic value of education, and instrumentally, in light of the complex structures of
contemporary post-industrial societies. This last aspect of the framework is
addressed in the final section of this chapter.
7.3 Towards a Principled Framework for a Just Distribution of
Educational Resources to Disabled Children and Children with Special
Educational Needs
The provision of an educational entitlement represents a possible answer to
compelling questions about the allocation of resources for special and inclusive
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education, and constitutes the first priority of equality in education. Everyone who
can, should have the opportunities and resources to be able to achieve fundamental
educational functionings, which constitute the necessary prerequisites for
participating effectively and as equals in society. However, this position leaves open
the important dimension related to the promotion of capabilities beyond and above
the actual fundamental educational capabilities. In this last section of the chapter I
argue that the promotion of higher levels of capabilities or higher educational
capabilities is important for justice and that the distribution of resources with
reference to these higher levels, hence beyond the threshold established by the just
educational entitlement, is better adjudicated by allowing in considerations of
efficiency. These considerations, drawn on Rawls's theory of justice as fairness
(1971 and 2001), take into account the long-term prospects of the least-advantaged,
hence the improvement of the situation of the least well off members of society.
Although an effective participation and the possibility of taking part as equals in
society do not require individuals to achieve high educational capabilities, the
promotion of high levels of fundamental capabilities and higher educational
capabilities is important both in light of the intrinsic value of education and of its
instrumental value. For instance, the possibility of interpreting complex literary
theories or understanding the scientific underpinnings of the Human Genome
Project are not necessary to participate effectively in society. However, their pursuit
may enhance the well-being of some, for instance those who love literary works or
scientific endeavours, whilst also proving instrumentally valuable in giving access to
better or preferred job opportunities. At the same time, these endeavours may yield
positive results for people other than those undertaking them. For instance, some
implications of the Human Genome Project may prove helpful in alleviating genetic
conditions. It follows, therefore, that considerations about the provision for higher
educational capabilities are not only important, but necessary, too. Our interest in
equality requires an analysis of the provision of higher levels of basic capabilities
and of higher educational capabilities as well.
As clearly stated by both Sen and Nussbaum, the capability approach does not
constitute a theory of justice, but a normative framework for the assessment of
inequalities. The capability approach, therefore, does not specify the principles upon
which to establish a just distribution of resources and these principles have to be
drawn from other theories. In particular, Rawls' s seminal work on justice as fairness
outlines fundamental principles that can guide the just distribution of resources,
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whilst also providing valuable insights for permissible inequalities. Let us analyse
this theory in more detail.
Rawls's theory of justice stipulates two fundamental principles. According to the
first, the Liberty Principle, each person has the same claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which include freedom of thought and speech, as
well as freedom of conscience. The Second Principle consists instead of two parts.
It states, first, that social and economic inequalities are to be attached to offices and
positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity. Second, that these
inequalities have to be to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society
(Rawls, 2001: 42-3), understood as all those with the lowest shares of income and
wealth. This second part is known as the 'difference principle' and regulates what
inequalities are permissible under conditions of justice. Rawls further specifies the
First Principle as prior to the Second, and fair equality of opportunity as prior to the
difference principle. It follows, therefore, that inequalities are permissible only
against a background where the prior principles are satisfied, and hence against a
background where people have equal basic liberties and are provided with fair
chances of attaining rewarding positions. Whilst constituting a strictly distributive
norm (Rawls, 2001:61), Rawls inscribes the difference principle within a conception
of social cooperation, and specifies it essentially as a principle of reciprocity. He
maintains that however great the inequalities in income and wealth may be, and
however consistent the differences among people in exerting effort and earning a
greater share of output, inequalities must contribute to the benefit of the least
advantaged. Furthermore, this contribution must be effective, and hence it requires
that to each improvement in the legitimate expectations of the more advantaged,
must correspond an equal improvement in those of the least advantaged (Rawls,
2001: 64). In this sense, considerations of efficiency are central to the difference
principle71 . Finally, according to Rawis,
This condition brings out that even if it uses the idea of maximising the expectations of the least
advantaged, the difference principle is essentially a principle of reciprocity (Rawls, 2001: 64).
In this sense, the difference principle requires that inequalities are to benefit others,
as well as ourselves (Rawls, 2001: 64).
71 Rawls refers to the economic concept of Pareto efficiency, also known as Pareto Optimality and
used originally for economic institutions. See Theory of Justice, 1971: 58-65. Under Pareto efficiency 'a
configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to change it as to make some persons (at least one)
better off without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off.' Rawls, 1971: 58.
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How can Rawls's principles of justice help in determining the norms upon which
regulating the distribution of opportunities and effective access to higher levels of
fundamental capabilities and higher educational capabilities? I maintain that the
difference principle appears particularly relevant in the context of determining this
distribution, since it limits permissible inequalities within considerations of justice
and efficiency. Applied to education, these considerations lead to the distribution of
resources and opportunities for higher capabilities in ways that allow for inequalities
in resources to be used by those with a greater capacity in relation to the design of
the educational arrangements. At the same time it requires these inequalities to
serve the interests of the least well off. It appears reasonable to argue that beyond
the threshold level of fundamental capabilities guaranteed to everyone, those who
can obtain the highest educational capabilities should receive resources to that aim,
providing the benefits they gain from their education corresponded to an equal long
term prospective improvement and benefits for those least successful. In this sense,
for instance, higher levels of educational capabilities achieved by some, may
provide the rest of us with more advantages than we would have otherwise had, and
therefore improve our long term well-being in considerable ways. Similarly, severely
disabled children or children with profound and multiple impairments might benefit
from the higher educational capabilities and results achieved by others, and this
ultimately justifies applying considerations of efficiency to the distribution of
resources for higher educational capabilities.
We can now, therefore, attempt to provide a (provisional) conceptualisation of the
principled framework for a just distribution of opportunities and effective access to
educational capabilities for disabled children and children with special educational
needs. This framework consists of two parts. The first stipulates that equal
opportunities for fundamental educational capabilities be provided at levels
necessary to individuals for an effective participation in society. It sets a threshold
level of capabilities and states that all should have effective equal opportunities to
the achievement of those fundamental educational capabilities. From the
conceptualisation of learning disabilities as functionings and capabilities limitations,
it follows that necessary and legitimate additional resources have to be devoted to
children with disabilities and special educational needs. The second part of the
framework applies considerations of efficiency to the distribution of opportunities
and resources for the effective access and achievement of higher levels of
fundamental capabilities and higher educational capabilities. It states that beyond
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the threshold level of fundamental capabilities resources should be devoted in ways
that allow the higher achievements of some to benefit the lower achievement of
others. Whilst, as mentioned throughout this final chapter, this framework does not
provide a theory of educational equality, it nevertheless helps in answering the
complex and difficult question of what might constitute educational equality for
disabled children and children with special educational needs.
Concluding Comments
Starting from the debate on equality and the contentious question 'equality of what?'
this chapter has analysed competing approaches to the best enactment of the ideal
of equal consideration for all. It has shown that equality in the space of capability
represents the best enactment of this ideal. Furthermore, it has suggested how the
capability approach allows for a conceptualisation of educational equality in terms of
the equal effective opportunities to the achievement of those fundamental
educational capabilities necessary for participating as equals in society. The chapter
has subsequently outlined how this conceptualisation helps in answering one of the
most difficult problems of educational equality: how much and to what levels should
educational resources and opportunities be distributed to disabled learners?
Towards this answer, the chapter has presented a principled framework, which
stipulates that disabled children and children with special educational needs should
have opportunities and resources to achieve a threshold level of fundamental
educational capabilities necessary for an effective and equal participation in society.
Beyond this level, considerations of efficiency are applied, with the proviso that any
inequality resulting from the distribution should be to the benefit of the least
advantaged members of society.
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Chapter 8
Objections to the Principled Framework for
Educational Equality: A Response
The principled framework outlined in chapter 7 presents a compelling argument in
support of educational equality for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. It legitimates the additional educational provision for these
children in terms of justice, and stipulates the groundwork for equality of effective
access to the educational capabilities fundamental to functioning and participating
as equals in society. However, the case for such a framework is not fully
accomplished unless the possible objections to it are addressed. In this chapter I
discuss and offer counterarguments to three of these objections. The first is a form
of 'elitist' critique maintaining that resources should go to those that can make the
best use of them. The second is a position arguing against educational equality and
supporting a minimum adequate education for all; whilst the third objection
maintains that recognition, together with equal opportunities for achieving self-
esteem, should inform our concern for equality and justice. I shall claim that the
conceptualisation of educational equality presented, and the principled framework
outlined, are valid and justified ideals that should guide the design of educational
institutions and policy, whilst, at the same time, constituting a normative framework
for the reconsideration of disability in learning.
Introduction
There are three main objections to the conceptualisation of educational equality as
equal effective opportunities and access to fundamental capabilities necessary for
participating in society. All three objections question primarily the liberal egalitarian
framework underpinning this conceptualisation, and concern, in particular, the ideal
of educational equality as a distributive principle, understood mainly as equal
opportunity. The main arguments of these critiques are nonetheless directly relevant
203
and extendable to the specific idea of educational equality I am defending, and
should therefore be addressed 72. Let us outline them briefly.
The first objection against educational equality concerns specifically the notion of
equality of opportunity and maintains that such an ideal is incoherent and,
consequently, it should not guide the design of educational policy. Further, it claims
that even the understanding of equality of educational resources is a flawed
concept. On this view, the idea of an educational resource implies the notion of
taking it up and using it appropriately. It follows that speaking of equality of
resources in the educational domain is not logically coherent, since different people
have different learning capacities and, consequently, different powers to use
resources. Hence, according to this view, resources should be distributed on the
basis of the best use that people can make of them, and not according to allegedly
incoherent principles of equality. How does this perspective apply to the educational
provision for disabled children and children with special educational needs? A
plausible extension of this position leads to the conclusion that these children
should receive only limited resources. For instance, it appears possible to maintain,
following this view, that dyslexic children should not receive literacy resources,
since, presumably, they cannot make the best possible use of them. As we shall
see, this position is not only morally questionable, but also theoretically unsound,
since it rests on an unjustified account of both equality of opportunity and
educational resources. It therefore rejects the principle of educational equality
without providing acceptable arguments against it.
The second objection argues that educational equality is not only a misplaced ideal,
but has also been used to justify the questionable involvement of the state in
schooling. More specifically, this objection contends that, although egalitarians claim
to support equality, what they really invoke is a kind of sufficiency or adequacy,
beyond which the results of any distribution of whatever goods are deemed
valuable, does not represent a concern of justice. Applied to education, this
translates to the view that the state should not be directly responsible for the
provision of education, but should only make sure that all children receive an
adequate minimum education, with full provision left to parental means. As we shall
see, this view not only misrepresents egalitarian theories, but also draws partial
conclusions from their arguments. Moreover, it appears important to restate here
72 The discussion of the first two objections draws consistently on Brighouse, 2000, Chapter 7, pp.
141 -1 62, whilst the third draws on Robeyns, 2003.
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the normative differences between promoting a minimum adequate education for all,
and arguing, as I do, for equal effective access to fundamental educational
capabilities. Whilst the first perspective denies the relevance of equality in
education, the second represents a possible conceptualisation of it.
Finally, the third objection maintains that distributive ideals of justice, such as the
one endorsed in my work, substantially fail to determine and provide for the
fundamental aspect of equal recognition and parity of participation in society for
underrepresented groups. This perspective, emerging mainly from feminist theory,
presents similarities with positions in disability studies and the much-endorsed
politics of difference. However, as we shall see, this position rests on a limited
understanding of theories of distributive justice and ignores substantive differences
among them. Furthermore, it does not acknowledge the theoretical and normative
reach of the capability approach in promoting both issues of distribution and
recognition.
The chapter is organised in three sections, each analysing and counter-arguing a
single objection. I start by addressing the first critique, the incoherence of
educational equality and the correlated idea of an 'elitist resource use'.
8.1 Should Resources be Distributed According to Individuals' Ability
to Make Use of Them?
In his article 'Does Equality (of Opportunity) Make Sense In Education?' John
Wilson (1991) argues against educational equality as equal opportunity for learning
and, in particular, against the idea of equality of educational resources73. Wilson's
argument proceeds in two stages, with the second being specifically relevant to the
case of the educational provision for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Consequently, my analysis of this objection will address, firstly,
the general lines of Wilson's discussion, and, secondly, its implications for the
education of children with learning difficulties. As we shall see, Wilson's position
rests on a wrong understanding of the principle of distributive justice and
educational equality, and its conclusions are theoretically unsound and normatively
questionable. More specifically, I maintain that generically arguing, as Wilson seems
to do, for the distribution of resources on the basis of people's abilities to use them
73 As noted above, Wilson's argument has been fully addressed by Bnghouse (2000) and my account
of its general framework draws consistently on this discussion.
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violates principles of justice and poses serious moral doubts on the view of
education, and, more broadly, on the kind of society proposed. Let us start by
arguing against Wilson's main position.
According to Wilson, 'some human activities simply do not lend themselves to the
context of distributive justice at all' (1991: 27) and in his view education is certainly
one of these. The idea that we can allocate opportunities for learning is, in his view,
logically incoherent, since it only makes sense to say that a person has the
opportunity to do X if they have the power to do X (1991: 28).
To see this, consider the case where a person is quite unable to do X. Given a particular situation on
the football field, a person may seem to have the opportunity to break through the opposing players
and score. But he is quite unable to do this: he is too fat or too weak. . . .He has the opportunity only if
he has the power (Wilson: 1991: 28).
Wilson maintains that this is specifically the case in education, since people have
different powers and capacities to learn and, conversely, certain pursuits can be
learned by some people, but not by everyone. It therefore follows, according to
Wilson, that equality of opportunity is an incoherent ideal if applied to education.
Brighouse (2000: 142) has rightly pointed out how the conclusion of this argument
does not really follow from its premise. To say that certain activities can only be
learned by some people and not by others does not imply that equality of
educational opportunity is incoherent. Brighouse's counter-argument proceeds in
two parts. First, he says, we could choose to teach only those activities that can be
learned by everybody, thus avoiding the alleged incoherence of equality of
educational opportunities. This solution would certainly result in undesirable
policies, since it would not only infringe on peoples' liberties, but it would also yield
unwanted consequences in depriving society of the valuable contribution of those
who can produce goods for the benefits of many. Nevertheless, it would respond to
Wilson's objection. Second, Brighouse points out that equality of opportunities in
education does not mean exactly the same opportunities, but equal arrays of
chances to learn. In this sense, two learners with different powers or abilities could
still be given equal opportunities to learn, providing these opportunities are not the
same ones (2000: 142-3). So if Lily has good abilities to learn foreign languages
and Mark has the ability to learn playing the cello, Lily and Mark can be given equal
opportunities to get their goods, but these opportunities will not be the same.
Likewise, if Lily is visually impaired, whilst Mark is non-disabled, we can still provide
Lily with equal educational opportunities, through Braille resources and appropriate
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educational provision. Hence, following these counterarguments, the alleged
incoherence of equal educational opportunities does not seem to be sustained.
However, there is a second part in Wilson's argument, whose logical consequences
are relevant to the educational provision for disabled children and children with
special educational needs and should, therefore, be specifically analysed in this
context. Wilson argues that, given the incoherence of equality of educational
opportunities, we can perhaps talk of equality of access, or resources or anything
similar (1991: 29). He then proceeds to demonstrate how, in his view, even the
concept of equality of educational resources does not make sense. According to
Wilson, resources in general, but educational resources in particular, can only be
considered such if they are taken up and used to educational purposes. In his
words,
the notion of an educational resource (and this includes access-opportunities and anything else we
may prima facie seem able to distribute equally) still contains the concept of uptake. For instance,
having a computer is only an educational resource if it is seen and used for learning: that is, if the
owner can actually (and will actually) become more educated by his possession of it (1991: 30).
Consequently, and given peoples' differential abilities and willingness to use
resources and to become educated through this use, Wilson maintains that the idea
of educational equality as equal distribution of resources is not a logically coherent
principle and should not inform policies. Further, he maintains that the correct policy
consists in,
first establishing the learning-activities which we think important, and then ensuring that all individuals
who meet the cntena of selection for those activities are not debarred from pursuing them (1991: 30).
Hence on Wilson's view, given the situation of scarcity of resources, educational
resources should only be distributed to those that can make the best use of them.
For instance, higher education, seen as a valuable pursuit, should be made
available only to those who can make the best of it, since 'not everyone can in fact
make as good use of higher education as anyone else' (1991: 29).
Is Wilson's position theoretically coherent and normatively justified? I maintain that it
is neither one nor the other. First, as Brighouse argues, the concept of resource
does not necessarily require any uptake and, more specifically, the notion of an
educational resource, counting as such only when used, is simply implausible
(Brighouse, 2000: 143). Brighouse supports his counterargument by noting, for
instance, that the nutritional value of a peanut is not compromised in the case of
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somebody not eating the peanut, or eating it before feeling sick, or forgetting to eat
it and so forth. What is missing in these circumstances is simply making use of the
peanut's nutritional value. Similarly, the fact that a monolingual Italian speaker
cannot make use of an English dictionary does not compromise the status of the
dictionary as an educational resource (Brighouse, 2000: 143-4). Therefore, the
notion of educational resource does not require an uptake of any kind: the
educational value of a resource is there, despite the good or bad use that can be
made of it. In this sense, Wilson's argument is theoretically unsound.
Second, what about the implications of Wilson's considerations on the use of
resources, and hence on their distribution? Is it really normatively the case that
educational resources should be distributed only to those that can make the best
use of them? Here Wilson's argument is directly relevant to the case of educational
equality I am defending. If Wilson is right, then there is no point in distributing
resources to children with learning difficulties: they certainly do not seem to count as
those who can make the best use of educational resources. However, I maintain
that Wilson's position is normatively wrong and that his statement needs to be
qualified, instead of being generically used for education broadly conceived. There
are two elements supporting my counterargument: first, the normative principles of
distributive justice, and, second, the specific moral domain of equality and justice.
To illustrate the first element of this counterargument, let us consider the example of
Lily and Mark used above, but suppose that Lily can learn foreign languages
excellently, whereas Mark can learn to play the ceflo but only at a mediocre level.
Should we distribute resources only to Lily, since she is the one who can make the
best use of them? As Brighouse comments, 'it is a harsh theory which yields these
results' (2000: 144). Not only this, but also such a theory misinterprets the
normative assumptions of distributive principles, which are 'to distribute goods
among persons, not to distribute uses among resources' (Brighouse: 2000: 145).
But let us extend this to the education of disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Why, after all, should we distribute resources according to
egalitarian principles, however specified, and provide the minority of disabled
children and children with learning difficulties with additional resources, when we
could actually invest those resources in providing the majority of children with, say,
better sports facilities and playgrounds? Here again, the basic assumption is not the
best use that children can make of the resources, but the possibility of distributing
these resources, in order to give children equal chances to participate effectively in
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society. This relates substantially to the second consideration supporting my
counterargument: the moral domain of justice and equality. Since considerations of
distributive justice and equality are underpinned by the equal moral worth of each
person, and by the equal consideration they should receive from social and
institutional arrangements, it seems that Wilson's focus on resources and their best
use misses this point altogether. On his view, Mark would indeed receive less
consideration given his supposed lower talent in using resources and, presumably,
disabled children and children with special educational needs would be considered
similarly. As discussed amply in previous chapters, such an assumption needs clear
and detail arguments and it is unlikely to be morally sustained. Ultimately, Wilson's
arguments appear unacceptable both theoretically and normatively.
There is, however, an aspect of Wilson's objection that needs further evaluation,
since, if distributing resources according to their best use is normatively wrong,
under conditions of scarcity of resources, the latter have to be used effectively
according to precise principles of justice (an aspect that Wilson seems to miss
completely in his discussion). This is fundamental in the case of educational equality
and the correlated distribution of resources for disabled children and children with
learning difficulties. What Wilson overlooks in his position, is that in the case of
education, referring to a fundamental education is different from referring to the level
of specialised further education mentioned in his argument, like an Oxbridge
education, for example. Hence it appears reasonable to argue for equal access to
educational resources, or, as in my framework, to fundamental educational
capabilities necessary to participate as equals in society, whilst determining the
promotion of further and higher capabilities on the basis of principles of justice,
further specified. In this sense, equality in education is meant to provide individuals
with the effective transformative resources that will allow them to lead fulfilling lives
and choose among valuable options. As we have seen, Wilson's discussion does
not contemplate this distinction, but only allows for the generic allocation of
resources to those who can best use them, and, therefore, his notion is theoretically
unsound and morally flawed. And this appears to settle our initial question by
arguing convincingly against the distribution of resources according to their best
use.
Ultimately, therefore, educational equality does not appear to be the incoherent
ideal claimed by Wilson, but maintains its validity against this first objection. In the
next section I address and argue against the second objection, the case for a
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minimum adequate education for all, set against my egalitarian view of equal
effective access to fundamental educational capabilities.
8.2 Is a Minimum Adequate Education for All Acceptable?
One of the ideas often invoked against egalitarian principles is that justice demands
only a notion of sufficiency or adequacy; hence it requires that everyone has
enough of whatever goods are distributed 74. On this view, therefore, what matters, is
not that people have equal shares of what is valuable, but that they all have enough.
And although there may be different and contrasting concepts of sufficiency,
providing that everyone has reached the level agreed as correspondent to it, the
subsequent distribution loses importance (Swift: 2001:121).
James Tooley endorses this perspective and applies it to education. Tooley claims
that the egalitarian concern about educational equality is not only misplaced, but
has also been wrongly used as the principal reason for justifying government
intervention in education (Tooley, 2000: 62). He maintains that a closer look at the
notion of equity or equality of opportunity reveals that not equality, but a minimum
adequate education for all is what justice requires (Tooley, 2000: 62). Tooley further
argues that empirical evidence suggests that state intervention in education does
not achieve more equitable results than private initiatives, and seems even to fail
the objective of achieving universal education. On these bases, therefore, he claims
that state intervention in providing education is not only unnecessary, but also
mainly unjustified (Tooley, 2000: 77). The only role of the state in education should
be to ensure that children from very poor backgrounds receive a minimum adequate
education. Hence, above the minimum level identified, educational opportunities
should not be independent or insulated from the family (Brighouse, 2000:146).
Is Tooley's objection to educational equality sustained? Is it really the case that the
analysis of the notion of equality of opportunity shows us that not equality, but
minimum adequacy is what counts? Brighouse 75 argues effectively against Tooley's
objection by showing that it is based on an incorrect reading of principles of justice,
74 For instance, Brighouse refers to the work of Harry Frankfurt (1987), The Importance of What We
Care About in his discussion of Tooley's objection to educational equality (2000: 146). Similarly,
Joseph Raz has questioned the concept of equality and presented instead a notion of diminishing
principles, which asserts that the reason for giving someone a good depends on the degree to which
they need the good. Although different, notions of sufficiency and diminishing principles act on the
same premise that equality as such does not matter for justice. See Raz, (1986) The Morality of
Freedom, and Swift, 2001: 121 -122.
75 My discussion of this part of Tooley's objection draws substantially on Brighouse's analysis. See
Bnghouse, 2000: 146-150.
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and by demonstrating that its conclusions on the adequacy of a minimum education
are not acceptable. Let us then follow, first, Brighouse's arguments in addressing
Tooley's critique of the concept of educational equality. Second, let us proceed to
outline the substantive normative differences between endorsing a criterion of
adequacy and providing a principled framework for equal and effective access to
educational capabilities. Finally, let us consider the possible implications of Tooley's
position for special and inclusive education.
Tooley addresses his objection primarily to John Rawls' theory of justice and
specifically to its principle of fair equality of opportunity. Recall here that Rawls'
theory is based on two principles, a Liberty Principle, which stipulates that the basic
liberties should be equally distributed, and a Second Principle, which regulates the
legitimate inequalities among individuals. According to the Second Principle,
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference pnnciple). (Rawis,
2001: 42-3).
Furthermore, Rawls specifies that the First Principle is prior to the Second and that,
within the Second Principle, fair equality of opportunity is prior to the difference
principle. This means that conditions of fair equality of opportunity constrain, but
cannot be constrained by inequalities benefiting the least advantaged members of
society (Rawls, 2001: 43).
As Brighouse notices, although the interpretation of the concept of fair equality of
opportunity is complex, Rawls specifies it by stipulating that fundamentally those
with 'the same level of talents and willingness to exert efforts should have the same
chances of success, regardless of their initial place in society' (2000: 147).
Brighouse then points out that this understanding of fair equality of opportunity
underpins educational equality, since it requires educational opportunities to be
provided independently of family circumstances. This is consistent with Rawls'
statement that 'society must also establish, among other things, equal opportunities
of education for all regardless of family income' (Rawls, 2001: 44). Hence,
educational inequalities due to the higher power expenditures of certain families
over others violate equality of opportunities, and are therefore unjustified
(Brighouse, 2000: 147). Furthermore, state intervention in education may be
necessary, among other reasons, exactly in order to enact this principle.
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Now, as Brighouse points out, Tooley's interpretation of Rawls' theory assumes that
fair equality of opportunity is mitigated by the difference principle, i.e. by the idea
that inequalities should benefit the least-advantaged in society. Further, Tooley
maintains that the difference principle is actually unjustified within Rawls's theory
and that inequalities should be acceptable not in the strict sense of being only for
the benefit of the least advantaged in society, but in the sense of providing a
minimum, an adequate level to the least favoured (Brighouse, 2000: 148).
Consequently, Tooley maintains that justice requires an adequate minimum
education, and that the principle of educational equality is indeed misplaced.
However, as seen in Rawls's restatement of his principles of justice, and as
Brighouse concludes in counter-arguing Tooley's interpretation, the latter is based
on an incorrect understanding of Rawls' theory. This clearly stipulates that the
principle of fair equality of opportunity constrains the possible inequalities benefiting
the least advantaged persons in society, and not the opposite. Ultimately, the
upshot of the discussion is that inferring, as Tooley does with regard to Rawls's
theory, that justice requires a minimum adequate education for all is theoretically
incorrect and normatively unjustified. It follows, therefore, that educational equality
is not the misplaced ideal claimed by Tooley and its normative validity is vindicated
(Brighouse, 2000: 149). Furthermore, and consequently, the presumed unjustified
intervention of the state in education is indeed legitimate exactly in order to enact
the principle.
I shall not take this discussion any further here, since what is important to note is
that the principle of educational equality withstands this second possible objection,
and that, contra Tooley, when referring to equality in education we are not
endorsing a notion of sufficiency or adequacy. I now turn my analysis to the
differences between supporting a minimum adequate education for all, and
suggesting a possible conceptualisation of educational equality based on equal
effective access to fundamental capabilities. This seems an important step at this
stage, because the framework I suggest theorises a threshold level of fundamental
capabilities, which can be seen as an adequacy criterion. What, therefore, are the
differences between the two positions?
The first, obvious difference consists in the normative framework within which the
two positions are inscribed. As we have seen, Tooley's perspective of a minimum
adequate education for all is not underpinned by a consistent theory of justice, nor is
it concerned primarily with equality. It appears more in line with the libertarian
212
critique of egalitarian approaches, maintaining that egalitarians transfer too much
power from the individual to the state. This seems consistent with Tooley's
insistence on the unnecessary intervention of the state in education, and his
proposal of educational provision to be left to parental means and not insulated from
the family (Tooley, 2000: 80). This links to the second main difference between the
two approaches. The minimum adequate education for all endorsed by Tooley, in
denying equality of opportunity and the necessary separateness of educational
opportunities from family endowments and circumstances, allows for substantial
inequalities to be reinforced through education. Recall here that education is a
complex good, which yields not only an intrinsic but also and importantly an
instrumental value, in that it allows for better future opportunities and life prospects.
The point of equality of opportunity and its defence within the Rawlsian scheme is
exactly to impose constrains to material inequalities, given that the family is
excluded from the principles governing the basic structures of society, and to ensure
that individuals are not unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged by family
circumstances. Tooley's minimum adequate education for all is therefore not
adequate at all, since it leaves the educational provision under-specified, and, in
connecting the provision of education to family circumstances, de facto legitimates
inequality. Conversely, the principled framework for equal educational opportunities
and access to fundamental capabilities I suggest, although implying a threshold
level of achieved functionings, links the threshold to the effective equal opportunities
and access to it, and hence safeguarding conditions for equality. In this sense, the
framework I propose presents an aspect of adequacy with respect to the level of
fundamental capabilities to be achieved. However, the conception of a minimum
adequate education I defend is more substantive than Tooley's, since it includes
explicit criteria that articulate equality of opportunities for fundamental educational
functionings. Ultimately, it attempts to promote and defend equality.
There is, finally, a further aspect implied by, yet not explicit in Tooley's objection,
that is the possible provision for disabled children and children with special
educational needs. Tooley does not specifically consider this provision hence we
need to extend his perspective to include it. Presumably, therefore, according to
Tooley, children with learning difficulties should receive a minimum adequate
education, provided by the state if they are extremely poor, or by their parents in all
other cases. Beyond that, their education should be left to parental choice, and
parents should be allowed to choose among different educational options in a
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market system. Is this an adequate provision? I maintain that it is not, and that there
are at least two kinds of problems connected to it. The first relates to the possible
specification of what the adequate education for children with learning difficulties
would be. Would it be the same minimum education for all, or a specific minimum
education? But we can bypass this problem and simply suppose it would be the
same education for all. However, then the question arises with respect to the
possible costs associated with the education of children with learning difficulties.
This cost might be higher than the one for educating non-disabled learners, due, for
instance, to extended learning time. Should the family be expected to provide for
this? Or should it be expected to do so beyond the minimum adequate education?
Furthermore, recent empirical research shows the possible negative results for the
education of disabled children and children with special educational needs
associated to the introduction of quasi-market mechanisms in the schooling
system76 Hence, further problems seem to arise. For instance, how could the
element of resource cost-effectiveness be considered in relation to this provision
and in order for private institutions to act competitively, as they are supposed to do
in a market structure? Tooley's perspective does not appear to provide any
guidance in the case of the educational provision for disabled children and children
with special educational needs. Consequently, his suggestion of a minimum
adequate education fails to be convincing under this respect, too.
Ultimately, educational equality withstands this second objection, and seems to
provide a valid principle upon which to reconsider not only general provision but
also special and inclusive educational provision. In the third and final section of this
chapter I address a further objection to the concept of equality as distributional
ideal. This is the critique of the lack of attention that theories of distributive justice,
including the capability approach, give to equal recognition and parity in
participation.
8.3 Is Educational Equality Unable to Account for Equal Recognition?
Recent perspectives on justice have questioned the egalitarian concern for issues of
distribution as the best enactment of the ideal of equality, and have proposed
instead views based on the positive definition of differences. In particular, the
76 See chapter 2, pp. 44-47.
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celebrated politics of difference maintains that institutional arrangements should
provide 'mechanisms for the effective recognition of the distinct voices' of oppressed
and marginalized groups in society: ethnic, 'racial' and sexual minorities, women
and disabled people (Young, 1990:184). Progressively, these perspectives have
been juxtaposed to egalitarian theories of social justice promoting equality as a
distributive ideal.
Nancy Fraser challenges this polarisation between redistribution and recognition by
arguing that it is not only a false antithesis, but also that 'justice today requires both
redistribution and recognition, since neither alone is sufficient' (Fraser, 1998: 5).
Fraser maintains that theories of distributive justice are unable to account for issues
of recognition. Conversely, she holds that theories of recognition are unable to
accommodate issues of redistribution. To overcome what she maintains is a false
opposition, Fraser proposes a 'bivalent' conception of justice, which encompasses
both concerns, without, she says, reducing either of them to the other. The
normative core of her framework is the notion of parity of participation, which
'requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact
with one another as peers' (1998: 30). According to Fraser, two conditions are
necessary for participatory parity to be accomplished: an objective precondition,
which states that material resources should be distributed to ensure individuals
independence and 'voice'; and an intersubjective condition, stipulating that cultural
and social arrangements should express equal respect for all and ensure equal
opportunity for achieving self esteem (Fraser, 1998: 31). Ultimately, the main aim of
'bivalent' justice is to avoid unilateral views, and to address the complex nature of
inequalities both from 'distributive' and 'recognition' positions.
In this section I engage with Fraser's critique of distributive theories of justice As
mentioned above, Fraser maintains that these theories, by concentrating uniquely
on economic and material equality, fail to account for the fundamental aspect of the
social and cultural recognition of disadvantaged and marginalized groups in society.
Furthermore, she holds that the theoretical framework of these theories is unable to
subsume aspects of recognition. Although Fraser does not refer specifically to a
single theory, nor does she explicitly list any of the authors she is addressing, from
footnotes and references it can be inferred that her critique is directed to John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Amartya Sen (Robeyns, 2003: 540). As Robeyns notes
77 This aspect of my critique draws consistently on Robeyns, 2003, 'Is Nancy Fraser's Critique of
Theories of Distributive Justice Justified?' in Constellation, 10 (4), 538-553.
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(2003: 540), it is unfortunate that Fraser does not provide a clear distinction
between these otherwise quite different theories, but deals with them
comprehensively, thus substantially limiting the validity of her account.
Nevertheless, if sustained, the suggestion that the critiqued theories, and in
particular that of Sen, cannot accommodate issues of recognition would
substantially question the conceptualisation of educational equality presented in my
work. More specifically, it would lead to the undermining of the normative reach of
the framework and its importance in informing policy and practice towards social
justice in education for disabled learners. Fraser's critique, moreover, appears
fundamentally in line with social model theorists, who have long demanded the
valorisation of all differences in society, as well as in education78. Hence Fraser's
assertion is even further enhanced by this convergence with positions expressed by
disabled people's movements and proponents of educational perspectives based on
the social model of disability.
But is Fraser's critique of distributive theories of justice sustained? Is it really the
case that egalitarian perspectives fail to accommodate the recognition of differences
by focussing only on economic and material inequalities? Following Robeyns (2003)
I maintain that Fraser's objection is incorrect, and that her claims do not pay
sufficient attention to different perspectives within the egalitarian debate, and 'are
simply stated without much supporting evidence or argument' 79 (2003: 540). In
particular, I argue that among distributive theories, the capability approach provides
a normative framework that not only includes both redistribution and recognition, but
also presents a wide theoretical reach able to legitimate justice for the
underrepresented groups which are the concern of the politics of difference. Let us
see how.
The one distinctive element that makes the capability approach able to account for
justice in terms of redistribution and recognition is its attention to human diversity
and the centrality accorded to it within the approach. Recall here that, according to
Sen, human heterogeneity is not a secondary aspect to be reintroduced a posteriori
in a given theory of justice, but constitutes the main concern of equality.
Furthermore, central in Sen's view is people's conversion factors of resources into
valued ends. This encompasses, together with personal differences, also
78 See previous chapters, and, specifically chapters 3 and 4.
79 In what follows I concentrate only on Sen's approach, whilst leaving the analysis of Rawis's and
Dworkin's positions to further investigations.
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environmental and social elements. Hence the impact of individual, social,
environmental and cultural factors on a person's set of capabilities, is fundamental
for the evaluation of people's relative positions and their advantages or
disadvantages in terms of justice. The centrality of human diversity in the capability
approach, and its clear definition, make the approach sensitive to the
reconsideration of differences associated to disability or gender, for instance.
Moreover, differences are here evaluated in their interaction with social and cultural
arrangements, thus leading to a perspective that does not undermine diversity as an
individual limitation with respect to given ideas of 'normality'.
There is, furthermore, a second element that restates the wide reach of the
capability approach in accounting for both dimensions of justice: the attention to the
process of decision making and selection with respect to individuals' valuable
capabilities. Recall here that, according to Sen, democratic processes of choice
should be followed for the selection of people's relevant capabilities, thus requiring
the direct participation of those affected by the choice in the process. In this sense,
the approach substantially theorises a space for the individual and collective
expression of people's voices, and hence it allows for the element of recognition to
be included. Furthermore, the approach is also sensitive 'to the cultural and non-
material social constraints on choice that influence which option a person will
choose from their capability set' (Robeyns, 2003: 547) and requires critical
examination of them, too. As Robeyns states, within the capability approach,
'preference formation, socialisation, subtle forms of discrimination and the impact of
social and moral norms are not taken for granted but analysed up-front' (Robeyns,
2003: 547).
To illustrate these aspects, let us recall in which ways the capability approach
allows us, for instance, to reconsider impairment, disability and special educational
needs and how this has an impact on both redistribution and recognition.
Seen within the capability approach, disability and special educational needs are
specific aspects of human diversity emerging from the interaction of individual and
social factors. Since they affect people's valuable functionings and capabilities,
disability and special needs constitute vertical inequalities, and as such, they have
to be addressed as a matter of justice. The capability approach emphasises the
interrelational aspect of disability and special needs with the design of social and
institutional arrangements, thus not locating either of them unilaterally on the
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individual or on society. Furthermore, the approach is concerned with enlarging
people's capability sets, and hence their capability to choose valued beings and
doings. In this sense, the approach provides us with a useful framework when we
want to address the injustice, both material and of recognition, associated with
disability and special needs. For instance, in evaluating the capability set of a
wheelchair user, the capability approach would consider how the personal
characteristics of the individual interacts with the design of social and environmental
arrangements. In this sense the approach legitimates the additional resources or
modifications to the environmental and social design necessary for the full
participation of the person in society. Furthermore, the approach considers the
cultural and non-material social constraints that can hinder the choice, or the
broadening of the capability sets, available to the person. Negative images and
forms of discrimination could therefore be seen as compromising elements for the
pursuit of individuals' well-being. Finally, the capability approach requires that the
voice of wheelchair users in the selection of their relevant capability be a necessary
part of the democratic process of policy making, thus allowing and requiring the
possibility of effective participation as equals in society.
Ultimately, the theoretical and normative features of the capability approach
restated above confirm, contra Fraser, that the approach can, and indeed does,
accommodate issues of distribution and recognition in substantial and broad ways,
thus vindicating it against her claims. However, before drawing this discussion to its
conclusion, a further aspect needs addressing, although only briefly. This concerns
the ways in which both redistribution and recognition can be shown as informing the
principled framework for a just distribution of educational opportunities to disabled
learners that I have formulated in my work. Here again, the two aspects appear both
present in the framework. Recall that the framework requires equality of effective
opportunity and access to the fundamental capabilities necessary to participate as
equals in society and draws a threshold level of achieved functionings, beyond
which the distribution follows specified principles. Hence, the distributional aspect of
justice of the framework is ensured by its allowing for additional resources to be
distributed to disabled learners as a matter of justice. Second, the aspect of
recognition is allowed by the choice of the fundamental capabilities and their aim of
promoting people's possibility to effectively participate in society on an equal level.
Correlated to these aspects, the kind of education that appears more conducive to
these aims seems to be a form of education for autonomy, which, if not in itself a
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guarantee of equal opportunity for self-esteem, constitutes nevertheless one of its
necessary requirements. And these final elements show that Fraser's concern about
the inability of the capability approach to accommodate justice as distribution and
recognition is not sustained.
Concluding Comments
In this chapter I have shown that three main objections to educational equality
substantially fail in their intent of arguing against it as a valid and important ideal
that should guide the design of educational policies and practice. More specifically, I
have demonstrated that educational equality, in terms of equality of opportunity, is
not an incoherent ideal and that its specification as equality of resources does
indeed make sense in education. Furthermore, I have argued against the idea that
educational resources should be distributed only to those who can make the best
use of them, and proved that such a position misinterprets the aim of distributive
justice and overlooks its normative and ethical dimensions. Secondly, I have argued
against Tooley's notion of a minimum adequate education for all and shown that
such an education would constitute an inadequate provision, both generally and for
disabled children and children with special educational needs in particular. Finally, I
have addressed the critique of the lack of attention to issues of recognition through
oftering a specific approach within distributive theories of justice. By demonstrating
that the capability approach encompasses justice both in terms of redistribution and
recognition, I have reaffirmed the theoretical and normative validity of the framework
I am suggesting for equality and justice in education for disabled children and
children with special educational needs. Since the framework withstands these
critiques, it appears a valuable groundwork for educational theory and practice.




In the Introduction to this study I outlined the importance of educational equality as a
fundamental aspect of social justice. I said that equality, although rather under-
researched and under-theorised in education, has a crucial role to play at two
interconnected levels: the level of ideal theory, concerned with conceptualisations
and norms, and the level of policy and practice, related to the enactment of these
ideals in education. I further maintained that educational equality is a vague and
complex idea, and that, whilst its conceptualisation requires a normative framework,
the same framework can provide substantial guidance for the design of more just,
and hence better educational policies. Drawing on the specific theory of educational
equality presented by Brighouse (2000), I argued that one of the most difficult
problems in conceptualising educational equality consists in clarifying its meaning in
relation to the inequalities of learners' abilities, and particularly with respect to the
provision for disabled children and children with special educational needs. I then
suggested that such a meaning resides in a principled framework for a just
distribution of educational opportunities and resources to these children. I therefore
planned this study to outline the main theoretical and normative elements of the
proposed framework. At the same time, I intended to present a possible perspective
in the philosophy of education, by deploying normative paradigms of political
philosophy and applying them to the context of education. The task set out in the
Introduction is now accomplished. However, many aspects of the principled
framework I suggest, as well as several methodological elements emerging from my
work, remain to be addressed. In these concluding comments I summarize the main
elements of the principled framework outlined. I then highlight some features of the
theoretical and methodological exercise undertaken. Finally, and more importantly,
I critically present and address issues for further analysis and theorisation. First, the
framework suggested.
9.1 On the Principled Framework
The current educational provision for disabled children and children with special
educational needs in many Western countries is characterised by a variety of
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organisational settings, which include special schools, integrated contexts, and
'more inclusive' provision. Variations are also present at the level of definitions used
to identify and classify children, with systems still adopting categories of disability
mainly referred to medical and psychological concepts, and others adopting instead
broader notions of 'special educational needs'. Likewise, the funding of special and
inclusive education sees pervasive inequalities and great disparities in the
resources allocated for the education of these children. This situation reflects, and in
turn is reflected in the diversity of theoretical positions informing the debate as well
as the policy and practice in special and inclusive education. These perspectives
are characterised by opposing theoretical frameworks, and by the divide between
positions emphasising disability and learning difficulties seen as individual
characteristics, and positions highlighting instead disability as socially determined.
Both frameworks present substantial theoretical limits, which reside mainly in the
artificial opposition between individual and social causal factors of disability and
special educational needs. In particular, the social model of disability, endorsed by
disabled people's movements and currently broadly influencing government acts
and the design of educational policies, presents limits that substantially hinder the
theoretical and political feasibility of its project of inclusion.
The analysis of this situation confirms the need for a principled framework informing
and guiding the distribution of resources and the more general design of the
educational provision for disabled children and children with special educational
needs. It furthermore confirms the necessity of conceptualising such a framework at
two interrelated levels: a theoretical level, concerned with defining impairment,
disability and special educational needs, and a level of provision, which
conceptualises educational equality in relation to differences and inequalities in
learners' abilities.
I maintain that liberal egalitarianism offers a valuable normative ground where some
of the tensions at the core of special and inclusive education may find a positive
resolution. In particular, within liberal egalitarianism, the capability approach
provides us with an important and innovative perspective that allows for a re-
conceptualisation of impairment, disability and special educational needs as well as
educational equality for disabled learners. The capability approach maintains that
equality and the just design of social and institutional arrangements should be
evaluated in the space of capabilities, i.e. in the space of the real freedoms people
have to be and to do what they value. Hence this approach provides a metric for the
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evaluation of people's reciprocal position based on the extent of people's freedom to
achieve valuable capabilities.
The conceptualisation of educational equality I suggest is inscribed in this normative
paradigm and consists in a principled framework for the just distribution of
educational opportunities to disabled learners. The framework includes two parts: a
definitional and a level of provision.
The definitional level - In capability terms, impairment, disability and special
educational needs are seen as emerging from the interrelation between individual
and circumstantial factors. Impairment is understood as a possible functioning
restriction, which may or may not become a disability. Impairment becomes
disability —and hence an achieved functioning restriction - when either the
impairment itself cannot be overcome, or the social and environmental design does
interact with individual features in ways that substantially restrict functionings.
Disability entails functionings restrictions and therefore results in capabilities
limitations. Likewise, learning disabilities are restricted functionings that result from
the relation between specific characteristics of the learner and the design of the
educational system. Evaluated through a capability metric, these restrictions in
functionings and capabilities constitute vertical inequalities, and, as such, they have
to be addressed as a matter of justice.
The level of provision consists in a principled framework for a just distribution of
opportunities and resources for educational capabilities. This framework entails the
conceptualisation of a fundamental educational entitlement and two criteria. A
fundamental educational entitlement requires equal opportunities and equal
effective access to levels of educational capabilities necessary to individuals to
participate as equals in society. It follows that disabled children and children with
special needs should receive educational opportunities and resources required to
allow them to achieve the basic educational functionings that are prerequisite for an
effective participation in society. This first criterion legitimates the additional
resources and opportunities for disabled learners as a requirement of justice. It
further sets a threshold level where the distribution of opportunities and resources
should be levered. This corresponds to the level of functioning necessary to
individuals to be effective and equal participants in their dominant social framework.
The second criterion applies considerations of efficiency to the distribution of
opportunities and resources in education. It asserts that beyond the level of
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fundamental capabilities necessary for an effective participation in society,
opportunities and resources for higher educational capabilities should be distributed
in ways that allow the achievement of more capable learners, providing that this
serves the prospective benefit of those less capable, and therefore least
advantaged within the institutional arrangements considered.
Whilst this principled framework does not constitute a theory of educational equality,
it nevertheless provides a feasible answer to the difficult problem of determining
what distribution of opportunities and resources is just for disabled learners.
Furthermore, the framework provides the groundwork upon which to design
educational policies aimed at equality. Since this framework is arrived at through a
specific philosophical method, a few considerations on the latter are now due.
9.2 On the Theoretical Exercise Outlined
This study connects the normative, ideal level of political philosophy to the
normative level of education. It clarifies what educational equality ought to be in
relation to the provision for disabled children and children with special educational
needs. Whilst specifying a precise account and meaning of educational equality, this
study provides a normative groundwork for the design of policies that are more just,
as well as for evaluating the fairness of current policies.
In connecting the normative aspect of political philosophy with that of education, my
work can be read as an exercise in the exploration of a particular perspective within
philosophy of education. This perspective consists in an articulated theory that,
whilst considering what principles should guide the design and the reform of
educational institutions, and hence whilst providing a normative ground, is at the
same time informed by the more empirical and practice-based framework of
educational theory and policy. In this sense this perspective in the philosophy of
education draws on the interrelation between philosophical argumentation and
educational issues. It adopts the standard methodologies of analytical political
philosophy embodied in the Rawlsian notion of 'reflective equilibrium' and applies
them to educational theory. Reflective equilibrium consists in proposing normative
principles, testing them against well-grounded intuitions, and adjudicating the
conflicts between principles and intuitions when they arise. The result is a precise
and defensible normative account of principles that can provide guidance for
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educational policy and practice. Hence a critical perspective developed in this way
could help educationists, policy analysts and policy makers to understand and more
clearly articulate their objectives and frameworks for actions.
There are, however, numerous tensions in the role and the process I advocate here
for philosophy of education in relation to educational policy and practice
(McLaughlin, 2000). And whilst the exploration of these tensions is beyond the
scope of this work, it is nevertheless worth indicating at least two of them. First,
tensions may arise between some of the 'non-instrumental aspects of philosophical
exploration' and the more technical and practical task of policy making (McLaughlin,
2000: 451). In this sense, the elucidation of the meaning of educational equality for
disabled children and children with special educational needs may not result in a
straightforward process of decision-making with respect to policy. Second, tensions
can arise in relation to the constructive critique offered by philosophical arguments,
for instance those I applied to the current policies in special and inclusive education,
and the more 'decisional' aspect involved in drawing feasible policies. Again, the
relation between philosophical argumentation and practical realisation is not a
straightforward and linear one.
However, despite these possible tensions, a clear theorisation of principles plays
the significant role of providing guidance for the design and reform of social
institutions and the judgement of whether a policy is good or bad (Brighouse, 2001:
1). It is not a philosopher's task to decide what policy reforms and policy-making will
enact specific principles and achieve valuable outcomes, but to outline compelling
arguments for these principles and outcomes and elucidate their interpretations.
Ultimately, therefore, this is the precise and defensible role for the perspective in
philosophy of education that I have deployed in this study.
9.3 Issues for Further Exploration
The conceptualisation of educational equality for disabled children and children with
special educational needs I suggest does not constitute a theory of educational
equality, nor a fully fleshed out account of justice in education for these children.
There are numerous aspects of this perspective that need further analysis and
significantly more substantive thinking. I shall outline here some of the most
compelling tasks still to be addressed.
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First, there are normative aspects. More specifically, what theoretical and normative
elements should be developed in order to provide a fuller theory of justice in
education for disabled learners? Furthermore, what role would educational equality
play in such a theory of justice? There are three main elements that need to be
addressed in relation to the questions posed above. The first relates to the attention
that a theory should devote to a more precise conceptualisation of the entire design
of the institutional framework within which educational arrangements are operating.
What would constitute the best design of the social and institutional framework in
which this notion of educational equality could be inscribed? This first element
relates substantially to the second one, which concerns specifying exactly the
relationship between justice in education and social justice. Exploring this aspect
requires elucidating the role of educational equality for a theory of justice. Finally,
and importantly, further analysis should be devoted to the fundamental implications
for justice deriving from a conceptualisation of equality that invokes an adequacy
criterion in the form of a threshold level of fundamental capabilities. Here the
analysis extends to the broader debate on equality and social justice and to the role
that the capability approach can play in such a debate.
Second, there are theoretical and normative issues specific to the debate in special
and inclusive education that need further analysis. The framework I suggest leaves
open the fundamental question of conceptualising inclusive education for disabled
children and children with special educational needs. Strictly related to the level of
provision suggested, this issue is central not only to policy and practice in
education, but also to any theory of justice for disabled learners. More specifically,
the questions to be addressed relate to the enactment of ideals of equality and the
design of schooling settings that are the best implementation of the ideal. Re-
examining the concept of inclusion through the capability approach helps in
clarifying the arguments that might support specific designs of inclusive settings in
relation to the expansions of disabled children's capabilities. The strong
consequential structure underpinning the capability approach allows for a
reconsideration of the arguments in support or against inclusive settings whilst
maintaining the aim of children's well-being firmly in sight.
Finally, the actual operationalisation of this study is a matter of further investigation.
Future analysis should therefore address the implications of applying the capability
approach to the context of education. Although the approach has promising
theoretical and normative insights for education, its operationalisation in education
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is still at a preliminary stage. In particular, there are two important aspects that need
researching. The first concerns the possible conceptualisation of education in terms
of capability, or, more precisely, as a basic capability, and the identifications of what
capabilities are fundamental in education. My study has presented a very tentative
and initial account of education as basic capability, and hence the subject needs
further exploration. Second, ideas and formulations for current and future policies in
special and inclusive education should be explored in more detail. More specifically,
further studies should address what sets of educational indicators, drawn on the
capability framework on disability and special educational needs, are relevant to a
just differential provision in education and how they can inform policy. This would
represent also an implementation of the normative framework I suggest in this
thesis, thus allowing for the enactment of the fundamental value of equality and
justice for disabled learners in the policy and practice of education.
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